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BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (ILLINOIS)  
24 June 1979

## forum-

### Former CIA official says we can verify treaty terms

Dear Editor,

The News-Democrat was quite correct in its recent editorial entitled, "SALT may be difficult to sell," when it said that "verification of the SALT II treaty is and should be a key issue in the Senate ratification debate."

The dangers of nuclear weapons are too great to depend on trusting the Russians. But, fortunately, we do not have to, even with the loss of our intelligence posts in Iran.

The Iran bases were important sites for collecting data on Soviet ICBMs because they were only 600 miles from their Tyuratam test launch area. But, this data was not essential for ensuring that we could carry out timely detection of the provisions of the SALT II treaty which could affect significantly our security. We have alternate redundant methods of doing this.

1. The basic SALT ceilings on strategic delivery vehicles do not rely on Iran for verification. They are monitored by reconnaissance satellites legalized and guaranteed against interference and concealment by the terms of the treaty.

2. The limits on MIRVed missiles and number of warheads per missile can be verified primarily by our extensive intelligence capabilities at the re-entry end of the Soviet test range. There we have radars, cameras, and many other sensors on land, on ships and on aircrafts which can detect, count and even weigh the incoming re-entry vehicles and warheads. The deployment phases

of MIRVs occur at such high altitudes that we can monitor this from far beyond Iran. Satellites can watch and identify the missiles as they are brought to the test launcher before firing.

3. Limits on new ballistic missiles also can be monitored satisfactorily without the Iranian posts although these would have provided us more detail and redundancy. However, the Soviets could not test a significantly new missile, as defined by the treaty, without running a very high risk of being caught.

We should replace our lost intelligence capabilities as fast as possible but satisfactory verification does not depend on this.

Such replacement would be more important in the absence of the treaty since that agreement provides many means of determining the nature and the extent of the Soviet strategic threat.

Herbert Scoville Jr.,  
former Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
and former Assistant Director  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
McLean, Va.

8 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-3

# Backfire Apt To Be Big in SALT Debate

By Robert G. Kaiser and Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writers

In December 1974, on a plane carrying President Ford and his party to Tokyo from the Vladivostok summit, Henry A. Kissinger gave one of his famous background briefings to reporters.

The subject was the new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT), tentatively achieved at Vladivostok, and Kissinger was asked if the Soviets' Backfire bomber would be covered by the new accord.

No, Kissinger replied, Backfire had not been mentioned at Vladivostok, so it would not be covered by the overall limits agreed to there on the two superpowers' strategic weapons.

In effect, Kissinger said Backfire was a medium-range, not a long-range strategic bomber.

Almost immediately Kissinger decided this was too definitive a statement. Copies of the transcript of that background briefing were withdrawn, and the State Department said they would be unavailable.

As it turned out, that Kissinger backgrounder baptized the Backfire as a new SALT issue. Previously, the swing-wing, supersonic bomber had provoked heated debate inside the U.S. government and some public comment, but only after Vladivostok did the plane become a point of serious public controversy.

When the formal SALT II debate begins Monday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Backfire is likely to be one of three substantive issues that gets the most attention. (The other two are verification and the Soviets' 300 "heavy" supermissiles.)

Numerous critics of SALT II and some uncommitted senators have asked publicly how a bomber that everyone agrees could be used against the United States could have been excluded from the numerical limits of the new treaty.

The answer to that question amounts to an encapsulated account of the delicate combination of winks and compromises that produced the SALT II agreement. The Carter administration is confident that it can satisfy senators that the Backfire can safely be left outside of SALT, but some of the treaty's opponents are confident that the Backfire will be a potent argument for amending or rejecting the pact.

The first Backfire (the designation is NATO's) was flight-tested in 1969. A modified version appeared soon after, and went into production. In 1974 the plane came into service. It is used by both the Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Navy.

From the beginning Backfire has divided American intelligence analysts. In the mid-

1970s, according to a senior government official at the time, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA produced widely differing estimates of the Backfire's range, so different that the White House had to order the two to produce a figure or figures on which they could agree.

To this day U.S. intelligence on the Backfire—the Soviets call it a TU22M—is not as good as officials would like. According to informed sources, the United States knows a good deal more about the Soviets' principal missile systems than it does about Backfire.

On one point there is no debate: at present, the Backfire is deployed as a "theater" weapon, for potential use in Europe and China, and as a sea-patrol aircraft. Nothing in its history so far, the way the plane is based, the training missions it flies, and so on, suggests that the Soviets envision using it against the United States.

But airplanes are flexible weapons, and theoretically at least, the Soviets would have little difficulty altering the Backfire's mission.

When used for short and medium-range missions, the Backfire can fly supersonically and at low altitudes. But flying that way consumes fuel rapidly. To reach the continental United States, the plane would have to fly at a high altitude and a relatively slow speed. On the other hand, if a Backfire were refueled in flight, a theoretical possibility, it could fly lower and faster on a mission to the United States.

The Backfire is clearly a lesser plane than the bombers that are counted under SALT, but nevertheless it shares an ability to strike the United States. This is the essence of the Backfire ambiguity.

However, it is not the only ambiguous weapon in this picture. The U.S. F111 and

FB111 swing-wing planes also raise questions. Sixty-six FB111s armed with thermonuclear bombs and based in Portsmouth, N.H., and Plattsburgh, N.Y., are part of the Strategic Air Command force targeted against the Soviet Union. With one in-flight refueling, these planes can strike targets throughout European Russia, and that is their principal mission today.

These FB111s are not counted under the SALT treaty's limits.

In addition, the United States maintains about 350 F111s, slightly less capable planes, 160 of which are based in Britain, and targeted against the U.S.S.R. The other FB111s based in the United States could be moved to Britain to join those 160 in a crisis. Flying from British bases, the F111s can hit targets over most of the Soviet Union.

The F111s also are not counted under SALT II.

The Soviets now have 150 Backfires, and are producing them at a rate of 30 a month. At the Vienna summit Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev assured President Carter that this rate would remain constant.

In a formal note, the Soviets pledged not to "increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the U.S.A." This phraseology is ambiguous, since the term "radius of action" suggests round-trip missions, and even U.S. bombers aren't programmed to return home from an attack on the U.S.S.R.

At Vienna also the United States said it would regard any Soviet effort to improve the Backfire's capabilities as inconsistent with the assurances the Soviets gave. But the Soviets said they would not be bound by any such unilateral American statement. The two sides agreed to disagree on that point.

During the SALT II negotiations, the two superpowers did not arrive at an agreed definition of a "heavy bomber," though they did agree that such bombers should be counted under the overall limitations.

In practice this means that Soviet Bison and Bear bombers, both 1950s vintage, and U.S. B52s and B1s are counted. The Backfire is smaller than all four of these. The FB111 is smaller still.

There has been a series of American gambits during the negotiations to somehow count or account for the Backfire in SALT. The Soviets have agreed to talk about the matter, but only once showed any willingness to incorporate a limit on Backfire into a SALT pact.

That one instance was in early 1976, according to Gerald R. Ford's recently published memoirs. The Soviets showed interest in a proposal advanced by Kissinger that would have limited the Soviets to 275 Backfires by 1981, and would also have put restrictions on the plane's "deployment and operations."

In return, the United States offered to abandon submarine-based, long-range, cruise missiles, a type of weapon not yet in use.

That Kissinger proposal foundered when Ford decided he could not afford to make a SALT agreement during the 1976 primaries, when Ronald Reagan was peppering him from the right wing. But the limits on Backfire it included were modest in any event.

Since early 1975 American officials have seen Backfire as a bargaining chip that could be used to protect American cruise missiles, the newest type of strategic weapon and one the Soviets have not yet matched. SALT II does permit the United States to proceed with deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and development of other types, and administration officials sometimes argue that leaving Backfire uncounted helped make this possible.

Carter administration officials also argue that leaving Backfire out of the SALT II limitations was the price the United States had to pay to leave out American "forward-based systems" and the French and British nuclear forces. The forward-based systems, bombers stationed

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in Europe and on U.S. carriers, give the United States thousands of nuclear bombs that can be used against Soviet targets but aren't counted in SALT.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and some other elements inside the American bureaucracy have argued repeatedly that, if Backfire has the capability to attack the United States, it should be counted in SALT.

But more than once the JCS has approved SALT proposals that left the plane uncounted, in return for other provisions they thought would balance Backfire.

The JCS signed off on the Carter administration's March 1977 "comprehensive" SALT proposal, later rejected by the Soviets, and they have signed off on the new SALT II treaty, both of which excluded Backfire.

Some critics of SALT II argue that the Backfire issue has symbolic importance beyond its substance. They contend that excluding the Backfire from SALT limits amounts to a one-sided concession to the Soviet Union in a treaty that is supposed to provide equality.

Defenders of the Backfire arrangement respond that the treaty also permits the United States to do things the Soviets can't match.

And beyond that, the practical aspects of Backfire cannot be ignored. Specifically, they argue, a Backfire attack against the United States would take 10 hours from takeoff to bombs-away, a fact that makes the bomber irrelevant to the initial phase of a nuclear war.



# -The Battle Over Verification-

*The struggle over ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union turns in part on how well Soviet compliance can be verified. Paul R. Bennett, who thinks it can, is an arms control specialist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Charles M. Kupperman, who does not, is a defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger.*

IT WOULD be utterly foolish and tremendously dangerous to rely on "the honor system" for enforcement of SALT II. Fortunately, we don't have to trust the Russians, because today's sophisticated military satellites, radars, signal reception gear and computers can probe deep into the interior of the Soviet Union and detect any significant violation.

Take SALT's overall ceilings, for example. Since our huge satellite cameras can capture details as small as a golf ball, the Soviets have virtually no chance of building illegal missile silos, submarines or bombers without detection. Nor could they slip extra Backfires or forbidden silo reload equipment past our view. Certainly the Soviet Union stretches across vast territory, but American satellites pass over every inch of it every day.

Camouflage won't help either. Special multi-color image techniques and computerized picture enhance-

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By Paul R. Bennett

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ment would reveal any hidden facilities. Efforts to conceal would themselves constitute violations of the treaty.

In fact, launcher verification by satellite is so good that SALT critics generally skip over the subject entirely and go directly to other concerns: Can we determine the number of missiles equipped with multiple warheads ("MIRVs" in SALT jargon)? Can we count the MIRVs atop a particular missile?

Yes we can, during the two dozen test flights every Soviet missile goes through to attain combat reliability. Anything shot up in these tests falls to earth within easy range of what is probably the world's most sophisticated radar, at Shemya Air Force Base in the Aleutian Islands. A Soviet basketball couldn't get past this device, which is supplemented by planes and ships in the vicinity.

Under SALT rules, "blank shots" (Like those included in several Soviet SS-18 missile tests) count as the real thing. Aiming and shooting maneuvers of a warhead carrier, tracked by our powerful radar in Turkey and signaled by intercepted telemetry, count even if no warhead is actually released.

Assume a test missile carried MIRVs. Prior to liftoff, American satellite cameras photographed its launcher (silo or submarine tube). All other launchers of the same design count as MIRV launchers. Non-MIRV look-alikes of these launchers are banned. These rules leave the Soviets no way to secretly add illegal MIRVed missiles.

All this should give some perspective on the loss of our Iran monitoring stations. Radar and listening equipment there followed Soviet missile tests at low altitudes, providing important tip-offs to new missile developments restricted by SALT. Similar facilities in Turkey fail to pick up certain valuable data, because they are older and farther away.

Where does that leave us? Satellite photographs still reveal the dimensions of test missiles. Our Aleutian radar tracks descending warheads, allowing us to calculate missile throw-weight. The bases in Turkey, radars elsewhere and heat-sensing satellites watch the ascent of test flights. But the certainty of several measurements is less without Iran.

We can quickly compensate for the loss by improving our facilities in

Turkey, by sending in specially equipped U-2 planes to follow missile tests, and/or by launching sounding rockets to shadow those tests. Ultimately, we can orbit enough electronic intelligence satellites to eliminate dependence on ground stations for launch monitoring. These steps will maintain the total monitoring capability necessary to SALT verification.

That brings us to the cruise missile, the favorite straw man of SALT verification critics. Sure, the small size of these precision-guided drones makes them difficult to verify. But the Soviets lag so far behind in cruise missile development that they couldn't reach illegal levels before the treaty expires anyway. The United States accepted cruise missile limits because in return the Soviets agreed to a ceiling on MIRVed land-based missiles (their most threatening weapons) and to a freeze on warheads per missile (the payload of their most threatening weapons). These crucial restrictions can be confidently verified, as described above.

So why does everyone think the United States cannot monitor SALT? I suggest that SALT opponents have successfully exploited this technical issue by scaring the public with sensational charges. Somewhat excessive secrecy restrictions have prevented a credible Administration response. It's a clever tactic for defeating the treaty, but not one that serves the security interests of America in the nuclear age.

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PRESIDENT Carter has stated repeatedly that the SALT II treaty "will be verifiable" because "we have very sophisticated proven means—including our satellites—to determine for ourselves whether the Soviet Union is meeting its treaty obligations." Such words fail to place the issue of verification in the proper perspective: That SALT II, far from

By Charles M. Kupperman

being verifiable, is a bad agreement on both strategic and political grounds, and a bad agreement does not cease to be a bad agreement by being wholly verifiable.

Not only does SALT II limit the wrong things, the United States has little capability to verify Soviet compliance with the critical terms of SALT II limits. Soviet violations of both the letter and the spirit of SALT I and our reluctance to confront the Soviets quickly and resolutely on such matters have set a bad political and strategic precedent for Soviet compliance with SALT II.

Another major source of difficulty is the treaty's language. Definitions of key terms, such as "missile launcher" and "heavy bomber," are extremely weak. In addition, loopholes in the treaty will compound the problem of verification. The limit of one "new type" of ICBM with no limits on new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles is one glaring loophole. The failure to close such loop-

holes permits the Soviet Union to further exploit its "breakout potential" for quickly adding to its strategic capability. Components of the fifth generation of Soviet missiles could be easily retrofitted to Soviet ICBMs currently deployed. Placing the propulsion system of the SS-17 or an improved version in an SS-19 type missile would give the Soviets an ICBM nearly as capable as the heavy SS-18 missile.

While the administration appears to be satisfied with its assertion that "we do not rely on trust or Soviet good faith," provisions covering Soviet cruise missile capabilities and deployments, Soviet encryption of telemetry in missile tests, and the flimsy assurances relating to the Backfire bomber, for example, are based on trusting the Soviets.

Even assuming that the Soviets will neither deliberately conceal activities nor attempt to deceive U.S. intelligence (an analytical leap of faith by the administration of the first order), recent intelligence coups by the Soviet Union—acquisition of the technical manual for the KH-11 satellite (reportedly our most advanced photo reconnaissance satellite) and vital information on other U.S. satellite systems—have severely compromised U.S. verification resources and capabilities. As a consequence, the Soviet Union now knows what U.S. intelligence satellites can see on each pass over the Soviet Union.

Despite the administration's fixation with compromised verification

technology, the fact that the number of Soviet missiles and warheads produced and stockpiled is not limited by SALT should not be forgotten nor that overhead photo reconnaissance cannot peer inside a building, shed, or under canvas, and that it is limited by adverse meteorological conditions.

Regardless of how precise satellite photo reconnaissance becomes, it cannot reveal the range of Soviet cruise missiles or the type of warheads they carry. Verification of Soviet cruise missile deployment inside Backfire bombers will be virtually impossible to detect. Other potential Soviet developments that would be militarily significant and unverifiable include the clandestine deployment of MIRVed or un-MIRVed missiles or deployment of a longer range sea-launched cruise missile on their already large number of cruise missile submarines.

The loss of U.S. intelligence facilities in Iran has virtually eliminated our ability to verify critical qualitative aspects of Soviet missile performance, including the power of Soviet missile boosters, the specific impulse of the propulsion system, and the throwweight of the missile. The proposed stopgap measures simply cannot replace these sites, and when Turkey, a NATO ally, requires Soviet permission to allow American U-2 aircraft the use of Turkish airspace, this indicates how far the strategic balance has shifted against the West.

Finally, verification of the terms of SALT II ultimately rests upon the nature and accuracy of intelligence estimates. The SALT record indicates a rather substantial American error rate in the intelligence estimates of Soviet quantity, quality, and the rate of Soviet strategic improvements. As Walter Lippmann said,

"I do not find much ground for reasonable confidence in a policy which can be successful only if the most optimistic prediction should prove to be true. Surely a sound policy must be addressed to the worst and hardest that may be judged to be probable, and not to the best and easiest that may be possible."

After nearly ten years of SALT, such skepticism is long overdue.

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# Russians See SALT's Value As Political

By Henry S. Brandon  
Special to The Washington Star

MOSCOW — Russian officials say the outcome of the SALT II ratification debate will indicate whether Soviet-American relations can move into a phase that will lead to further arms reductions or an era of fiercer arms competition.

The possibility that a Senate rejection of the treaty later this year might coincide with Chairman Leo-

## Kremlin Views

### A Star Special Report

*As the SALT II debate begins today in the U.S. Senate, the Kremlin, too, is watching. The view from there, as recorded in recent days by Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, is one of hope for ratification. But one aside by Kremlin insider Georgi Arbatov suggests a lot about the tone of Russian thinking. He says bluntly: "American senators cannot expect to make the world dance to their tune." This is the report by Brandon, on special assignment for The Washington Star.*

nid I. Brezhnev's physical and political demise is on the minds of Russian officials and many statesmen in the world as are the uncertainties that this could inject into the world situation.

Russian officials, Russian military experts and Western diplomats indicated in interviews that the Soviet leadership attaches more of a political than a military importance to the SALT II treaty. But the Soviets do stress that the treaty includes for the first time qualitative restrictions on weapons and that its ratification could lead to further arms limitation agreements.

The reason for the political importance attached to the treaty is that the Carter-Brezhnev meeting in Vienna and the signing of SALT II is

seen as proof that the basic Nixon-Kissinger detente policy, derailed by the first Carter proposals for SALT II of March 1977, is again the guiding impulse to American policy. Its basic function is to contain the risks of conflict within certain boundaries by negotiated agreements or implicit understandings.

In contrast to the Kremlin, the U.S. Senate puts more emphasis on the military aspects of SALT II. The Russians for this reason have been unusually cooperative in giving a Senate delegation and Sens. Sam Nunn and Robert Byrd access to top military and civilian leaders in order to help President Carter to convince the Senate of the importance and the equal advantages of the SALT II treaty.

There is a barely suppressed resentment by the Russians that after all the long drawn-out negotiation with the Carter administration, the Soviet government in effect is now engaged in another set of negotiations with American senators.

Soviet experts in American affairs, however, seem to have had enough influence to overcome the resentment and to win a better understanding in the Politburo for the American constitutional processes.

### 'A Clearcut Solution'

The Soviets also stress that it is important for the West to understand their foreign policies.

Georgi Arbatov, the director of the Institute for American and Canadian Studies, for instance, put the Soviet position as follows:

"The U.S.S.R. is a great power with its own responsibilities. A situation could develop, say in Southern Africa where we would have no alternative but to aid national liberation movements. We have a clearcut solution, though, to prevent such a situation from developing, which is for the United States to help remove the remnants of colonial rule in Africa.

"It is a great opportunity for the West to strengthen its position in Southern Africa. But American senators cannot expect to make the world dance to their tune. We had some very difficult decisions to take in 1972 when President Nixon decided to bomb Haiphong on the eve of his meeting with Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow.

"Our leadership then had to weigh what was more important in the long run and it decided to hold the summit meeting in spite of this provocation. Whatever might happen on the sidelines of Soviet-American relations, it will be up to the Senate to weigh the importance of SALT II against this and against the fact that it has raised many people's hopes for further positive development."

### 'To Be Or Not To Be'

Valentin Falin, the spokesman for the Central Committee of the Communist Party and former Soviet ambassador to West Germany, put it somewhat differently:

"The SALT II problem is not an emotional one, it is one of common sense. It's a matter of to be or not to be. It cannot be considered in connection with events in other parts of the world."

He and Vitaly Kobyshev, the head of the Department for American Affairs in the Central Committee who sat in on the interview, nevertheless wondered whether some senators, opposed to SALT, might not take advantage of the revolutionary situation that has developed in Nicaragua and blame the Soviet

Union for it though, he stressed, Russia had nothing to do with it.

One of the highly respected Soviet specialists in military affairs praised the SALT agreement for being the first effort to place quantitative and qualitative limits on the missile race. But he warned that unless it is ratified and serves as a bridge to SALT III, the world "will be moving into an increasingly more dangerous phase."

"The arms race is not any more a race to improve weapons, but one that gains its momentum from new technological inventions. This danger is growing because the military and the scientists now look for weapons which are more useable than big missiles to make limited wars more feasible."

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**One Missile Breeds Another**

He said that according to the SALT II treaty the United States had the right to opt for the MX missile with a mobile basing system, but it would be a dangerous development because the idea behind it is that United States now needs a counterforce capability.

"As we all know," this man, a former high military official, argued, "the military are like children. When one child has a new toy the other wants it too. Therefore if the United States proceeds with the MX, our military are bound to tell us that they too find a mobile basing system very attractive. Then it will be our turn to improve the accuracy of our missiles and their invulnerability. This is the natural way. If one side escalates the other follows sooner rather than later. The last 15 years prove it."

Three Russian officials, questioned about the prospects of a shift of priorities from military to civilian production, confirmed independently that no shift would even be contemplated until SALT II is ratified.

**Obstacles to Ratification**

He was emphatic that the Soviet Union is not aiming at military superiority.

He added: "It is impossible for two great powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States to create a situation where one or the other side can achieve superiority. It is not possible even if one tried to gain superiority in one or the other military sector."

It was pointed out that one obstacle to ratification could be the problem of the verification of Soviet missile testing and Soviet unwillingness to give the Turkish government at least tacit approval for overflights by American U-2 planes.

The Soviet officials said it would be psychologically difficult for the Soviet Union to approve the operation of a plane that has such notoriety with the Russian public. They also said that the United States did not really need the U-2 flights for missile test verification but wanted them for other intelligence reasons.

The leading Western ambassadors here, while not necessarily considering Brezhnev a man of peace, believe that he is sincere in his abhorrence of war and that the Soviet government has shown a good deal of restraint in recent months in Africa, the Middle East, Iran and Vietnam.

These Western ambassadors also believe that SALT II is important to the Soviet government because it is symbolic of military equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States. It flatters the Soviet power ego and it also is a useful reminder to China that the Soviet Union has its own special relationship with the United States.

29 June 1979

# Ex-Director Of CIA Says Senate Must Ratify The SALT II Treaty

William E. Colby, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Thursday urged ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), saying, "We are a lot better off with the treaty than we are without it."

Colby said that adoption of the treaty by the U.S. Senate will halt the nuclear arms race and allow the nation to concentrate on conventional Soviet threats.

He said treaty ratification will save the American taxpayers \$50-\$100 billion because it would stop the need to develop new nuclear weapons systems to counter Soviet threats.

IN SHARP contrast to congressional critics of the treaty, Colby said verification is not a problem with the treaty.

"Our intelligence can absolutely tell us about Soviet weapons development and production," he said.

Colby, now an attorney, made his remarks to the Economic Club of Indianapolis in the Indiana Convention-Exposition Center.

He said that America's spy service had made some "stupid and some wrong" moves during its existence since World War II.

"The agency was created by a presidential commission that directed it to be more ruthless than the opposition and by a Congress that said it didn't want to know what was happening."

"WITH A directive like that, the Fish and Wildlife Service would have gotten into trouble," he said.

He urged the U.S. to resume engagement in "covert" operations in foreign countries. "To say we support an ally (like the Shah of Iran) but to refuse

to help him is a contradiction in terms," he said.

By assisting moderates in foreign governments, the U.S. can make sure the people of those nations won't be faced with the choice between a right-wing Dictatorship and a left-wing terrorist group, he said.

He said that the greatest threat to world stability is the chance that nuclear weapons will be developed by Third World nations, adding that South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan and Argentina could develop those weapons.

He told the audience of about 950 persons how the CIA observed the construction and outfitting of a Soviet aircraft carrier and "when it sailed into the Black Sea, it was no surprise to us."

"The question is this: Are we petty-foggers looking for absolute evidence for some little variation—a quarter of an inch on the side of an absolute state—or are we interested in the protection of our country and the ability to make an agreement to move ahead to these kinds of new restraints that will help us as well as the Soviets."

Colby said the agreement must be ratified before the "next generation of Soviet leaders take over the government."

Article Appeared  
On Page 1

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line)  
12 July 1979

# SALT Treaty Gets Backing of Joint Chiefs

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are "not really enthusiasts" for the SALT II treaty, acknowledged one of their number, Adm. T.B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations.

But the chiefs appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday to give a guarded, conditional endorsement to the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union. Their aim was clear. Hayward put it this way: "Pressure decision-makers."

According to the chiefs, "SALT II is a modest but useful step in a long-range process which must include the resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence."

But Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the chiefs, who did most of the testifying, declined to link any particular defense programs to support for the treaty and bristled at any "implication of being bought off."

Jones insisted that "regardless of the outcome of the SALT II ratification process, there is an urgent need to proceed resolutely and deliberately with a well-thought-out program of force modernization, both to

avoid the undesirable international consequences of strategic inferiority and to create the necessary incentives for Soviet agreement to significant reductions as the arms control process continues."

## Criticizes Civilians

Jones was critical of past civilian masters of the military. He claimed that previous administrations were given military advice that, if followed, would have left the nation better off in the 1980s and made the Russians more agreeable to significant arms reductions in the round of SALT negotiations just completed.

The four chiefs and their chairman sat side-by-side at the witness table in the big Senate Caucus Room, from time to time outnumbering the senators who questioned them as the long afternoon of SALT testimony wore on.

"Despite differing degrees of concern among the joint chiefs of staff on specific aspects of SALT II," Jones testified, "all of us judge that the agreement which the president signed in Vienna is in the U.S. national interest."

Chief among those concerns was one that the mere existence of a treaty would lull the public into believing that a larger expenditure for a strengthened strategic arsenal was not necessary.

The chiefs did have specific concerns and they voiced some of them yesterday. For one thing they were concerned about the ability of the United States to adequately monitor Soviet behavior in order to verify compliance with the new treaty.

"Our review of these matters indicated that the U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the many

provisions of the agreement vary substantially," Jones said. Thus, there are risks in this area of the treaty, he said, adding that the chiefs on balance found the risks "acceptable provided we pursue vigorously challenges to questionable Soviet practices, improvements

in the capability of our monitoring assets, and modernization of our strategic forces."

Another of the chiefs' concerns was the treaty provision that permits the Soviet Union to retain 308 of its mammoth SS-18 intercontinental missiles.

The chiefs would have preferred "a major reduction" to cut down on the payload the Russians can hurl at the United States. At the same time, Jones said limiting the Soviet Union to 10 warheads did go some of the way toward denying them the full use of this throwweight advantage.

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## SALT Wins Cool Support From Military

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the new strategic arms limitation treaty yesterday as "a modest but useful step" provided it is accompanied by substantial new military spending.

The five chiefs "are not raging enthusiasts for many features of the treaty," as Adm. Thomas B. Hayward put it, but under intense senatorial questioning the chiefs reiterated their overall support for SALT II and their belief that the treaty is "adequately verifiable."

As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued hearings on the treaty, John Glenn (D-Ohio) said he thought the chiefs were "damning it by faint praise," but Gen. David C. Jones of the Air Force, chairman of the JCS, said he would not use that phrase.

Moreover, Jones explicitly rejected the idea of reopening substantive negotiations on SALT II with the Soviets, and he disputed the suggestion that the country would be better off by abandoning the SALT process or rejecting this treaty.

Repeating the phrase the chiefs worked out to describe their position, Jones said the treaty was "a modest but useful contribution, but it doesn't solve the whole problem. That's our advice and we hope you will take it."

In a detailed prepared statement and in answers to senators' questions, the five chiefs echoed the message given earlier by both Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance: Even with SALT II, the United States will have to increase its spending on strategic forces by \$10 billion or more in the next six years.

But in the special echo chamber that the nation's military leaders create, that message came through yesterday louder and more forcefully than it had in earlier hearings on SALT II in this committee.

Senior officials of the Carter administration expressed satisfaction that the chiefs had given broad support for the treaty while declining to adopt any of the opponents' substantive or tactical positions.

However, skeptics and opponents thought they found some support in the many qualifying clauses that dotted the chiefs' comments.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), for example, pressed Gen. Lew Allen Jr. of the

Air Force on qualifications in the chiefs' prepared statement about the verifiability of SALT II — that is, America's ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty.

The statement said that verification "will pose a stern challenge to our varied and mighty, capable intelligence systems," and that U.S. ability to verify different specific elements of the treaty will vary "substantially."

Under questioning from Helms, Gen. Allen said there were some points that might not be possible to verify with high confidence, but the chiefs assessed the potential significance of cheating in these areas and "our conclusion was that it is all right" — provided, he went on, that the United States aggressively improves intelligence-gathering.

Helms replied that he sympathized with citizens watching the hearings on television who had to decide what the general had just said. "I think you said 'yes and no,'" Helms commented with a grin, and Allen did not dispute him.

The chiefs' testimony illuminated the complex web of interests involved in the SALT process. When the five pillars of braid and brass who lead the country's armed services sat down in a row at the witness table, there wasn't a civilian official in sight—only military aides. This was the military's day, as Jones affirmed under questioning from Frank Church, (D-Idaho), the committee chairman.

Will you "give us your honest advice" even if it differs from the position of the president and secretary of defense, Church asked.

"Yes, sir, we pledge to do so," the general replied.

In their carefully drafted statement, read by Jones, the chiefs declared: "With or without SALT, the United States needs to do far more than we have done in recent years to strengthen and modernize our strategic forces lest the trend toward Soviet superiority become irreversible."

The chiefs said continued cutbacks starting in the Nixon administration "lowered... the incentives for the Soviets to negotiate significant reductions in strategic arms."

"The most serious concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," their statement said, "is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer to the American people," one that would disguise the "urgent need to proceed resolutely and deliberately with a well-thought-out program of force modernization..."

The chiefs' statement acknowledged that they had always wanted the Soviet's Backfire bomber to be counted under SALT limits, and that the provision permitting the Soviets to retain 308 "heavy" supermissiles also troubled them. They also said they would have preferred a treaty that called for much deeper cuts in both superpowers' arsenals.

But they added that restraints on the Backfire's rate of production and on the number of warheads the "heavy" missiles can carry (ten) were both significant. And the chiefs enumerated half a dozen provisions of SALT II which they said "operate primarily to our advantage."

These included provisions forcing the Soviets to dismantle 250 strategic systems, limiting the numbers of warheads rockets can carry, limiting the introduction of new rockets, banning the Soviets' SS16 mobile missile, and requiring that the Soviets not interfere with U.S. "national means" of observing their strategic programs.

"On the other hand," the chiefs said, "the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal" and permit all the strategic programs now on Pentagon drawing boards to go ahead.

"The danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past—and, if we are not careful—in the future."

If the United States undertakes new military programs—and senior Carter administration officials have been promising them repeatedly all week in these hearings—and if future negotiations lead to substantial reductions, "history will record SALT II as a step forward," the chiefs said.

Without a commitment to both those points, they added, "we will find SALT II made little difference and may have been a net loss."

The chiefs noted that in 1972 their predecessors recommended approval of the SALT agreements provided certain new American programs were undertaken, but that some of those programs (the B1 bomber, for example) were later canceled. Had that advice been heeded the new chiefs said, "we would face less perilous strategic prospects..."

Yesterday morning, Defense Secretary Brown and his undersecretary for research and engineering, William J. Perry, testified. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) pursued the issue of the 308 Soviet heavy missiles that has concerned numerous treaty critics. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the Senate minority leader, has said these 308 missiles represent "a fatal flaw" in the treaty.

Biden elicited affirmative answers from Brown to a series of questions meant to establish that these 308 missiles do not give the Soviets any great advantage that they couldn't achieve with other rocket systems. At the end of his questioning, Biden said: "I hope this puts an end to what I think is posturing on this issue."

Baker could not reply; he was absent from yesterday's hearing.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

9 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-23*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*  
**Bungle on the U2**

ANKARA—President Carter's insistence on flying the U2 spy plane through Turkish airspace in hopes of gaining Senate votes for SALT II has backfired on Carter and damaged Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in a classic case of risking a major U.S. strategic interest for a minor tactical gain.

The strategic interest is keeping Turkey cemented in the Western alliance while other Soviet-bordered states—Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran—have turned anti-American or neutral. That strategic interest was just beginning to pay dividends once again following the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo imposed by Congress in a splurge of self-defeating, pro-Greek emotions in 1974.

The minor tactical gain is Carter's search for votes in the Senate ratification battle over the new strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II). With verification of Soviet compliance a key element in the debate, Carter has pressured Ecevit—when he should have pressured Moscow—to permit the U2 verification flights. His probably vain hope is that even though the U2 would not possibly be ready for its new task until long after the Senate vote, it would attract the support of skeptical senators.

The result has been a double loss for Carter: a much-ballyhooed admission that the United States cannot verify SALT II without new electronic monitors somewhere, and a serious but wholly predictable setback in U.S.-Turkish relations. This is partly the result of growing concern inside the Turkish government, and including powerful military officers, that Carter is now linking approval for the United States to launch its U2 overflights to the new U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation agreement and the long-term military aid now being negotiated. In other words—approve the overflights, or else!

In fact, such direct linkage almost certainly does not exist at this point as a matter of administration strategy. But Turkey has so often been abused, particularly by the one-dimensional pro-Greek lobby in Congress led by Rep. John Brademas (D-Ind.), the Democratic whip, that a touch of paranoia clouds its vision. Moreover, circumstantial evidence abounds in the U2 affair that Turkey is being deliberately squeezed from Washington.

For example, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown muscled Gen. Kenan Evren, chief of staff of the Turkish armed forces, in his Pentagon office June 8 in a surprisingly uncharacteristic lecture for the disciplined, self-controlled Brown. Teaching the Turkish general a civics lesson, Brown instructed him as follows: You Turks should make up your own mind what to do about your territory; Turkey is a sovereign country, isn't it, and are you not its senior general? You don't have to clear U2 flights with Moscow. But Brown knew that Ecevit had already given Carter his immutable condition for the overflights. Ecevit wrote Carter in reply to a long April 13 letter from Carter asking U2 permission. Since the U.S. request was not based on any stated or perceived need of the Western alliance, but on the SALT treaty alone, Ecevit wrote, Moscow would also have to agree.

Brown's civics lesson to Gen. Evren looked suspiciously like an effort to undermine Ecevit, using the general as a lever. Evren has told intimates here that he was not amused.

If that was on the clumsy side, the rush trip here by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in early May, following the exchange of letters, was cut from the same cloth. Christopher warned Ecevit that Congress, the key to resumption of absolutely essential military aid, would be inclined to vote "no" if the U2 scheme was rejected by Turkey. Christopher thought he was stating an objective fact; to Ecevit, those words sounded like blackmail.

When the House then rejected a symbolically important \$50 million in grant military aid for Turkey by a 200-vote margin in a fight led by Brademas, just 10 days after Brown's civics lesson, Ecevit, Gen. Evren and most other Turkish leaders drew the conclusion that the U2 affair had jammed the gears.

Ecevit, clinging to power by a torn fingernail in an evenly divided parliament, has been badly hurt by the U2 affair. Opposition leaders have distorted his "clear-it-with-Moscow" order, calling it ignominious for Turkey. "The U2 affair has hurt Ecevit, yes sir," the principal opposition leader, Suleyman Demirel, told us. "It has opened up a big hole through him."

More important, the United States—and particularly Carter himself—have been damaged. The huge vote that defeated that \$50 million in grant military aid followed White House assurances to Gen. Evren that Carter would exert all his influence to get it passed (the Senate had easily passed it weeks before). Brademas made the president look ridiculous here, alarming Turks of all political persuasions. To them it meant either presidential weakness or calculated U2 linkage, both of which raise ominous questions about the U.S.-Turkish future.

Until the U2 affair, Carter had moved courageously and with success to liquidate the errors of the past, a success now dimmed by his haste to pressure Turkey—instead of Moscow—in his search for votes on SALT.

THE WASHINGTON POST  
12 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-7

# Soviet Union Declines to Accept U2 Flights Over Turkey

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has refused to acquiesce to United States reconnaissance flights over Turkey to aid verification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), informed official sources said yesterday.

The Russian attitude, conveyed to Washington through diplomatic channels since an inconclusive discussion at the Vienna summit meeting three weeks ago, has generated additional U.S. interest in an alternative verification plan involving improved radio interception facilities in Norway.

Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli was quoted by the Oslo newspaper Aftenposten as saying that "if the United States and the Soviet Union want Norway to play a part in the implementation of the SALT II agreement, Norway would be willing to do this."

Nordli's attitude was news to American diplomats concerned with Norwegian affairs, evidently because discussion of the highly sensitive questions involving surveillance of the Soviet Union has been carried on outside of regular diplomatic channels.

Nordli's statement could be interpreted to mean that, as in the case of Turkey, Norway will insist that the Soviets give their assent to new U.S. intelligence operations designed to support verification of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

Soviet approval of improved Norwegian facilities seems doubtful in view of Moscow's refusal to cooperate on the Turkish flights. Additional cause for doubt is Soviet media criticism of the Norway bases plan following its publication June 29 by The New York Times.

A Radio Moscow broadcast earlier this week, referring to public discussion of Norwegian intelligence bases, called the facilities "yet another part of the military presence in Scandinavia... another lever for influencing the border country's policy." The broadcast maintained that Norwegian bases are not needed for verification of SALT II and charged that they would have "no connection" with the interests of detente in Europe.

Another article in the Oslo newspaper, however, quoted unnamed "Norwegian authorities" as saying the Soviet Union is not expected to oppose Norway's becoming more involved in the monitoring of SALT II through facilities on Norwegian soil. A Norwegian defense official was quoted as confirming that an existing listening station in Norway, manned by Norwegian personnel, is capable of monitoring Soviet strategic weapons systems.

The reported U.S. plan is to use the combination of an improved American space satellite and improvements in the Norwegian ground intercept stations to provide additional data on Soviet missile testing performance. The information would substitute for some of the data previously obtained by U.S. monitoring stations in Iran, which were near the Soviet missile testing sites.

Verification of the highly technical provisions of the SALT II agreement

is a sensitive issue in the Senate debate on ratification. The United States has several methods for monitoring Soviet weapons developments, but there is disagreement on whether they are precise and accurate enough to do the job with assurance.

Despite the Soviet message declining to approve U2 reconnaissance flights over Turkish territory just across the Soviet border, U.S. officials

have not given up on that plan to improve verification. Further talks on the matter both with Moscow and Ankara are expected.

In addition to the U2 flights, at least five other means of improving verification are under development by the United States, according to a recent statement by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee.

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ON PAGE A-6

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 JULY 1979

## Turner Reportedly Asks Inquiry Into Disclosure of Data to Times

By PHILIP TAUBMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 12 — The Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the request of Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, has taken the first steps to determine whether an investigation should be made into the disclosure of alleged national security information to The New York Times, according to senior Administration officials.

The information concerns United States plans to use Norwegian electronic surveillance equipment to help verify Soviet compliance with the new treaty to limit strategic arms.

According to a senior intelligence officer, Admiral Turner was incensed by the report of the plans, published on June 29, and sent what was described as an "angry" letter to Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, demanding an investigation into the source of the disclosure.

### Notification Called Routine

A spokesman for the C.I.A. confirmed that the intelligence agency had informed the Justice Department about the disclosure but called the notification routine.

Some White House aides said that they

had been told that they might be asked to take a lie detector test.

Intelligence officials described the information about use of an electronic listening post in Norway as "terribly sensitive." One official said, "It was one of the few secrets left in this country."

The Times reported that the United States hoped to employ the Norwegian facility to monitor Soviet missile testing if Turkey refused to allow this country's reconnaissance planes to fly over its territory.

The Soviet Union has objected to such flights, according to sources here, and those objections reduce the likelihood that the Turkish Government will approve them. As a result, Administration interest in the use of the Norwegian facility has increased.

Norwegian officials, however, have indicated that they may also seek Soviet approval before allowing the United States to use its detection facilities. Such approval seems doubtful. In recent weeks, the Soviet radio and Soviet newspapers have criticized the possible use of Norwegian bases by Americans.

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THE MIAMI HERALD  
4 July 1979

# Cuba Intensifies Aid To Rebels in 3 Latin Nations, CIA Reports

By TOM FIEDLER  
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Encouraged by the upheaval in Nicaragua, Cuba recently has "intensified" its efforts to aid left-wing rebels in their attempts to overthrow three Central American governments, according to unconfirmed U.S. intelligence reports.

Those efforts, the Central Intelligence Agency reported in a secret May 2 memorandum, "reflect a far more sophisticated and selective revolutionary doctrine than that which guided Cuba's action in the 1960s."

"Cuba clearly ... wants to avoid provoking a U.S. counter-response," the memo added.

THAT ASSESSMENT of Cuba's renewed interest in promoting leftist revolutions in Central America — especially in Nicaragua, but also in Guatemala and El Salvador — is contained in the classified memorandum entitled "Cuban Support for Central American Guerrilla Groups."

The CIA sent copies of the 10-page document to State Department and other government officials. At the time, Cuba's role in aiding the Nicaraguan Sandinista rebels, using Panama as an intermediary, had been noted in congressional debate over the Panama Canal treaties.

State Department spokesman Tom Reston confirmed the report's CIA origin. However, he and others familiar with it stress that its findings are based upon "raw intelligence" that has not been verified.

Nevertheless, knowledgeable government sources have told The Herald that the memorandum's findings are consistent with other information received in recent months.

THE CIA REPORT outlines what it sees as a new Cuban strategy in exporting its revolution to other Latin American countries.

Gone is what one source called the "frontal assault" strategy of Cuban revolutionary Ernesto (Che) Guevara in the 1960s. Guevara led a small, Cuban-directed guerrilla movement in Bolivia in the mistaken belief that the populace would join the uprising.

The new strategy takes a more pragmatic view of conditions than did Guevara, who was killed by Bolivian counterinsurgency forces in 1967.

The CIA report notes that now Cuba is most willing to provide indirect assistance to rebels.

Most of this assistance comes in the form of training, although the CIA said that Cuba, with Panamanian help, also has provided guns and other weapons to the Sandinistas.

IN ALL THREE countries, the CIA memorandum says, Cuba has attempted to downplay its involvement — and thereby run less risk of provoking the United States — by funneling its aid through intermediaries and refusing to provide any direct military assistance.

Cuba also is conditioning its help to El Salvadorean and Guatemalan rebels on their promises to form coalitions with other opposition groups. Cuba now believes that these coalitions have a better chance of succeeding than do even highly disciplined guerrilla groups, the report says.

The memorandum says Cuba applied this strategy with great success in Nicaragua. Until recently, despite widespread opposition to the government of President Anastasio Somoza, the anti-government forces had been splintered.

HOWEVER, the CIA says, Cuban President Fidel Castro summoned the Sandinista guerrilla leaders to Havana in March and, during a 48-hour meeting, got them to put aside differences and form a coalition to include any group intent upon ousting Somoza.

To help solidify that coalition, Castro promised stepped-up aid to the rebels as long as they cooperated with each other, according to the memorandum.

The CIA also says Castro urged the Sandinistas to "play down the Marxist nature of their programs at this point and to offer to join non-Marxists in forging a broad coalition."

The Sandinista Marxists "have taken steps to comply with the request," the memorandum says.

Two weeks ago — in a move that demonstrated this further — the Sandinistas announced formation of a relatively broad-based "Government of National Reconstruction" that includes both leftist and moderate anti-Somoza groups.

IMPLICIT IN THIS "low-key" approach is Cuba's apparent belief that events are working against the governments in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, according to the memorandum.

In the three countries, it says, Cuba has urged the rebel groups to prepare for a prolonged civil war while avoiding direct clashes with government troops.

As in Nicaragua, Cuba theorizes that public sentiment ultimately will shift in favor of the insurgents, the CIA report says.

The memorandum, citing "several sources," says Cuba, "on at least two and possibly three occasions," supplied arms to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Those arms were ferried aboard Panamanian air force planes to airfields in Costa Rica for shipment to the guerrillas, the report said.

Continued

IN GUATEMALA, Cuba has concentrated on getting the anti-government factions to work together to overthrow the military junta.

Citing a "reliable" source, the CIA says a Cuban official met with representatives of three rebel groups — the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, the Rebel Armed Forces and the dissident wing of the Guatemala Communist party — "to urge unity."

If they agreed to work together, the report continues, Cuba would promise stepped-up aid as it did in Nicaragua.

The memorandum says Cuba has given less attention to El Salvador than it has to Guatemala and Nicaragua on the assumption that the El Salvador rebels are not as far along in mounting a revolution.

So far, the State Department has shown little alarm at the report. Spokesman Reston, citing the unverified nature of the intelligence, said the United States won't question Cuba on its alleged activities unless it has more proof.

THE SPOTLIGHT  
16 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page 4

# Carter and Cronies Knew of Panama's Role in Nicaragua

By Walter Riley

WASHINGTON—President Carter and his aides were fully aware of Panama's role in helping Cuba export communist revolutions to Latin America long before the signing of the canal giveaway treaties, a secret 10-page CIA report discloses.

The May 2, 1979 document reveals Fidel Castro's inside operations with the regional communist parties of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador for his proposed takeover of Central America.

The report exposes the Panamanian government as Castro's willing partner in a long-planned communist conspiracy to overthrow the Somoza government of Nicaragua and install a pro-Cuba Marxist regime.

The CIA papers establish beyond a doubt that President Carter and his administration staff have been fully aware of the Panama-Cuba connection since taking office.

Carter and State Department officials have not told Congress and the American public the truth about Panama. Rep. George Hansen (R-Idaho) has called President Carter a "liar."


## RIPE FOR REVOLT

The opening paragraph of the intelligence memo states: "The Castro regime apparently concluded by at least last fall that prospects for revolutionary upheaval in Central America over the next decade or so had markedly improved—largely because of the weakened position of Nicaragua's Somoza, and the ripple effect his removal would have on other countries in Central America.

"As a result, Cuba has intensified its attempts to unify insurgent groups, not only in Nicaragua—where Cuba has concentrated its efforts—but in Guatemala and El Salvador as well."

The report continued: "While tailoring the extent of its support to the realities of the situation in each country, Cuba has stepped up its on-island (Cuba) training of guerrillas from each of these countries . . ."

Panamanian air force planes are used to transport the terrorists from revolutionary staging areas in Costa Rica through Panama and on to Cuba and return, according to the report. The same aircraft are used to transport Soviet- and Red Chinese-



REP. GEORGE HANSEN  
manufactured weapons to the terrorist bases in Costa Rica, according to the report.  
DISSENT IN STATE DEPT.

Ranking military officers familiar with all intelligence reports coming out of Central America are dismayed by the Carter administration's under-the-table deals with Cuba and other communist minority groups in Latin America. Many of these military experts can only shake their heads in despair, because the only way they could speak out would be to resign their offices.

A veteran State Department official familiar with the leaked report said: "I am



FIDEL CASTRO

afraid that President Carter and members of his administration have not been candid with Congress or the American public. I am of the opinion that in the near future, many more documents are going to be leaked to the press by dissidents in our organization.

"Please don't quote me," he begged.

Many State Department veterans have expressed their concern over the narrow policies of the Carter administration with respect to the human rights issues. Some suggest that the departure of the assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, Pat Derian, would improve the American image among foreign circles.

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THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
9 July 1979

## Bob Wiedrich Cuban presence felt in Nicaragua

CUBAN PERSONNEL are directly involved in leftist Sandinista guerrilla operations to oust President Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, according to a New York congressman.

U.S. Rep. John M. Murphy, a Staten Island Democrat and staunch Somoza supporter, made the charge during an interview in which he also accused Cuban Premier Fidel Castro of supplying the rebels with virtually all of their arms.

"Cubans have been overheard on Sandinista radios directing rebel combat operations in Nicaragua," Murphy said.

"Intelligence reports clearly indicate that Cuban personnel have been changing credentials in Panama, substituting Panamanian credentials to mask their nationality."

Further, practically all of the weapons that have been recovered by the Somoza national guard have been Cuban weapons of Belgian manufacture. That fact has been documented.

"One of (Fulgencio) Batista's last arms purchases, before Castro ousted him as the Cuban president in 1959, was 5,000 FN-14 automatic rifles from the Fabrique Nationale in Belgium.

"The rifles were part of a specially marked run for Cuba. And Castro got them when he took power.

"These are the same weapons that have been picked up by the hundreds on Nicaraguan battlefields. So there is the Cuban connection."

MURPHY, A PERSONAL friend and high school classmate of Somoza when the strongman was being educated in the United States, leveled his charges only a few days after having made a secret trip to the embattled Central American country at Somoza's request.

His allegations of Cuban communist involvement in the Sandinista guerrilla movement also followed on the heels of public disclosure of a secret State Department memorandum that the Cubans were funneling arms to the rebels in Panamanian air force planes.

"Russian-built Ilyushin planes have been flying from Havana to Tocumen Airport in Panama City, then to Liberia, a Costa Rican airport about 20 miles south of the Nicaraguan border. The planes have been loaded with arms for the Sandinistas.

"People, including Panamanians, have been flown to an institute 20 miles outside of Havana for guerrilla training in the last two years and then returned to Costa Rica.

"They come into Liberia Airport, then move on into Nicaragua to join the Sandinistas. This is the use of Costa Rican territory as the most valuable part of the rebel movement — the invasion of Nicaragua.

"The Panamanians supply men, weapons, and money. The Cubans furnish weapons, money, training areas, and now manpower.

"There can no longer be any doubt about the Cuban connection in Nicaragua. Castro has repeatedly declared, 'We will get Tachp' (President Somoza's nickname).

MURPHY, CHAIRMAN of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, has been interested in Latin American affairs since he was first assigned to the House Panama Canal subcommittee nearly 18 years ago.

He charged that Castro agents started infiltrating Nicaragua in 1962, participating in the murders of a hundred Somoza justices of the peace several years ago as Cuban involvement escalated.

Murphy sees the communist role in the Nicaraguan insurrection as part of a broad plan to achieve Red domination of the Caribbean and Latin America. He views Castro as nothing more than a footpad for Moscow.

"Already, Russia has one of the biggest embassies in the Americas in Costa Rica with 130 personnel who really serve as Soviet agents," Murphy said.

"Virtually every country in South America has a significant communist organization. And those organizations are growing. Throughout Central America, much of the leadership is leftist-oriented.

"COSTA RICA GOES along by letting its airports and roads be used as conduits for weapons and men for the Sandinista guerrillas.

"The whole medical evacuation program for the Sandinistas is Costa Rican. It has handled at least 1,000 wounded guerrillas since the war accelerated in the last 12 weeks.

"Honduras has also been used as a conduit for Cuban personnel and weapons. And the Dominican Republic has supplied the rebels with weapons, principally mortar ammunition.

"Before the war escalated last fall, the Castro crowd used Honduras and Mexico as conduits to funnel personnel with phony credentials into Nicaragua.

"Clearly, there is a coordinated plan to get rid of Somoza and put the Sandinistas in power as the government of Nicaragua."

Murphy charged that Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo is under pressure by the "Castro communist political structure" in his country to disavow the Somoza regime.

But in fact, Murphy said, Mexico is the ultimate plum of Soviet intentions in the Americas, short of toppling the United States.

"Mexico has been the target all along," Murphy said. "It's so obvious. Soviet influence has been heavy in Mexico since the 1930s. The Soviets want Mexico because of its oil and gas and mineral resources."

"It's big population is a natural target for communist domination. But the United States is the ultimate target. Mexico is only an intermediate target."

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
11 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-5

# House Keeps Secrecy Shroud on Intelligence Outlay

By Katherine Ellison  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House approved a multi-billion-dollar intelligence authorization bill on a voice vote last night after rejecting a move to disclose how much money Congress was authorizing.

The measure now goes back to the Senate.

By a vote of 321 to 79, the House rejected an attempt by Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ky.) to amend the bill. Mazzoli would have required the president to reveal in November the total amount of spending authorized for foreign intelligence in the coming fiscal year.

The bill authorizes spending for the CIA and parts of the National Security Agency, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the departments of Defense, Energy, Treasury, Army, Navy and Air Force.

Mazzoli said he wanted to make the total spending figure public as a "concrete demonstration that Congress is very serious about its responsibility to develop cost-effective national intelligence." He said the step would create a "presumption of openness which would serve as our best protection against slipping into the abuses of the past."

The administration has said it would not object to the disclosure of an aggregate figure. Mazzoli also pointed out that several congressional oversight committees on intelligence have recommended disclosure.

Speaking against the amendment, Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson (R-Va.) said it would cause "further erosion of our intelligence capability brought about by further disclosure." Robinson pro-

tested that "our adversaries, the Soviets, will feast on these additional facts that they will get for free."

Rep. Bill Burlison (D-Mo.) said "the act of disclosure would only be symbolic and it would lead to revelations of more and more detail about the intelligence budget."

Burlison maintained that Mazzoli's attempt "represents a lack of confidence in the intelligence agencies" and in congressional oversight.

Speaking in favor of the amendment, Rep. Donald J. Pease (D-Ohio) said it would strike a "meaningful balance between the taxpayers' right to know how their dollar is spent and the need for effectiveness in streamlining the budget of the intelligence community."

Mazzoli, a member of the House Committee on Intelligence, said The New York Times and The Washington Post have "routinely run" estimates of the aggregate figure that are "almost on the money."

THE WASHINGTON POST  
7 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-10

# House Faces Vote on Funding Intelligence Activities

By Katherine Ellison  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House is expected to be confronted again next week with the problem of authorizing billions of dollars for the nation's intelligence agencies in almost complete ignorance.

Rep. Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, intends to offer an amendment that would lift the secrecy just enough to force publication of the total spending in the authorization bill.

The Carter administration has no objection to the idea. Neither does the Central Intelligence Agency. But the House has turned out to be more protective.

Mazzoli says he has little hope of a majority, but wants to "keep people thinking about why they make the decisions they do." He offered his amendment in committee sessions this year and last, and was voted down both times.

"Even at times when the [Central Intelligence] Agency had a much worse reputation than it does today, these kinds of attempts have failed," said a House Intelligence Committee staff member.

The House measure would authorize undisclosed sums for the conduct of "intelligence-related activities" by the CIA, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy, FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration.

Total spending for these activities, according to a suppressed report of the House Intelligence Committee that leaked in 1976, was estimated to exceed \$10 billion. That figure apparently included both direct and indirect costs.

Committee Chairman Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.) said his committee voted against disclosing the sum this year and last year because, "the majority feels it would lead to more questions being asked."

The public, Boland said, "would want to know why, for instance, if the budget has a particular bulge in it one year or not the next . . . We don't want to deal with these questions."

"I don't think the American public is particularly interested in that figure anyway," he added.

The committee keeps a "Classified Annex" in its office that House members can read to learn details of the authorization measure, but few have bothered since the system was established last year. Critics say the secret document is so crammed with code words and acronyms that it makes little sense to outsiders.

In testimony before the committee last year, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said: "The administration does not object to [Congress] releasing to the public a single overall budget figure of the U. S. intelligence community." But Turner said he opposed breaking down the figure into its components.

The FBI discloses the amount it spends each year for domestic counterterrorist projects—authorized this year at more than \$13 million—but does not reveal how much it spends to combat foreign espionage in the United States.

"In that area, you're dealing with adversaries with sophisticated intelligence apparatus, and they could scan a budget and determine what resources are being used," explained FBI spokesman Homer Boynton. "We want to give them as little information as we can."

Treasury Department spokesman Jack Plum said the department's intelligence budget is used to monitor financial exchanges and the actions of central banks in foreign countries.

"I frankly don't know why there's any reason to keep that quiet," Plum said.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) found in 1976 that U.S. intelligence efforts then totaled 3 percent of federal spending, "but 8 percent of controllable federal spending." About 75 percent of federal spending for fiscal 1976—such as payments from the Social Security trust fund—are described by the administration as "uncontrollable."

The committee at that time reported a lack of control over intelligence spending by either the White House Office of Management and Budget or by Congress.

The House Committee on Intelligence reported this year that the total authorization for 1980 intelligence spending is substantially larger than the amount authorized last year, but less than the administration requested.

The U.S. Constitution provides that "a regular statement of account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time," but the debate over whether this applies to intelligence spending has yet to be resolved.

THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-5

## On Capitol Hill

### EXCERPT:

The House will vote today whether to require that the amount of money spent by the federal government on intelligence work be made public for the first time as part of the annual bill authorizing Central Intelligence Agency and other spook activity. The spy budgets themselves have always been hidden in the big buck Defense budget. Despite its recent moves toward openness, Congress isn't expected to reveal the size of the intelligence operation.

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ON PAGE A-10

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 JULY 1979

## New Bills Set Rules on Classified Documents in Trials

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 11 — Carter Administration and Congressional leaders sponsored bills in Congress today that are designed to prevent criminal prosecutions from being dropped or weakened by the threatened disclosure of classified information.

The threats of defendants to demand and perhaps disclose sensitive national security documents at trials, a tactic being called "graymail," have forced the Government to drop or reduce charges in

a number of recent cases, including that of Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence. He was able to plea-bargain when charged with perjury involving his Senate testimony about Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile.

The bills introduced today would establish legal procedures to insure that judges rule before a trial on whether sensitive evidence is admissible. The bills would also permit the courts, in cases where such evidence is approved, to order that it be admitted in sanitized

form to avoid having the entire case dropped.

Where uncensored classified evidence is regarded as essential to the defense, and the Government opposes its introduction in court, the bills allow judges to seek resolution short of complete dismissal. The possibilities include dismissing some, but not all, charges.

### A Game 'Corrupting Justice'

"These measures will not end the problem of graymail, but they will help solve it," said Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, a sponsor of the Senate bill.

The proposed bills would give the Government the right to appeal immediately rulings on evidence and would require appellate courts to handle the appeals as quickly as possible.

The legislation would also direct the Supreme Court to establish security procedures to protect secret documents that are in the custody of Federal courts so defense attorneys or Government officials cannot disclose sensitive information at a trial.

All the measures are endorsed by the Justice Department, according to Philip B. Heymann, chief of the department's criminal division.

The Carter Administration, however, differs with Mr. Biden and other members of Congress over several points contained in the Senate and House versions of the proposed "classified information procedures act." As a result, the Administration is introducing its own version of the legislation.

### Difference in Accountability

The main difference concerns what, if any, accountability the Justice Department has when it drops a case. The Senate and House bills would require the department to provide a written explanation when it decides not to prosecute a case because of the possibility of disclosure of secret information.

"That would be an infringement of our prosecutorial discretion," Mr. Heymann said at a briefing for reporters.

According to Mr. Biden and Mr. Heymann, most of the provisions contained in the legislation are already rooted in Federal law. The new legislation would primarily spell out how the relevant laws should be applied in cases of this kind.

It is a central issue in the prosecution of three former top officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including former Director L. Patrick Gray, who have been accused of authorizing illegal burglaries. Defense lawyers have said that the introduction of classified documents would be crucial to their case. As a result, according to Government officials, the Justice Department could be forced to drop the case.

THE WASHINGTON POST

12 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-7

# Bill Would Protect U.S. Secrets From Trial Exposure

By Charles R. Babcock

Washington Post Staff Writer

Legislation designed to save future prosecutions threatened by exposure of national secrets was introduced yesterday with support from the Justice Department and civil liberties groups.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), main sponsor of the Senate version of the bill, told a news conference that the measure would prevent defense attorneys from forcing dismissal of cases by "graymail"—that is, by threatening to disclose classified information at trials.

The main feature of versions of the bill is a pretrial conference at which a judge would rule on whether classified evidence for the defense could be used at trial.

The Justice Department had to abandon the prosecution of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. official Robert Berrellez early this year when a federal judge in Washington refused to agree to the kind of

pretrial rulings contained in the proposed legislation.

Berrellez was accused of lying to a Senate subcommittee about ITT's involvement with the CIA in financing opponents of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970. Berrellez's attorney intended to use classified information to show that his client testified with the encouragement of CIA officials.

Rep. Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), sponsor of the House Intelligence Committee version of the measure, said the new procedures would not be the equivalent of a "state secrets privilege."

Philip B. Heymann, assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division at Justice, said he expected some controversy about the few differences in the bills.

For instance, the administration bill, sponsored by Rep. Peter Rodino (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, would allow a judge to sanitize statements of witnesses presented to the defense.



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WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL  
8 July 1979

# Prosecutors: CIA blocked Paisley probe; reopen it

By RICHARD SANDZA  
and JOE TRENTO

SOLOMONS, Md. — Two prosecutors assigned to the case of missing CIA official John A. Paisley have urged a reopening of the investigation they say was hampered by CIA lies and pressure.

Former state's attorneys Naji P. Maloof and Lawrence Lampson said the Paisley probe suffered from CIA stonewalling and an unwillingness by the Maryland State Police to pursue the case.

"Some people just don't want the truth about this case out," said Maloof, who was the Calvert County state's attorney when Paisley disappeared Sept. 24.

Lampson, Maloof's successor and now a district court judge, said Friday state police were "unwilling to go to the wall" to force the Central Intelligence Agency to give them the information necessary to pursue the case.

Maloof said he had the feeling "someone was always looking over our shoulders." Maloof and state police Cpl. John Murphy were assigned to the case the day a body believed to be Paisley's was found in Chesapeake Bay.

There were "a number of key areas that we had been looking at in the case," Maloof said, "and we could have cracked this thing if we didn't get so much flak."

"It's time to open this thing up and do it right," said Lampson.

Maloof complained that "Maryland State Police headquarters was releasing statements that Paisley had killed himself. This is when we had not been halfway through our investigation. They would not even ask us what we were finding. It was all peculiar."

State police "hesitated to take on the CIA," Lampson said Friday. "They had been lied to by the CIA about who Paisley was. The CIA stonewalled on documents."

"Lack of manpower, changes in where people worked and inertia caused them to ease off," he added.

Both former prosecutors said they cannot understand why the current Calvert County state's attorney, Warren F. Sengstack, has not pushed the investigation more actively.

Sengstack told the Sunday News Journal, "It isn't my job to get into this. I rely on the state police for their good work. I see no reason to open the case up. I don't have the manpower."

"You have to trust your investigators. We have no choice. I don't have my own investigator. The prosecutors were all gone before I got here."

Murphy, who has since been transferred to traffic duty in Salisbury, Md., said he was not permitted to talk about the Paisley case.

"I am sorry but I am under orders to refer any inquiries to headquarters," he said. "I am not allowed to talk to you about this."

William E. Clarke, the Maryland State Police spokesman, did not return a series of Sunday News Journal phone calls dating back to June 27.

Lampson said Murphy is "a very tenacious cop. I don't think him being removed from the case had anything to do with politics. But I am not convinced he got the help that he needed from headquarters."

Maloof, defeated by Lampson in a primary last Nov. 12, is now in private practice in Solomons, the community where Paisley berthed his sloop, the Brillig.

Maloof said that when he was on the case he got the feeling there were two investigations, the one he and Murphy were conducting and another run from state police headquarters outside of Baltimore.

Murphy was the first police officer called into the case after the Coast Guard recovered a body from Chesapeake Bay Oct. 1. The body had a bullet hole in the head and 40 pounds of diving weight belts around it.

Maloof said the case was different from all the other cases he handled in his four years as state's attorney. "I never saw a police report on the case. Our files were just kept bare," he said.

Lampson also said he had to ask repeatedly for files. "They kept refusing to bring them up here and I finally got 5,000 pages of transcripts which showed a lot of leads no one followed up," Lampson said.

He added that the Paisley case still "cries out for an investigation and I cannot understand why the state is not pursuing it."

The Paisley case came under the jurisdiction of Calvert County, on the Chesapeake's western shore, because that is where Paisley kept his sloop and that is where the body was brought.

"Murphy and I worked on many investigations and I have never had one that made you feel like some one was always watching you," Maloof recalled.

"At the time the state police were playing what I thought was politics with the Calvert County unit," he continued. "They transferred everyone so that nobody had any knowledge of the Paisley case. Now I think it went beyond all that (politics). It's damn strange that not one original investigator on the case is around."

The Maryland State Police acted as if "they just wanted us to leave this thing alone. They never told us to get off it, but they simply took all the investigative tools away. When John (Murphy) was taken off of it in October, that was it for me," Maloof said.

Before he was ordered not to discuss the case, Murphy had talked with Sunday News Journal reporters about the CIA's presence.

"The CIA's footprints are all over this case," Murphy said shortly after he started the investigation in October. "They have been meeting

CONTINUED

with Col. (Thomas S.) Smith, (head of the state police). This won't be in my hands much longer."

A few days after the Sunday News Journal revealed that Paisley was a top CIA official and not the low-level analyst the CIA had called him, representatives of the agency met at state police headquarters in Pikesville to discuss the case.

A state police source, who asked not to be identified, told the Sunday News Journal that at this meeting a decision was made to take the investigation away from the Calvert County state's attorney without telling him.

Lampson said he believed the CIA had successfully lied to the state police in disguising Paisley's background. Although the agency said Paisley had retired, he actually continued to work on satellites, U.S. relationships with the Soviet Union and other top-secret projects. Lampson said the documents he reviewed convinced him that "something more needed to be answered." He said that in his present position as judge he could not compel the police to pursue the case actively.

Jerry Eiseman, a Maryland State Police spokesman, began telling

reporters immediately after the police officials met with the CIA that "Paisley almost definitely committed suicide." He made that statement without receiving any details of the Murphy investigation, Maloof contends.

Maloof's and Lampson's comments last week followed a June 27 press conference at which two long-time Solomons residents said they saw what appeared to be rope burns around the neck of the body brought by the Coast Guard to a local naval installation.

One witness, acting county coroner George Weems, said he believed the Paisley case involved foul play, not suicide. He said the neck abrasion appeared to be caused by hanging before the gunshot caused the death.

Another witness, Harry Lee Langley Sr., a local marina operator, said he was convinced the wound was more severe, that it looked to him as if the neck had been cut.

Both Dr. Weems and Langley said they had been told by officials present when the body was brought in that they were not to discuss what they had seen.

A state police spokesman said later that Murphy had noted the

neck marks in his report but that the autopsy had shown them to be inclusive. The autopsy report did not mention the marks at all.

State Police Superintendent Smith announced at an Oct. 20 press conference that the death had been ruled a suicide. Maloof said at that time he thought he and Murphy still had a major role in the case. In fact, even while the conference was being held in Pikesville, Maloof said, Murphy was interviewing a CIA source at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington.

Maloof believes the CIA played upon the state police as a political instrument. "They really understood what needed to be done to get them to jump," he said.

Maloof and Lampson, who agree on the Paisley case, are political enemies. Lampson overwhelmingly defeated Maloof in last fall's Democratic primary for the nomination to run for Calvert County state's attorney. After the primary, Maloof said information on the Paisley case was withheld from him and fed by police to Lampson. Lampson denies that.

In March, Lampson left the state's attorney's office to become a district judge.

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ON PAGE B1

THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)  
9 July 1979

### The Paisley Saga Continues

To borrow a line from "Alice In Wonderland," the story of the investigation into the death of former CIA agent John Paisley becomes "curiouser and curiouser."

Yesterday, the Wilmington News-Journal carried an article in which two former Calvert County state's attorneys charged the agency with thwarting the Paisley investigation. The 55-year-old former agent was found shot to death last October under mysterious circumstances.

One former prosecutor, District Court Judge Lawrence Lampson, was quoted as saying that the CIA lied to Maryland State Police investigators. The police, Lampson said, were "unwilling to go to the wall" in forcing information from the agency.

# Around the Nation

## Investigators in C.I.A. Death Charge Laxity by Agency

WILMINGTON, Del., July 8 (AP) — Two former prosecutors who investigated the death of John A. Paisley, an official of the Central Intelligence Agency, have said that their work was hampered by the agency's refusal to cooperate with the state police.

The Sunday Wilmington News-Journal quoted the prosecutors as saying that the case was never properly investigated and that it should be reopened.

Mr. Paisley disappeared last fall while sailing on the Chesapeake Bay. A decomposed body was later identified as his, and the state police ruled the death a probable suicide.

"Some people just don't want the truth about this case out," said Naji P. Maloof, who was the Calvert County state's attorney when Mr. Paisley disappeared on Sept. 24.

Lawrence Lampson, Mr. Maloof's successor and now a District Court judge, said that the state police had been "unwilling to go to the wall" to force the intelligence agency to give them information on the case.

The comments from Mr. Maloof and Mr. Lampson came a week after Acting County Coroner George Weems and Harry Lee Langley Sr., a southern Maryland marine operator, both of whom were present when the body was recovered, said that they saw what appeared to be rope burns around the victim's neck.

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NEW ERA (HOPKINSVILLE, KY.)

20 June 1979

## Editorials

# Soviets Cheat

Detente has been of great benefit to the Soviet Union, allowing it to acquire advanced American technology sold to the Russians with Washington explicit approval.

American officials have defended these technology transfers on grounds that they improve Soviet-American relations and that adequate safeguards are present to prevent use for military purposes.

Forgetting the debatable issue of whether trade alone improves political relations, it is now quite clear that adequate safeguards do not exist to bar Soviet use of that technology for military utilization.

A case in point is the sprawling Kama River truck plant.

The plant was built to American specifications and stocked with \$500 million in equipment supplied by American companies.

This new manufacturing complex covers 38 square miles and is the largest heavy truck factory in the world.

The plant's rated capacity of 250,000 trucks a year tops the maximum annual production of the entire U.S. truck industry.

It's automated foundry is the most modern in the world, and its industrial computer system provided by International Business Machines Corp. is among the world's largest.

When negotiating purchase of this technology, the Soviets said the facility would be devoted to civilian production.

Now, three years after the plant opened, both the Pentagon and the

CIA report that heavy trucks produced there are being supplied to the Soviet army and to communist forces in Eastern Europe.

Also, CIA officials have told a congressional subcommittee that some of the 50,000 diesel engines produced at the plant each year are going into Soviet tanks and armored vehicles.

Ironically, the latest Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers getting these engines are rated superior to anything in our own army.

And while trucks and armored vehicles have mechanized the Soviet army, units of some U.S. divisions still consist of foot-borne infantry.

It's incredible that the Commerce Department has not yet determined whether partial use of the Kama River plant for military production violates agreements negotiated in the early and mid-1970s.

We can only wait the Commerce Department's findings with interest.

A department official told the Research and Development subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee last month that safeguards against military diversion of American technology sold to the Soviets "have only marginal utility."

Simply, it is easy for the Soviets to cheat on the agreements and difficult for the United States to monitor compliance.

None of this is calculated to strengthen President Carter's hand in trying to sell the SALT II treaty with its even more important ramifications.

ARTICLE 1  
ON PAGE A-4NEW YORK TIMES  
13 JULY 1979

# Aides Say U.S. Seeks Faster Upgrading of Its Arsenal

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 12 — The United States, in a shift in strategic planning, is making preparations that would make possible a rapid upgrading of the existing arsenal of long-range missiles and bombers, according to Pentagon officials.

Until recently, the United States has emphasized new arms programs, such as the MX mobile missile, to bolster strategic capabilities in the late 1980's. However, the officials said, growing concern over the nuclear balance in the next few years is leading the Pentagon, for the first time, to examine earlier remedies.

The officials said that, at President Carter's request, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had instructed aides to study a list of measures that could be taken to improve the strategic posture in the next few years. They said 19 options were being considered, from simple steps, such as putting more warheads on missiles, to more complex moves like producing the B-1 bomber.

## Arms Treaty Hearings a Factor

The new interest in expanding American forces is said to reflect revised intelligence estimates that show Soviet forces growing at a more rapid rate than projected earlier. The officials said steps to bolster American forces in the early 1980's would also improve chances of gaining Senate approval for the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union.

In hearings on the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Administration witnesses, including Secretary Brown, acknowledged that Moscow in the next few years was likely to achieve the ability, in theory, to launch a first-strike attack against American land-based missiles. The witnesses also conceded that by 1985, when the new treaty would expire, Moscow would possess a numerical advantage in many areas of strategic capability.

In the past, the Pentagon view was that, while certain disparities in the strategic balance might disappear in the early 1980's, new American weapons, such as the \$30 billion MX missile, would rectify the situation in the latter half of the decade. Pentagon aides said that they still believed this to be the case, but that, following Mr. Carter's decision early last month to begin developing the MX, high-level interest grew in finding ways to increase American strategic power sooner.

Although the B-1 bomber, which Mr. Carter canceled two years ago, is one option under consideration, other, less costly improvements are receiving more

serious consideration. These are said to include the following:

¶Increasing the bomb load of B-52 bombers and the number of planes that would be ready for quick takeoff.

¶Increasing the warheads on the Poseidon missile from 10 to 14.

¶Deferring the retirement of the 10 Polaris submarines and refitting them with the new Trident missile.

¶Making the Trident more accurate.

¶Accelerating the construction rate of the new Trident submarine.

¶Speeding the development and de-

ployment of a plane specially designed to carry air-launched cruise missiles.

Although none of the options would cost as much as deploying new weapons, officials said, each would still take up funds that would otherwise be spent on new systems like the MX. Nevertheless, some measures are expected to be adopted, if only to respond to concerns expressed in the Senate hearings.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES  
13 JULY 1979

## Topics

## Intelligence

## Finally

One substantial dividend of normalized relations between China and the United States has been the normalization of China's economic profile. For years the China-watchers have been able only to deduce the agricultural and industrial output of that vast country: statistics were as insubstantial as the smile of the Cheshire cat. Now, for the first time since 1959, Peking has published detailed data.

The new information indicates that the People's Republic of China, with a crop totaling 304.75 million tons last year, was the world's leading producer of grain. And the country apparently ranks third in the world as a producer of coal, fifth in steel and among the top 12 in oil.

What is genuinely remarkable about the new figures is how closely many of them match the past estimates published by the C.I.A. For example, the agency put Chinese steel output at 31.7 million tons in 1978; Peking's figure is 31.78 million. For cement, the C.I.A. estimated 1977 output at 56.2 million tons; Peking says it was 55.65 million

tons. Particularly in view of all the flak that the C.I.A. has been catching lately, it seems only fair to acknowledge its expertise in an essential area of intelligence.

In any event, normalization has necessitated Peking's going public with formerly secret statistics in order to establish itself as a credible trading partner. That in turn has permitted not only the world at large but the Chinese themselves to get a closer look at their economic, social and political realities. Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping's cat — the one whose color he's not concerned about so long as it catches mice — has superseded the Cheshire.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-12NEW YORK TIMES  
12 JULY 1979

# Peking Gives First Details of Economy in 20 Years

By THEODORE SHABAD

The Peking Government, ending 20 years of statistical secrecy, has resumed the publication of its detailed annual reports on the Chinese economy. Some of the data come close to estimates made in the interim by experts in the West.

The newly released statistics show China, with a population of 958 million, to be the world's leading producer of grain. It is third in coal, fifth in steel and among the top dozen oil producers.

The first indications of a new information policy became evident in mid-June during a session of the National People's Congress, the nominal legislature, when

Prime Minister Hua Guofeng and other Chinese leaders included previously secret statistical data in their speeches.

Then, on June 27, the State Statistical Bureau issued a detailed report titled "Communiqué on Fulfillment of the National Economic Plan of 1978," relating last year's economic performance to that of 1977. The last time such a report was issued was April 14, 1959, giving 1958 economic results and those of the previous year.

The new report, like those of the 1950's, ranges widely over the economy, from industry and agriculture to labor and wages, science and education.

The renewed openness reflects the pragmatism adopted by the Peking leadership after a long period in which ideological considerations were emphasized at the expense of economic growth.

The published indicators suggest that China's economy has grown greatly since the Soviet-backed industrialization drive of the 1950's despite repeated disruptions from political turmoil.

In the absence of systematic official information, Western scholars made estimates by using the percentage figures occasionally released by the Chinese and other scattered sources. The most complete estimates have been published by the Central Intelligence Agency under its policy of making some of its research available to the public.

A comparison shows the C.I.A. figures to be close in many cases to the data now officially released. The agency's latest report on Chinese economic indicators, as of last December, estimated steel production to have risen from 24 million metric tons in 1977 to 31.7 million in 1978. The official Chinese figures for the two years are 23.74 million and 31.78 million. In 1957, China produced 5.4 million tons.

American estimates have also been remarkably accurate for petroleum production, one of the rapidly growing sectors. China's new figures give output as 93.64 million tons in 1977 and 104.05 million in 1978; the C.I.A. estimates were 90.3 million and 100.3 million.

The American estimates are also close for coal output, which China now says was 618 million tons in 1978, a 12.4 percent increase from 1977.

But a substantial Western underestimation is indicated in the case of electric power. According to Peking, 256.55 billion kilowatt-hours were generated last year, compared with 223.4 billion in 1977. These figures turn out to be 58 percent higher than the C.I.A.'s electricity index.

The American estimates for cement, an indicator of construction activity, were remarkably close to the official figures. Peking gave 1977 production as 55.65 million tons; the C.I.A. figure was 56.2 million. Last year, according to the Chinese report, cement output was up 17 percent to 65.24 million tons.

On the other hand, the United States estimates were low for another building material, timber. The C.I.A. put production in 1977 at 37.2 million cubic meters; the Chinese figure was 49.7 million.

Peking's population estimate as of the beginning of 1979 was 958 million, with the current growth rate 1.2 percent a year.

Estimates by the United States Census Bureau assumed a growth rate of 2 percent, with the population reaching 1,014 million as of the beginning of 1979, or 56 million more than Peking's figure. The difference suggested that China's birth-control program may have been more effective than believed in the West.

In agriculture, Peking put the nation's grain crop last year at 304.75 million tons, and the cotton crop at 2.167 million tons.

JULIET HERALD NEWS (1111)  
21 June 1979

# Soviets dupe U.S. again

Detente has yielded the Soviet Union precious benefits in the form of advanced American technology sold to the Russians with Washington's explicit approval. American officials have defended these transfers of technology on grounds that they improve Soviet-American relations and that adequate safeguards exist to prevent its use for military purposes.

Leaving aside the debatable question of whether trade by itself improves political relations, it is now abundantly clear that adequate safeguards do NOT exist to bar military utilization of American technology sold to the Soviet Union.

A case in point is the sprawling Kama River truck plant, built by the Soviets to American design specifications and stocked with \$500 million in machine tools, computers and foundries supplied by American companies. This new manufacturing complex, which covers 38 square miles, is the largest heavy-truck factory in the world.

The plant's rated capacity of 250,000 trucks per year exceeds the maximum annual production of the entire U.S. truck industry.

In negotiating the purchase of this American technology, the Soviets stated that the Kama River facility would be devoted to civilian production.

Now, three years after the production line opened, both the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency report that heavy trucks produced there are being supplied to the Soviet army and to Communist forces in Eastern Europe. Moreover, CIA officials have told a congressional sub-committee that some of the 50,000 diesel engines produced each year at the Kama River plant are going into Soviet tanks and armored vehicles.

It is easy for the Soviets to cheat on these agreements and difficult for the United States to monitor compliance. The Kama River experience dictates that controls over technology transfers be tightened, not eased.

# Oil's crucial roles in the Soviet Union

By Bruce A. Mohl  
Globe Staff

The energy crisis is becoming a test of leadership for the United States and the Soviet Union, the heads of the world's two major economic blocs.

That point was underscored recently as the world's seven Western economic giants converged on Tokyo, and their socialist counterparts met in Moscow. At both parleys a key issue was energy. At both parleys the real subject was how well their leaders could handle the energy crunch.

The story of how the United States has inadequately handled its energy problem is well known. The leader of the capitalist world produces 8.4 million barrels of oil a day but consumes 17 million. Europeans repeatedly have chided the United States for not having an effective energy policy and, in effect, using more than its share of the world's oil.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, pumps 11.5 million barrels a day, making it the world's largest oil producer. The Soviets are second to the United States in oil consumption, using about 7.5 million barrels a day. That leaves 4 million barrels for export, much of it going to its communist allies.

Moscow, even as much as Washington, is concerned about the energy future. The Soviets are engaged in a desperate struggle to prove incorrect a CIA projection that the Soviet bloc — the Soviet Union plus its six East European neighbors and Cuba — will import a significant amount of OPEC oil by the mid-1980s. If so, and the Soviets vehemently deny it, the implications are enormous.

Oil plays many crucial roles in the Soviet Union. It provides access to much-needed Western currencies, works better than guns and tanks in binding the oil-dependent Soviet-bloc countries to Mother Russia, and is in many ways the lifeblood of the often-fragile Soviet economy.

Although misery usually loves company, in this case Soviet energy problems are not entirely welcome in the United States.

If the Soviet bloc begins importing oil in large quantities, it would mean heightened pressure for scarce world oil supplies. It might also mean that the Soviets would push harder — diplomatically and even militarily — into the alluring Mideast oil region.

Already the Soviets have widened their influence in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, and unrest in Iran has contributed to Arab fears about possible Soviet action. The Saudis, for example, repeatedly have expressed fears that the Soviets may attempt to encircle Arab oil fields.

If that were to happen, the Soviet energy problem would become a US energy problem. And it could become much more than the "moral equivalent of war." It could become World War III.

It is too early to tell whether this scenario will be played out. The information is too sketchy, and those

who keep tabs on the Soviet Union for a living can't seem to agree.

The CIA, despite widespread criticism of its analysis, has stood by two reports in 1977 that predicted the Soviet bloc would become a net importer of oil by 1985. The CIA has, however, scaled back its original predictions. It now says the Soviet bloc will import 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day by 1985 rather than 3.5 to 4.5 million.

"We have been working on a major update of those reports," a CIA spokesman said recently. "Right now we have no timetable on when it will be completed; we hope sometime this summer or early fall. But as of now those numbers are still our best estimate. Of course, those numbers should be considered flexible. They depend on any measures the Soviets might take to prevent a shortfall from occurring."

The reason for the hedging is that the CIA is not pessimistic about Soviet oil potential; it is pessimistic about whether the Soviets will be able to get the oil out of the ground during the next decade.

Most new Soviet oil production is expected to come from east of the Urals, in sparsely populated western Siberia. It is a region that makes Alaska look like a driller's paradise.

The CIA doubts that Soviet oil technology, questioned worldwide, will be able to meet the challenge. The 1977 reports particularly stressed Soviet inability to aggressively pursue exploration and development (production) drilling at the same time.

Marshall I. Goldman, a professor at Wesleyan University and a member of the Russian Research Institute at Harvard University, questions many of the basic assumptions of the CIA analysis.

"The difference between my view and the CIA's is that mine is an economic approach and their's is an engineering approach," Goldman says.

He says the CIA is correct about the engineering difficulties the Soviets face, but he argues that the economic necessity of exporting oil to obtain hard currencies will spur them on to import the Western technology to boost production and switch to alternative fuels to free oil for export.

Goldman also says the CIA reports failed to consider the prospects for energy conservation and the possibility of finding oil offshore.

He says oil exports earn the Soviets half of their hard currency. "Without it, they are stuck," he says. "They won't be able to pay for their imports. They'll do anything to avoid importing oil."

Professor Arthur Wright of Purdue University, another Soviet watcher, agrees with Goldman. He claims the CIA studies were taken out of context by the Carter Administration, which took the unusual step of releasing them just as the Carter National Energy Plan went to Congress. "The reports were just political tools," he says.

Professor Bob Campbell of Indiana University who has written several books on the Soviet economy says the validity of the CIA reports hinges on the ability of the Soviets to curb domestic oil consumption.

CONTINUED

"The Soviets use oil in many ways that are wasteful," he says. "If they can reduce the waste and shift to alternative energy forms, they shouldn't have too many problems."

As for production, he says, "I think it's about at a peak now. They're going to have a hard time going beyond that, and they're going to have their hands full keeping it at that level."

It is difficult to determine who is right. Much of the data on the Soviet oil industry is a state secret. The Soviets stopped publishing precise export figures in 1977. "They didn't like us looking over their shoulder," Goldman says. "That may reveal real problems, but so far it doesn't seem to have."

The statistics available indicate that Soviet production of oil and coal is expected to fall short of 1979 projections and fail to meet the goals set forward in the five-year plan ending in 1980. Despite the absence of environmentalists' opposition or regulatory conflicts, the Soviet Union is struggling to expand a modest supply of nuclear electric power.

Natural gas is the one form of energy in which the news has generally been good. Last year the Soviets produced 13.14 thousand billion cubic feet of natural gas and this year plan to produce nearly 14.3 thousand billion cubic feet.

The all-out Soviet effort to keep oil production up has caused an interesting relationship to emerge with the United States.

For the Soviets to boost production in the inhospitable areas where oil is to be found, Western oil technology is necessary. The United States is the best source for this technology.

This presents a dilemma for US policy makers: Should they help the Soviets find oil and in so doing enhance the relative power of the Soviets? Or should they reject the Soviet requests for technological help and risk the oil crunch the CIA studies predicted?

So far the Administration has taken the course of helping the Soviets. Although President Jimmy Carter delayed the sale of drill-bit technology in 1978 during a dispute over human rights, he later allowed the sale to go through. Since then, more than 125 license applications have been approved, worth more than \$250 million, the Commerce Department says.

But there are complaints that the Administration's system for controlling exports to the Soviet Union is too cumbersome and slow, and security-minded government officials have expressed concern that the technology is being used for military purposes.

Oil and gas pipelines are almost as important as tanks and troops in binding the Soviet bloc countries to the Soviet Union. Of the six East European members of the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, there is a strong correlation between energy reliance on the Soviet Union and degree of independence from Soviet policy in internal and foreign affairs.

## THE WASHINGTON POST

9 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-9

## Oil Shortage Laid to 'Friends'

Associated Press

The worldwide shortage of oil is "largely the fault of our 'friends' in OPEC and not the alleged militants," a Wisconsin congressman declared yesterday.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said unclassified U.S. intelligence documents show that the 13 nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries are producing 3.9 million barrels a day less than they could on a continuing basis.

Although the new revolutionary government in Iran accounts for 40 percent of that underproduction, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi are responsible for nearly 60 percent, Aspin said.

He said these conservative, Western-oriented monarchies have been "consciously depressing production (and) causing the shortage. In turn, it is the shortage that allows OPEC to keep raising prices."

In contrast, Aspin said, Iraq, Algeria and Libya, three of the most

militant Arab states, are producing at or near their full sustainable capacity.

Iraq, which has averaged more than 3.1 million barrels a day for more than six months, is producing oil "full blast and in recent months has poured out more oil than engineers actually thought she was capable of producing," he said.

Algeria has been producing 1.1 million barrels a day, its maximum amount, and Libya has average 97 percent of its sustainable production this year, Aspin said. Libya's leader, Moammar Qaddafi, has threatened to cut oil production.

The other five OPEC members—Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, Ecuador and Gabon—are producing at slightly under 100 percent of their capacity, he added.

Aspin urged U.S. leaders to try to convince the four Arab monarchies that increased production would be in their long-term national interests.

## THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

11 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page 34

## U.S. Grain Prices Increase on Speculation Of Reduced Size of Soviet Union's Crops

By LAURIE COHEN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Farmers have only begun to harvest the winter wheat crop in the Soviet Union, but speculation about the reduced size of this and other Soviet grain crops already has triggered a sharp rise in U.S. grain prices.

The week after June 8, when the Agriculture Department trimmed its estimate of the Soviet grain harvest 12%, the price of wheat for July delivery on the Chicago Board of Trade rose 58 cents a bushel to \$4.43. That estimate put the 1979 crop at between 170 million and 210 million metric tons, well below last year's harvest of 235 million metric tons. Traders reason that a smaller Soviet crop means more demand for U.S. grain exports.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency then estimated the Soviet crop at 185 million metric tons, and wheat prices plunged 16 cents a bushel. The estimate was within the Agriculture Department's range but above the 150 million metric tons rumored on the floor of the Board of Trade.

The Agriculture Department is due to issue an updated Soviet crop forecast today based on a recent tour of winter-wheat growing areas by agency officials. If the new forecast is substantially different from the one issued June 8, grain prices can be expected to reflect the difference, analysts say.

On the Board of Trade yesterday, wheat, corn and soybean prices fell as traders anxiously awaited today's news on the Soviet crop and a separate report on the U.S. crop outlook. The U.S. crop was expected to be higher than previous forecasts, while the Soviet crop was expected to be nearly unchanged, despite initial indications from the Agriculture Department that the Russian crop would be at the low end of its range.

This nervousness shows the Soviet Union's importance as a customer for world grain and the high degree of uncertainty regarding the country's needs, analysts say. Officials of major grain-exporting companies and other experts agree that the extent of buying by the U.S.S.R. will play a key role in determining the tightness of world grain supplies this year. Moreover, they say, the U.S. will be the main source of additional grain for Moscow. But observers also say that the Soviet Union's physical capacity for handling imports could limit its purchases, despite lagging crop production.

The Agriculture Department forecasts that world grain trade will increase to between 166 million and 176 million metric tons in the year ending June 30, 1980, up from 158.9 million last year. The Soviet Union is expected to buy about nine million metric tons more than it did a year ago, or between 21 million metric tons and 28 million metric tons, up from 15.2 million metric tons in 1973-74. (A metric ton equals 36.7 bushels of wheat or soybeans and 39.4 bushels of corn.)

But some experts say Soviet imports could exceed the department's forecast. The Soviet Union's largest grain purchases, about 26 million metric tons, came in 1975-76, when their grain harvest fell almost 30% from the previous year to 140 million metric tons. Since then, a campaign to upgrade the country's diet has boosted demand for wheat and feed grains. In addition, "they've made such tremendous improvements" in their ability to receive imports that they could take more than 30 million metric tons, asserts the top officer of an international exporter.

A vice president in charge of Soviet sales for another grain company says that in the past the Soviets were able to import a maximum of three million metric tons of grain a month. "It's almost inconceivable that they could keep that up for 12 months," he adds. Experts say that the need to put railcars in place to haul such a large amount of grain to interior points would probably create severe logistical problems. Limited space for storing and drying grain could also result in bottlenecks, analysts say.

Under a U.S.-Soviet grain agreement that enters its fourth year Oct. 1, the U.S.S.R. may buy a minimum of six million metric tons of corn and wheat and a maximum of eight million metric tons. For the second and third years of the pact, the limit was raised to 15 million metric tons. Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland has left open the possibility of raising the ceiling again this year, "pending the outcome of the (U.S.) crop." A vice president for a major exporter says that "if our crops are better than normal, the Agriculture Department would certainly let them take more" than 15 million metric tons. "Currently, our crops look excellent," he says.

In fact, market sources say that the Soviet Union has probably already bought the eight million metric tons basic quota for 1979-80, which begins Sept. 1. Though exporters are required to report large sales to the Agriculture Department, they don't have to disclose the destinations of sales until the grain is shipped. Sales of corn and wheat to unidentified buyers for shipment in 1979-80 total 13.7 million metric tons.

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ON PAGE 94

THE ECONOMIST  
7 July 1979

### Grain

## Russia wants more

There are too many ways of assessing Russia's grain prospects: (a) hire James Bond or a spy-in-the-sky satellite; or (b) more simply, have a look at the Chicago futures market, which, via the United States department of agriculture and the CIA, does these things for you.

Chicago has been bouncing up and down like a yo-yo. The July wheat contract, after bumping along at around \$3.15 a bushel for months, jumped suddenly in late April, then soared again in early June to a peak of \$4.83 on June 22nd, before dropping some 50 cents. It was picking up again this week, on news from Russia.

Last year Russia had a record 237m-tonne grain harvest, but it still went on importing heavily from the United States. This year's Soviet target for the harvest was 227m tonnes. It is not going to be reached, because of a wet autumn, a cold winter and a flooded spring (notably in the grain areas of the Don and Volga valleys) followed by a too-dry early summer. A month ago the American agriculture department forecast a range of 170m-210m tonnes. Expectations have been lowered since then.

The effect on forecasts of international trade has been dramatic. In the current crop year, the Russians have imported about 5m tonnes of wheat and 10m tonnes of coarse grains. The American agriculture department has expected for some time that both figures will be roughly doubled in the new crop year: to 7m-11m tonnes of wheat (the International Wheat Council says 5m-7m tonnes) and 13m-19m tonnes of coarse grains. A total of 20m-30m tonnes, in a world whose entire international trade in these grains (rice is excluded) is only 150m-160m tonnes. The latest forecast, from the CIA, puts the guess at Russia's imports still higher: over 35m tonnes. Hence Chicago's surge.

There is no risk of the Russians starving, but their hopes of getting decent supplies of grain-fed meat may have been put off for yet another year. Nor will the world starve, though the present best guess is that world wheat output this season may drop to around 405m tonnes (against last season's 435m), and coarse grains drop to 710m tonnes (against last year's 740m). Consumption is pretty flexible, especially of the coarse grains, mainly destined for animals. And American farmers still have some 20m acres of potential grain land "set aside", so that they do not produce a glut of grain to overwhelm price support policy.

Big imports by Russia would be good news for shipowners. They would be bad news for the poor of the few third-world countries that would then have to import wheat on commercial terms. The extra push given to American inflation could be disagreeable—but not to grain farmers or America's trade balance: an extra \$1.25 a bushel on their wheat crop, plus, say, 60c on maize, which has moved up less dramatically, is worth about \$6½ billion a year to American farmers, \$2½ billion of it in export earnings. EEC consumers should not be hard hit: even at \$5 a bushel, American wheat would only just about reach official EEC support levels.



## The Fireman and the Flanks

THE encouraging word out of NATO the other day, following the two-day semi-annual meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels 13-14 May, is that the various members of the Alliance have agreed in principle to maintain an annual "real increase" in defense spending of about 3% through the mid-1980s.

Also approved was a substantial increase in expenditures for the Alliance's "infrastructure"—the aircraft shelters, port facilities, ammunition storage depots, etc., needed for any emergency reinforcement of the combat troops on the line.

Thirty years after the founding of NATO, and 35 years after D-Day, those collective pledges are heartening affirmation that the organization's military hierarchy, at least, recognizes the seriousness of the continuing Soviet buildup and is determined to counter it with equal force.

There are problems with such promises, though. For one thing, they're not binding even on present governments, much less future ones. The announcement of the 3% annual defense spending increases was hedged as usual with reservations about the economic and political conditions within each country "and the risks and difficulties of final government and parliamentary approval." In other words, each country will judge for itself what's economically and politically feasible. If experience is any yardstick, most members of the Alliance probably will let domestic considerations outweigh their apprehensions about the threat to their collective security.

Another problem is that a 3% annual increase in defense spending would be a helpful start in the right direction, but no more than that. The CIA estimates that the Soviet Union last year spent 45% more on military manpower and armaments than the United States did—\$146 billion vs. \$102 billion. If the United States and its NATO allies do increase their own defense spending as promised, the best that can be said is that we would be flunking higher. Until the Alliance faces up to the fact that much greater outlays are needed to regain military parity the present overwhelming Soviet margin of superiority in conventional arms will continue to grow until the situation is perhaps militarily irreversible.

What was not said, what was not promised, in Brussels, moreover, could be of even greater importance in the long run than what was said, and what was promised. There was, for example, a realistic recognition that U.S. airlift capabilities should be expanded. "By the end of the [infrastructure] program," Don Cook of the Los Angeles Times reported on 16 May, "the United States hopes to be able to airlift five divisions to Europe within 30 days instead of the present capability of two divisions. The United States is also to be able to bring in 60 air squadrons within the 30-day period as against the present 20-squadron capability."

That's all well and good. But what about sealift, the real Achilles heel of the Alliance? Hundreds of thousands of

tons of supplies will be urgently needed on an almost immediate basis by the ground and air units ferried in as reinforcements, as well as by those already stationed on the Central Front. There is no way to airlift the supplies and equipment needed for any conflict which lasts more than a week or two; the troops can be flown in, but everything else will have to come by ship.

But the ships simply are not available—not in the sizes, capabilities, and configurations most likely to be needed. And neither are the naval forces available which would be needed for convoy duty against a Soviet submarine force about 10 times the size of, and immensely more capable than, the Nazi submarine fleet which almost won the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II.

If NATO doesn't build up its anti-submarine warfare forces and U.S./NATO-flag merchant marine capabilities to insure resupply of its personnel reinforcements, the ground and air units on the Central Front will, within just a few days after the start of conflict, be out of fuel, out of ammunition, and out of luck—and out of the war as well.

The Alliance also is neglecting its flanks. And, make no mistake about it, those flanks now extend from Indonesia to Italy, from Bolivia to Belgium, across the Indian Ocean and through the waters of the South Atlantic, wherever the ships must go which bring the raw materials, metals, and minerals needed by the highly industrialized member countries of NATO. In long-range strategic terms it matters little that there is peace in Europe if the USSR controls the passage of ships to and through the Persian Gulf and around the Cape of Good Hope.

In warfare as in sports it is common sense to hit the enemy where he is weakest. NATO's greatest weakness is in logistics, in its reinforcement capabilities, particularly in sealift. In such circumstances sound Soviet strategy would dictate an attack not on the Central Front, where the United States and its allies are relatively strong and able to fight back most effectively, but against the fuel and supply dumps, the prepositioned stocks of ammunition and equipment, without which the combat forces would be helpless, and against the Alliance's outnumbered naval and maritime units both in port and on the high seas.

Admiral Isaac C. "Ike" Kidd, Jr., the now-retired former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, liked to compare the air units and ground troops in the combat zone to a fireman holding the business end of the hose at a fire. So long as the water keeps coming through in sufficient volume and force the fireman can keep doing his job. But cut the water off at the source, or anywhere else along the line, and he is no longer effective.

It's a homely analogy, but one disconcertingly applicable to the present situation in Europe. At their next meeting the defense ministers might want to consider that, without a hose which is well-secured and in good repair, the fireman holding the nozzle is going to get burnt—and, until the hose is repaired, so are all the additional firemen rushed to the scene.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1-5THE BALTIMORE SUN  
9 July 1979

# JFK autopsy photos said to be fakes

By STEVE PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

New York—A photo technician hired by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to analyze film related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy has concluded that four of the Kennedy autopsy photos are forgeries.

Robert F. Groden, a photo-optics technician who served as consultant to the committee, said he has evidence "that raises grave doubts about the authenticity" of materials relied upon by the House committee and three earlier investigations into the Kennedy assassination.

The Sun was shown a copy of his written conclusions, which will be included in the final version of the committee's report to be released later this month.

"For the record," Mr. Groden wrote in his analysis, "my visual inspection of the autopsy photos and X-rays reveals evidence of forgery in four of the photos," two color pictures showing the back of the President's head and the same shots in black and white.

Mr. Groden's analysis suggesting the possibility of an exit wound in the back of the President's head is supported by the sworn statements of 10 doctors and nurses who treated or handled President Kennedy upon his arrival at Parkland Hospital in Dallas immediately after he was shot November 22, 1963.

The Warren Commission based its September (1964) conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin in part on autopsy evidence that indicated all the shots came from the rear. The House committee's reported conclusion also is that the only shots which hit the President came from the rear.

Mr. Groden concludes that the alleged

forgery of autopsy photos was accomplished by the "matte insertion process," a technique well known in motion pictures and widely used in such films as "Superman: The Movie."

The process works this way: A small area is cut out of the larger backdrop film into which a new image is to be inserted. For instance, the skyline of the fictional city of Metropolis was the backdrop against which a horizontally outstretched Superman was imposed, giving the impression of flight.

The density of images around the edges, where one negative fits into the other, is reduced so they blend smoothly. One negative is placed on top of the other and a positive image is created from this insertion process.

Mr. Groden contends that the autopsy photos were forged in the same manner.

A photo showing part of the back of a cadaver's head, containing a small entry bullet wound, Mr. Groden said, was inserted over that of a massive exit wound in the back of President Kennedy's head in an apparent attempt to conceal the wound caused by a shot from the front.

Mr. Groden's analysis of the autopsy photos was completed early last summer, before his September 7 testimony during the committee's public hearings. Mr. Groden said he was specifically forbidden to discuss the autopsy photos when he testified.

Committee sources said Mr. Groden's instructions were that he was not allowed to discuss any aspect of the case which had not been covered previously in the public sessions. As Mr. Groden was the second witness to be called—following former Texas Gov. John B. Connally—the autopsy photos were off limits in accordance with the committee's ground rules.

In mid-July, a staff member of the House assassinations committee discovered that one of the Kennedy files—containing the autopsy photos that were being kept in a combination safe—had been handled by "an unauthorized person," who apparently gained access to them surreptitiously.

Fingerprints were found not only on the plastic sleeves containing the photos, but also on the pictures themselves. Among them were the four photos which Mr. Groden contends are forgeries.

District of Columbia police traced the fingerprints to Regis T. Blahut, a Central Intelligence Agency officer assigned to assist the committee with CIA files needed for the assassinations investigation.

Police said Mr. Blahut's fingerprints also were found on X-rays of the President and on the so-called "magic bullet," which had been crucial in linking Oswald to the assassination.

A CIA spokesman said the agency fired Mr. Blahut immediately after the fingerprints were identified. The spokesman, Herbert Hetu, said the agency was satisfied that the tampering with Kennedy assassination evidence was "just a matter of personal curiosity."

Mr. Groden said he submitted his report on the alleged autopsy-photo forgeries to the committee during the last week of June—about two weeks before it was discovered that Mr. Blahut of the CIA had tampered with the same photographic evidence Mr. Groden had been examining.

"It seems like too much of a coincidence to me," Mr. Groden said over the weekend.

At the close of its hearings last year, the House committee released its preliminary finding that President Kennedy's death was "probably" the result of a conspiracy—that there were at least two gunmen.

EXCERPT

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
11 JULY 1979

# Mystery of J.F.K. photo is unsolved

By Jim Adams  
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — House investigators say they are not satisfied that mere curiosity was the reason a CIA agent removed an autopsy photograph of President John F. Kennedy from a committee safe.

But they do not know what the reason might have been and probably will never find out, Rep. Louis Stokes (D., Ohio), chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, told the House last week.

Stokes said a committee investigation has concluded that the CIA did not direct the agent to rifle the committee's safe, which the agent was assigned to guard.

The agent, since fired, has been quoted as saying his only reason for looking at the photograph was personal curiosity. The photograph was found outside the safe by a committee employee.

"The committee staff members are not satisfied that the motive has been established," Stokes told the House.

"They believe mere curiosity is not consistent with the fingerprint evidence."

The CIA said its own investigation concluded that the reason was mere curiosity.

Stokes told the House there was no evidence that the photograph had been taken from the committee's office or had been misused, or that anyone had profited from it. He said the agent's fingerprints were found on the inside of the safe door, indicating that it had been pulled open, and on a plastic cover in a notebook from which the photograph was ripped.

Stokes said that, in the initial interview, the agent denied getting into the safe and that, in a second interview, he "did not admit any wrongdoing." Stokes said the agent had refused further interviews.

"In the absence of a full and truthful confession by the agency employee or the others, if any, who were in league with him — or substantial new evidence — all recognize that

the matter of motive cannot be ultimately resolved," Stokes said.

He said he considers the matter closed, but would assist any further House investigation. There have been reports that the permanent House Select Committee on Intelligence is investigating the incident.

Stokes' report to the House confirmed Washington Post reports about the incident, which occurred last July. The newspaper identified the agent as Regis T. Blahut. The CIA subsequently confirmed the agent's name and said he had been fired as a result of the incident.

The Post quoted Blahut as saying, when asked why he would not discuss the case: "There's other things that are involved that are detrimental to other things."

Stokes told the House that the agent was left alone in the committee's offices by a committee employee, but then had to open a closed but unlocked door to an adjoining room to gain access to the safe.

The committee employee, an artist making medical drawings of Kennedy's wounds, returned to find the photograph and the notebook that had contained it outside the safe, Stokes said.

The autopsy photographs were kept in the safe, Stokes said, to prevent the pictures from ever becoming public.

The assassinations committee has concluded that Kennedy's assassination on Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas probably resulted from a conspiracy involving two gunmen.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
18 JULY 1979

## Hill Panel Turns To Top Issue, Verifying SALT

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today turned to the most sensitive, technical and perhaps most difficult single question of the strategic arms treaty debate: Can the United States adequately determine whether the Russians are cheating?

Today's open session follows an afternoon spent by the committee behind the Capitol's most secure doors going over this question of verification, as it is called in arms control jargon.

Scheduled to testify were Defense Secretary Harold Brown, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and George Seignious, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The administration has maintained that the SALT II treaty is "adequately verifiable," despite such recent setbacks as the loss of CIA electronic listening posts in Iran that monitored test launches of Soviet liquid-fueled rockets.

Chief among critics on verification has been Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, a former astronaut sufficiently at home with the technology to command credibility on the issue with colleagues.

At a recent committee meeting, Glenn made clear that he is still very skeptical about the verification ability of the United States and is particularly interested in pinning the administration down on current capabilities, rather than being satisfied with programs for future improvement.

The administration position in that regard has been that while U.S.

ability to monitor missile tests was degraded by the loss of Iran, its capabilities remain good enough to detect Soviet cheating before it could affect the strategic balance.

For the first time yesterday, the administration picked up endorsements for the treaty from retired high-ranking military men: Adm. Noel Gaylor, former head of the National Security Agency, Gen. Russell Dougherty, former chief of the Strategic Air Command, and Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, former commander of the Navy's Atlantic fleet and former chief of naval materiel.

Kidd said the treaty supplied breathing room in which to correct deficiencies in the strategic position of the United States.

Gaylor said more could be hoped for, "but I ask what the situation would be without this treaty." Dougherty commended the process of negotiation and the results of SALT II.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
18 JULY 1979

## Some Senators Say an Arms Pact Loophole Aids Soviet

By RICHART BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 17 — A new issue in the Senate debate over the strategic arms treaty has arisen with the realization that the treaty would allow the Soviet Union to deploy up to five intercontinental missile systems now under development.

Senate aides said that, during a closed hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee last week, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, said the deployment was permitted under the pact's provisions on missile modernization and replacement.

The treaty allows the testing and deployment of an entirely new type of missile as well as the modification of existing types within 5 percent of some of their present characteristics such as weight and size.

### One Entirely New System Allowed

Witnesses for the Government have tended to stress that each side, under the treaty, would be permitted to deploy the one entirely new missile system. But White House and Pentagon aides confirmed today that the modernization provisions would allow the Russians to deploy five new types of missiles.

The new Soviet missiles, including a replacement for the SS-18 heavy missile, are said to be part of a "fifth generation" of systems that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown disclosed a year ago.

As a result of Admiral Turner's testimony, some senators critical of the treaty are now saying that the Govern-

ment misled them by asserting earlier that the accord permitted both sides only one new type of land-based missile. They said that Soviet Union's apparent ability to deploy additional systems could become a central issue in hearings next week before the Armed Services Committee.

Pentagon aides, while conceding that Moscow could replace its existing force of land-based missiles with new systems, denied any intention to mislead the Senate. They said that, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last week, Secretary Brown alluded to the replacement missiles by saying that "all but one of these new missiles will have to be restricted to quite limited modifications of their predecessors."

The aides said the issue of new missile systems reflected differences over how Article IV of the treaty was to be interpreted. The article says that each side can deploy only one "new type" of land-based missile. But it also allows modification of existing types as long as the changes do not increase or decrease the weight, size or lifting power of the missiles by more than 5 percent.

### Critics See Loophole in Treaty

Opponents of the treaty regard the 5 percent provision as a loophole. They say that the provision, while restricting allowable modifications, does not stop the Russians from replacing existing models with new systems in the next few years. Under the treaty, they say, Moscow can say that any new missile system is only a modification of an earlier type.

Intelligence officials say that the Soviet Union's new generation of missiles under development consists of one heavy, liquid-fueled missile, two medium-size, liquid-fueled systems and two smaller solid-fuel systems. Critics say that the treaty would enable Moscow to use the new sys-

tems to replace the existing heavy SS-18 as well as the SS-17 and SS-19 missiles.

A Pentagon aide involved in the arms treaty did not dispute that the SS-18 and other missiles might be replaced. But he said the restrictions on increases in weight and size would insure that any threat posed by the new missiles would not be fundamentally different from that of the existing Soviet arsenal.

He also noted that any new missiles would not be permitted to carry more warheads than the systems they replaced. As a result, he said, with the exception of the one new type allowed each side, the Soviet systems could be considered variants of existing missiles.

This interpretation was questioned by aides on the Armed Services Committee who said that the new missiles could be made more lethal than the weapons they replaced. While the treaty would not allow the new systems to differ significantly in weight and size from existing missiles, the aides said, the new generation of missiles could still be more accurate and reliable and would be easier to maintain.

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HUMAN EVENTS  
14 July 1979

THIS WEEK'S NEWS FROM

## Inside Washington

### Ex-CIA Director Bush Says SALT II 'Unverifiable'

Former CIA director George Bush, who is also a Republican presidential contender, has come out foursquare against Jimmy Carter's strategic arms limitation treaty. Bush, who has proved himself to be a hardliner in foreign policy, recently asked rhetorically of his Orlando, Fla., audience—before his rival, Sen. Howard Baker had opposed SALT—whether the treaty was verifiable, guaranteed U.S. equality or even held the Soviets in check. Responded Bush: "The straight hard answer in every case... No!"

Aside from pointing out that the treaty permits the Soviets to keep more than 300 "very large ICBMs with seven times the power of our largest MIRVed missile, while we are permitted none of these remarkably destructive weapons," Bush stressed that the treaty was "unverifiable." As the ex-chief of the CIA, his remarks take on added weight.

There is only one question on the subject of verification, he said, "Can we catch the Soviets if they try to cheat? And again, the answer is ominous for the United States. The fact is that under this treaty, we are virtually unable to monitor whether the Soviets comply with its terms."

The Soviets, he said, "have flatly refused to permit on-site inspections to verify such compliance. Stansfield Turner, the current chief of the CIA, has testified in closed session before the Senate that it will take until 1984 to fully restore the intelligence capability that we had for monitoring Soviet missile tests and development, but that was lost when Iran went up in flames."

"Everyday, it seems, we learn how high a price we must pay for the loss of our close ties with Iran—whether it is in higher prices at the gas pump, long lines at the filling station, or an inability to keep a close eye on Soviet nuclear armament."

"When it comes to verification of SALT II, Jimmy Carter will ask us to trust the Soviets as he once asked us to trust him. But I should say to you: a treaty that cannot be verified tomorrow should not be ratified today."



THE WASHINGTON POST

17 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-17*William E. Colby*

## Soviet SALT Politics

Weapons systems, military forces and intelligence machinery are the stuff of SALT II. Debate rages over each of these to the bewilderment of the public and the delight of the experts. But there is another dimension to the debate, which is as important as any single detail. The political background of the treaty, within the Soviet Union and in the international arena, must be factored into the eventual decision on ratification, amendment or rejection. Only by including this dimension can its individual details be given their proper weight.

The Soviet Union's political process is certainly different from the American. But different interests and points of view do exist in the Soviet system, and there are procedures for resolution of those differences within the bureaucracy, the party apparatus and the leadership councils. From the record of negotiations of SALT II, it is clear that a number of balancing trade-offs took place in the Soviet negotiating position and in Soviet acceptance of the final version. Hardheaded Soviet insistence on retaining the heavy missile was balanced by Soviet acceptance of equal aggregate force totals, despite earlier arguments that our Europe-based and allied nuclear forces that can strike the U.S.S.R. should be included in the American count. American insistence on counting rules was accepted despite their penalizing some single-warhead Soviet missiles and launchers by counting them as multiples, because their prototype was so tested.

Some Soviet concessions were more apparent than real, such as the agreement to abandon the mobile SS16, which was apparently a dud. But others will require substantial changes in established Soviet practices, such as the destruction of 250 existing Soviet launchers, the limit to one new missile instead of the usual four per generation, the exchange of data on forces and test notifications despite longstanding Soviet paranoia about secrecy, and the restriction of the heavy missile to 10 warheads rather than allowing it to be improved to carry its full capability of

30 or more. The final text also represents Soviet acceptance of future improvements in America's forces through the MX missile and cruise missiles, the latter compromise balancing American agreement that the Soviet Backfire not be counted, with limitations imposed on each side's weapon.

These Soviet concessions reflect a Soviet political decision that the benefits of SALT II to the U.S.S.R. outweigh them. The primary benefit was the cap it put on the American arms race and the danger that the American sleeping giant might arise and outdistance the Soviets in this technology in the same dramatic way it did in the 1960s space race. Recognition as an essentially equal superpower also represents a long-sought Soviet goal, and SALT II's numerical and qualitative provisions make this plain.

But a sense of the bargaining that occurred among Soviet decision-makers can be seen from the Soviet reaction to President Carter's March 1977 suggestion to "amend" the agreements reached in 1974 at Vladivostok to reduce the Soviet heavy-missile force from 300 to 150 launchers. The reaction was sharp and harsh, showing that the 1974 trade-offs were viewed as firm rocks in the negotiated balance, not subject to later rearrangement. Americans blithely contemplating similar amendments now should recall the criticism of the naiveté and brashness of the American diplomacy in that instance.

The final text of SALT II reflects these compromises made within the Soviet government, just as it reflects the compromises made within the U.S. government. The treaty before the Senate thus does not satisfy every Soviet interest, as it does not satisfy every American. But it is the culmination of a series of mutual compromises and concessions, to which the Soviets contributed in substantial measure. The Soviet political consensus this reflects is a fact that must be weighed as the Senate now judges the treaty.

Ratification, of course, is a different subject in the two countries, but the review required for Senate ratification could find an analogy on the

Soviet side if the treaty is not ratified and an obviously ailing President Brezhnev dies. The succession crisis then would seize the Soviet leadership. Previous successions suggest that this would produce an interim period of confusion and maneuvering, followed by the rise a few years later of a new leader and the possible adoption of new policies.

Failure of U.S. ratification thus could open a political interstice in which strategic weapons would be without agreed controls during a Soviet succession struggle. Wholly new policies and positions could be advocated by contenders for power and for support within the Soviet leadership. An agreement fully ratified before the passing of Brezhnev could, of course, be subject to actual if not legal repudiation by his successor, but that would be a much more difficult and dangerous defiance of American power than drastic proposals for Soviet "amendments" of a text still not formally adopted by the two governments.

American allies, the Soviet Union and its allies and the uncommitted nations closely observe the firmness and competence of the American management of the strategic arms relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Brinkmanship and provocation would draw criticism, but indecision and weakness would create doubts. As concern has grown over American leadership in the fields of energy, international finance and assistance to embattled friends, so disarray and lack of an American consensus in the strategic nuclear field could cause qualms about basic alliance relationships and could bring about shifts in the center of political gravity from the United States toward the U.S.S.R.

As the debate moves to include these broad political dimensions beyond the details of SALT II, it should also stimulate consideration of the other problems America faces with respect to the Soviet Union. These must include our convention-

**CONTINUED**

al-force imbalance and the problem of dealing with Soviet subversion and Cuban proxies. We must also face up to the need for firm support of our friends and allies against outside siren songs or internal turmoil, despite cries for our noninterference.

This dimension need not "link" all our problems with the Soviets to SALT II and make it hostage to our satisfaction across the board. But it should alert us to the need to fashion appropriate policies, programs and weapons to protect ourselves and our allies at each level of threat. In this larger political dimension, the benefits of SALT II can be better appreciated for the talents and resources it will free to devote to other purposes. The "small step for man" presented in SALT II can then be firmly taken by Americans as a component of a "giant step for mankind" that a stable U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship could produce.

*The writer was formerly director  
of the Central Intelligence Agency.*

Article Appeared  
On Page View-20

THE DAILY NEWS  
15 July 1979

# SALT-2: The name of the game is high spy

By JOSEPH VOLZ

**W**ASHINGTON—High above the Soviet Union, four United States spy satellites are on permanent station, watching for Russian missile tests.

Usually, two of the four Rhyolite satellites, hovering 22,000 miles up, are in operation at any one time. Their mission: To discover a Soviet missile blast-off within seconds and to identify the missile by using infrared sensors to detect the particular infrared "signature" of that weapon.

These spy satellites, along with land and sea-based radars, spy planes, ground listening devices and a few—very few—old fashioned human spies, make up the U.S. "verification" team. They will make sure that the Soviets do not cheat if the new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT-2) is ratified by the Senate. The critics say our "spies" can't do the job well enough.

## *Disguise missile development*

The Senate began hearings on the treaty last week, and one of the major points of the anti-SALT crowd was that the Soviets can disguise new missile development and upgrade of strategic missiles and bombers without the U.S. spies learning the full story in time to stop the violations.

The Carter administration is the first to publicly admit that the U.S. does have spy satellites, but Carter has ordered that little more be said publicly. No photos taken by U.S. spy satellites have ever been released.

Nevertheless, it is possible through interviews with people who have seen such photos, to put together a list of U.S. spy satellite accomplishments.

• Pictures from the photo satellites, which circle the earth at an altitude of about 100 miles and speeds of 16,000 mph, showed that

the Soviet SS-9 missile warheads were being delivered to the silos in different containers, indicating the Soviets were putting multiple rather than single nuclear warheads on each missile.

• Photo satellites were the first to discover that the Soviets were building a new super submarine and a new mini-aircraft carrier. This was before the vessels were ready for sea trials. Apparently the satellites took pictures of shipyard activity and materials trucked into the yard.

• Central Intelligence Agency analysts concluded a few years ago, mainly on the basis of satellite data, that the Soviets did not have an operational antiballistic missile system for Moscow. The Russians had dug numerous ABM holes in an attempt to deceive the photo satellites.

• Through electronic communications intercepts by the National Security Agency of Soviet conversations, the U.S. reportedly discovered the Russian position on the SALT-1 talks. (SALT-1 was signed in 1972.)

The U.S. has about 50 spy satellites aloft—they have a six-month life span—compared with more than 300 for the Soviet Union. The "Big Bird" spy satellite—weighing 11 tons, compared with the first American spies in the sky 20 years ago, which weighed only 38 pounds—is the workhorse of the U.S. spy fleet.

Big Bird can take black and white, color or infrared television pictures and can take a clear picture of a 3-foot object from 100 miles up. That is, if it knows what it's looking for.

## *Can film large areas*

To solve that problem, satellites flying at 200 miles up can film large areas. For example, a U.S. satellite—and presumably its Soviet counterpart—can photograph half of New England in one film clip.

Photo satellites do have draw-

*continued*

backs—they need clear weather and daylight. And because they fly the same pattern day after day to make sure there are no significant changes, the Soviets often know when the spy-in-the-sky is coming and can make attempts at camouflage.

Satellites are also uncritical, as Air Force's former intelligence chief Gen. George Keegan points out: The satellites spotted and photographed hundreds of Soviet military buildings but had no way to determine what they were used for.

"They're excellent in counting the number of above-ground missiles and planes, but CIA analysts sometimes fail to come to grips with the operational import of the weapons," Keegan says.

Huge ground radars at the beginning of a Soviet missile test flight and at the end of the flight in a Pacific splashdown have provided

vital information on performance characteristics of the missiles. Cobra Dane, a U.S. radar facility in the Aleutians that went into operation in 1977, for example, can spot a basketball at 2,000 miles.

The Iranian revolt has shut down a key CIA radar facility near the Soviet test center at Tyuratam. U.S. ground radar facilities in Turkey, which are much farther from the test center, and possible U-2 spy plane flights over Turkey may make up the loss.

#### ***Not quite what he said***

But CIA Director Stansfield Turner reportedly told Congress it would take until 1984 to compensate for the Iranian losses. Turner now says that is not quite what he said but what he did say is classified.

Carter has complained that the CIA relies too much on technical means (satellites and spy planes like the U-2 and the high flying SR-71) and should use more "regular" means. That means human spies, on the ground.

Because so much of the material on U.S. intelligence is classified, it is difficult for the average person to determine who is right: Carter, who says we do have adequate means to detect Soviet cheating, or the former intelligence officials, who say the Soviets will take us to the cleaners.

However, it does appear the U.S. has the ability to detect any major cheating by the Soviets, even if officials can't go into great detail about it with the senators who must approve the treaty. In any event, the U.S. must continue to watch Soviet weapons development closely, whether or not it ratifies SALT. The point is if the treaty is not approved, we may end up needing better verification.

*Joseph Volz, of The News Washington bureau, covers the Pentagon.*

19 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page 5

## U.S. Can Detect Major SALT Violations By Soviets, Brown Assures Senate Panel

By THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON—The U.S. will be able to catch any militarily threatening Soviet violation of the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, although minor infractions might go undetected, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said.

"Any cheating serious enough to affect the military balance would be detectable in sufficient time to take whatever action the situation required," Mr. Brown told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The U.S. ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II provisions is one of the most sensitive issues in the Senate debate over the treaty. The pact must win a two-thirds vote for ratification. The treaty limits to 2,250 the number of long-range nuclear weapons each side can deploy through 1985 and places various restrictions on force improvements.

In response to some Senators' assertions that the U.S. won't be able to spot possible Soviet violations, Mr. Brown conceded that "no one can pretend that our intelligence collection capability is perfect." But, he added, the treaty is "adequately verifiable. Our impressive monitoring capability doesn't mean that we can be certain of detecting every conceivable treaty violation—or every conceivable change in Soviet strategic forces—as soon as it occurs," he said. However, "to go undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it wouldn't be militarily significant."

Further, Mr. Brown said that SALT agreements make it easier to monitor Soviet strategic forces because they ban "deliberate" interference with the photographic satellites, giant radars and signal collection gear the U.S. trains on Soviet strategic programs. They also establish a number of rules and standards that make monitoring easier, he said. "All of the uncertainties we face in SALT II would be far worse without an agreement because Soviet concealment practices would then be unconstrained," Mr. Brown testified.

Some Senators were bothered by the ambiguity of adequate—rather than absolute—verification. "I guess Mrs. Brown would be a little suspicious if you were to come home tonight and say you'd been adequately faithful," Sen. Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) quipped. Mr. Brown, quickly seizing a chance to stress his point that verification will be eas-

ier with SALT than without it, replied: "In that case, as in this, I suppose it would depend on the alternative."

Part of the verification controversy involves a section of the treaty that allows each side to deploy one new land-based missile but attempts to limit the conversion of existing intercontinental ballistic missiles into new, more powerful ones. The provision bars changes of more than 5% in an existing missile's diameter, launch weight and payload weight. Some Senators, such as John Glenn (D., Ohio), say they don't believe the U.S. can monitor changes that small, particularly after the loss of intelligence outposts in Iran earlier this year.

Mr. Brown conceded that small violations of the 5% limits on launch weight or payload weight may go undetected. If there's an increase in one of these factors, Mr. Brown said, "I don't think it matters whether it's 5% or 10%. It doesn't affect our security."

Major violations of the rules, however, could be detected, Mr. Brown asserted.

Mr. Brown also repeated President Carter's assertion that the U.S. would abrogate the treaty if it discovered significant violations but he didn't list the type of infractions he considers major. "It depends how serious a violation is and how clear," he said. But he added that the U.S. should challenge the Soviets "early and strongly" when it suspects a violation.

# Harold Brown Seeks to Assure Senate on Pact Verification

By CHARLES MOHR  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18 — Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sought to assure the Senate today that the United States would be able to verify adequately the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union, but his testimony brought to light unresolved issues and disputes.

Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, said that with current methods of intelligence gathering the United States would "not even come close" to being able to ascertain whether the Russians have violated provisions limiting modifications that might be made in Soviet intercontinental nuclear missiles.

At a public hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, drew from Secretary Brown the statement that the Soviet Union did not define "national technical means" of intelligence gathering as broadly as did the United States. This, Mr. Sarbanes suggested, may make it difficult for the United States to complain about possible violations of the treaty's provision that neither side may interfere with such national means.

## Soviet Attitude Seems Unclear

Secretary Brown said Soviet officials "do not accept" intelligence-gathering systems and stations deployed in third countries as national technical means of the United States. His testimony did not make clear the Soviet attitude toward intelligence-gathering ships and planes operating on or over international waters.

The absence of an agreed definition of "national technical means" may become an issue since the Soviet Union may not feel constrained to interfere if it regards facilities in third countries as not constituting such national means.

Regarding concern that Soviet violations might go undetected, Mr. Brown said: "To have a good chance of remaining undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it would not be militarily significant."

Secretary Brown was questioned about a report today in The New York Times that some senators were concerned that the treaty allowed the Russians to deploy up to five intercontinental land-based missiles now under development.

He answered that, in addition to one entirely new missile, the treaty did permit changes in existing missiles within a 5 percent range of some characteristics.

Such changes would not be "militarily significant," he said, even if they were 10 or 15 percent of some characteristics such as launch-weight and throw-weight. The launch-weight is a missile's weight on launching; the throw-weight is the weight it can deliver to a target.

## Glenn Stresses Present Capability

The Defense Secretary said the Soviet Union could not be certain that American monitoring would not be refined enough to detect any violation of the 5 percent provision. But Senator Glenn said the United States should be able to verify the treaty by systems that exist now rather than depend on systems still under development.

Today's testimony followed a closed session yesterday when Secretary Brown discussed secret aspects of United States monitoring capabilities. Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, will testify on the same subject in closed session next Tuesday.

In answer to questions by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, Secretary Brown said that a long series of test firings was needed to develop a new or significantly improved weapon and that the chances of any unauthorized improvements going undetected "is not as high as one in a million."

While marginal improvements through cheating are widely assumed to be possible, a more serious question is whether the Russians could "break out" of the treaty constraints with rapidly deployed new strategic strength.

Both Secretary Brown and Dr. William

J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, said that there was little danger of the sudden appearance of many new missile launchers and that it takes several years between the time a missile is first tested and the time it is deployed.

Mr. Brown made the point that the treaty provisions prohibiting deliberate concealment of deployment as well as interference with national technical means also made it easier in general to gather intelligence about the Soviet Union than would be the case without a treaty.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Article appeared  
on page A-8

19 July 1979

# Brown Defends SALT's 'New-Type' Missiles Rule

By Robert G. Kaiser  
and Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writers

Defense Secretary Harold Brown acknowledged yesterday that the United States would have "some uncertainty" about Soviet compliance with some sections of SALT II, including the provision banning more than one "new type" of missile during the life of the treaty.

Nevertheless, Brown said, American intelligence can catch the Russians if they ever try to cheat in a way that would significantly alter the strategic balance.

Brown acknowledged that the ban on more than one "new type" missile would not prevent the Soviets—or the United States—from replacing all their existing missiles with new ones. He insisted, however, that these new missiles would have to be such close copies of the existing versions that they would not provide any significant military advantage.

Specifically, Brown said, the new versions could not significantly exceed their predecessors in throw-weight—the amount of payload a rocket can deliver—or in the number of nuclear warheads carried by each rocket. These, Brown said, were the militarily significant measures.

At yesterday's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on verification of the new treaty, Brown was asked about the prospects for new Soviet missiles by Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho), who referred the secretary to a report in yesterday's New York Times. The article said "some senators" felt the treaty contained a loophole after hearing secret testimony from CIA Director Stansfield Turner that the Soviets could replace all their missiles with new models.

Air Force Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the same effect in an open session of the committee last week. Jones said that if the Soviets chose to deploy new versions, they would get no appreciable military advantage from doing so.

Brown repeated this point yesterday. He asked committee members to imagine what would happen if he went to the Armed Services Committee to request billions of dollars for "entirely new missiles" that have the same payloads, the same number of warheads, the same yield and the same principal dimensions as their predecessors.

"I would be accused, and quite rightly, of wasting the taxpayers' money," Brown said, adding that the Soviets would be doing just that.

Brown's remarks illustrate the extraordinary complexity of the "new-type" provision. Though he said the permissible new versions of old rockets would have to have the same yield (explosive power) and same number of warheads, this is not precisely true. In fact the treaty permits increases in yield provided they do not cause a change of more than 5 percent in the weight of a rocket's payload. The treaty also permits reductions, but not increases, in the total number of warheads a rocket carries.

The American objective for the new-type provision was to limit Soviet options for modernizing their missile force. According to American intelligence estimates, the Soviets have at least four new missiles now in development.

Some critics of the treaty charge that the Soviets will be able to deploy all of these rockets, notwithstanding the new-type provision of SALT II.

Administration officials acknowledge that this may happen. But they say that the new-type provision—which limits variations in the size, weight and throw-weight to plus or minus 5 percent, compared to existing missiles, and bans any increase in the number of warheads—will mean these new missiles won't pose any added threat to the United States.

Officials acknowledge privately that some spokesmen for SALT II have been too loose with their language in describing the new-type provision, leaving the impression that the Soviets will be frozen in place by the treaty, except for the one new-type missile the treaty permits. In fact they won't be frozen, just severely limited, these officials say.

Gen. Jones testified that the new-type definition allows the Soviets to replace a Chevrolet with another Chevrolet, but not with "a Cadillac or a Volkswagen."

At yesterday's hearings senatorial frustrations spilled out in public for the first time during these deliberations.

John Glenn (D-Ohio) criticized Chairman Church for rushing through the verification issue, saying the committee was not prepared for yesterday's hearing. Glenn also charged that the committee hadn't adequately

probed U. S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty.

Church defended the committee's work, and said Glenn could have more meetings on verification if he wanted them.

Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-DeL) criticized the committee's rule limiting senators to 10 minutes of questioning at a time. This made follow-up questions impossible, Biden said.

Glenn said he thought the United States would be unable to know if the Soviets exceeded the 5 percent limit on improvements in missile characteristics using existing means of gathering such intelligence. Unless satisfied on this point, he said, he would vote against the treaty.

Brown replied that there might be some uncertainty about some precise figures, but he assured Glenn the Soviets could not deploy a strategically significant new weapon that violated the treaty without being detected.

Without SALT II, Brown said, the Soviets could hide many aspects of their strategic weapons program (the treaty bans deliberate concealment).

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-17NEW YORK TIMES  
18 JULY 1979

## *Kennedy Plot Theory Is Rejected by Counsel To the Warren Panel*

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 17 — The former counsel to the Warren Commission today rejected the conclusion of the House Assassinations Committee that the murder of President Kennedy was part of a conspiracy.

David W. Belin, counsel to the commission in 1964, said, "The conclusion that there was an unseen, hidden gunman is based on incomplete and incorrect investigation."

Mr. Belin, however, did not dismiss the House committee's allegation that the Warren Commission had failed to explore all conspiracy possibilities. "The Warren Commission did not have information about C.I.A. assassination plots against Castro that it should have had," Mr. Belin said, "and which probably would have broadened the scope of the commission's investigation."

### **Organized Crime Is Suspected**

The House committee released its report today. The panel, which spent more than \$5 million on its investigation into the assassinations of President Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., concluded that organized crime elements had "probably" conspired to kill Mr. Kennedy and that two people had fired at the President in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963.

The committee concluded that Dr. King's death in Memphis on April 4, 1968, "probably" evolved from a conspiracy of right-wing St. Louis businessmen. Its report criticized the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for failing to explore conspiracy possibilities adequately.

The House committee recommended that the Justice Department reopen the Kennedy investigation. Spokesmen for the F.B.I. and the Justice Department said that a decision would be made after a review of the committee's report.

Sources on the committee said that its published report did not include a long list of investigative leads the committee staff developed. These leads, the sources said, would be made available to the Justice Department should it reopen the investigation.

## Counsel in Assassination Study Brightened Panel's Reputation

By WENDELL RAWLS Jr.

Special to The New York Times

When he was appointed chief counsel to the strife-torn House Select Committee on Assassinations and assumed the burden of brightening the legislative and investigative reputation of that panel, George Robert Blakey stood before a gathering of reporters and said with a flinty grin:

"This press conference was called to announce that this is our last press conference."

He was not altogether joking. The next news conference was not held until more than a year later and was virtually simultaneous with the committee's first public hearings into the murders of President Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

The last news conference was held yesterday when the committee formally released its 686-page final report, which said that its investigation of the assassinations had found that both President Kennedy and Dr. King had "probably" been killed as a result of conspiracies. The committee urged the Justice Department to pursue its conspiracy leads.

### Panel Chairman Resigned

Mr. Blakey joined the committee at a time when it seemed likely that it would be dissolved by Congress, which appeared to despair over the panel's internal warfare. The committee was also accused of being disorganized and unproductive.

The committee's chairman, Representative Henry B. Gonzales, a Texas Democrat, tried to dismiss the chief counsel, Richard A. Sprague of Philadelphia, but the committee members backed the counsel against the chairman. Mr. Gonzales resigned and was replaced by Representative Louis Stokes, Democrat of Ohio.

Then Mr. Sprague was replaced by Mr. Blakey, a professor at Cornell University Law School. When he arrived at his new office he found an investigation that had been under way for six months but had not seen a single classified document from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency.

### His Job Is Described

Mr. Blakey's job was to put a staff together, plan the investigations of two of the most celebrated murders in the nation's history and present the findings to the public. Along the way, there was a legislative mandate to judge the performances of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secret Service and make legislative recommendations.

Mr. Blakey was one of 115 people considered for the job, Mr. Stokes said, and one of 13 persons interviewed for it.

Mr. Blakey came under harsh criticism this week from David Belin of Des



The New York Times

### George R. Blakey

Moines, the former Warren Commission counsel.

In an article in The New York Times Sunday Magazine, he accused Mr. Blakey of "excessive secrecy" in the conduct of the assassinations investigations, said that the committee's conclusion that a conspiracy probably existed in the Kennedy assassination "will not stand the test of history" and that when "all the other inadequacies come to light, the folly of the multimillion-dollar supersecret investigation will become clear to all."

### Response Will Come Later

Mr. Blakey said that he would respond to such criticism "at an appropriate time and in an appropriate place and at an appropriate length."

Mr. Blakey was born Jan. 7, 1936, the son of a Burlington, N.C., banker. He graduated with honors from the University of Notre Dame and was second in his class at Notre Dame Law School.

He was hired as part of a Justice Department Honors Program in 1960 and in 1964 returned to Notre Dame Law School to teach. In 1973, he became a professor at Cornell and director of the Cornell Institute on Organized Crime.

In 1958, he married the former Elaine Menard of Schenectady, N.Y. They have seven children.

Mr. Blakey says that he has little interest in becoming wealthy or famous. He took a pay cut to work for the assassinations committee at \$17,500 a year, and when his job with the committee ended he declined an offer from a Washington law firm and returned to Cornell.

Article appeared  
on page A-17

19 July 1979

# House Assassinations Panel Hands the Ball to Justice Department

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a \$5.4 million inquiry that was touted for its independence from the executive branch, the House Assassinations Committee wound up its work yesterday by asking the Justice Department to pick up the loose ends.

The 2½-year congressional investigation into the murders of President Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. concluded that both killings were probably the result of conspiracies, but the committee was unable to determine the extent of the plots or who, besides the original suspects, was involved.

"The findings of the committee in its two separate inquiries were remarkably similar," Chairman Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) observed at a news conference yesterday. "We were satisfied, in each case, with the determination of federal investigations in 1964 and 1968 that Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray were the respective assassins. We did not concur, however, with the conclusions that Oswald and Ray had acted alone."

The committee's final report, made public Tuesday, suggested tentatively that Kennedy's 1963 assassination may have stemmed from plotting by a bizarre assortment of gangland figures and anti-Castro activists. It also offered, in a footnote, the alternative suggestion that Oswald may have been aided by one or two other "left-wing" types who could have been his confederates in an earlier attempt on the life of Gen. Edwin A. Walker.

The committee said it considered Mafia leaders Carlos Marcello of New Orleans and Santo Trafficante of Tampa "the most likely" gangland leaders to have taken part in an anti-JFK plot, but then said it was "unlikely" that either had done so.

In the King case, the committee focused on the possible involvement of Ray's brothers, John and Jerry, and on what it called "substantial evidence" of a St. Louis-based conspiracy featuring two segregationist businessmen who had reportedly made a standing offer of \$50,000 for King's death. But the House panel acknowledged it could not be definite. It also sharply criticized the FBI for "investigative excesses," including the interception of James Earl Ray's jailhouse

mail, that might have jeopardized the original investigation.

In any case, the committee wrapped up its work by recommending that the Justice Department "determine whether further investigation is warranted."

Stokes said he recognized that some would say "the committee should have pursued the plots to the point of assessing individual responsibility for them," but he defended the decision not to do so, partly on the ground that this was not the proper province of a congressional committee.

"We were determined to respect the rights of subjects of our investigation—including possible suspects in the conspiracies—and their associates," Stokes declared.

Asked how the committee had protected the rights of Marcello, Trafficante or Ray's brothers, Stokes insisted that "the committee has not, in any way, defamed or degraded anyone" with unwarranted conclusions.

"We tried to set forth the evidence as we found it," he said. "We did not have the right to come to any conclusions that were unwarranted." But he added that "we had to report to the American people."

A committee minority dissented from the findings, primarily over the acoustical evidence underpinning the conclusion that a second gunman fired at Kennedy from the so-called "grassy knoll" overlooking Dealey Plaza in Dallas.

THE WASHINGTON POST

19 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-1, 16

# JFK-King Report: The Book Comes First

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Even before the Justice Department received a copy, Bantam Books had it all set in type.

The merchandising of the final report of the House Assassinations Committee began in a rush last Friday, while the rest of the world was still awaiting formal release of the panel's findings in the murders of President Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.

After negotiations with chief committee counsel G. Robert Blakey, a representative of the book publishing company was provided with an exclusive advance copy that day, to pave the way for another instant book.

It will feature, among other things, "an exclusive introduction" by Blakey for a fee said to be somewhat less than \$3,000. A Bantam publicist proudly displayed a copy of the forthcoming paperback's cover to reporters yesterday at a news conference scheduled by House committee members to make public the government-printed version of the findings. After a few moments, Blakey frowned and sent word for the man from Bantam to stop.

One of the central recommendations of the House committee, which wound up its \$5.4 million inquiry with a series of iffy findings about a gangland plot to kill Kennedy and a racist bounty to kill King, was that the Justice Department review its work and continue the investigation.

As Blakey, who so far has insisted on not being quoted by reporters about the report, puts it in his work for Bantam:

"It is up to the government—the executive branch, specifically that department called 'Justice.' The committee has provided a road map that indicates the points of departure for subsequent investigation that need not be limited to congressional investigations are—New Orleans, in the case of the Kennedy assassination; St. Louis, in the case of the King assassination. The government, to live up to the meaning of 'Justice,' can do no less than to pursue the course the committee has charted."

The Justice Department remains noncommittal, at least partly because

it has yet to receive a copy of the report. Department spokesman Robert Havel said a check yesterday afternoon showed it had yet to arrive.

Bantam's 736-page edition, meanwhile, had been set in type in Nashville and was, at that moment, on the way to printers in Chicago, according to associate publicity manager Terry Bromberg. Priced at \$3.95—in contrast to the Government Printing Office price of \$6.50—it should be on newsstands in selected cities such as Washington by Monday, if not sooner, he said.

Besides the special introduction by Blakey, it will feature a 2,500-word foreword by Tom Wicker, associate editor of The New York Times. Wicker did not cover the Assassinations Committee's hearings nor did he get a copy of the final report until Tuesday afternoon, with the rest of the press. Bantam's early copy went straight to Nashville over the weekend, with no time to make a copy of it for Wicker.

Even so, Bromberg reported, Wicker, who was present at the JFK assassination, spent the weekend fruitfully, "starting with a personalized account from Nov. 22, 1963, forward" and finishing Tuesday night with a hurried reading of the House committee's report. It was made public Tuesday — instead of yesterday as originally scheduled—because The Times published a preliminary account of the committee's work Tuesday morning.

At yesterday's news conference for the now defunct House committee, Chairman Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) confirmed that he had authorized early release of a copy for commercial printing, but skirted a question about the propriety of that action.

Blakey refused to comment when asked if he had been paid for writing the introduction.

Bantam spokesmen later said he had been given "an honorarium of under \$3,000." Concluded Bromberg: "So he's not making off like a bandit by any means."

At another point in the news conference, Blakey was asked whether he thought organized crime was responsible for John Kennedy's death.

"I have no public views to state," Blakey replied.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

14 July 1979

Article appeared

on page A-2

# *FBI Asked to Probe Leak on Listening Post in Norway*

By Charles R. Babcock  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The FBI has been asked to begin an investigation of what the U.S. intelligence community considers a very damaging leak about the use of a listening post in Norway to help verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II treaty.

Administration sources said yesterday that Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, made the request to Attorney General Griffin B. Bell on June 28. That same day a New York Times article disclosed that the site in Norway was being considered as a way to replace listening posts in Iran and U2 flights over Turkey as a verification tool.

The leak about the Norway site was the latest in a series of disclosures during the escalating debate on the strategic arms limitations treaty.

The latest disclosure of classified information is considered especially damaging, intelligence sources said, because so few persons had access to it and it led to a barrage of Soviet criticism toward Norway, which could endanger the future of the facilities and their expansion.

The leak to Times reporter Richard Burt was also embarrassing because it came just a few months after Vice President Mondale had told Norwegian officials during a state visit to Oslo that the secret would be protected, one source said.

"The intelligence bosses were screaming, hopping mad," one official said of the disclosure. "No wonder other governments ask whether we can protect information about their cooperation with us."

Despite the high-level outrage at the leak, other officials said it wasn't likely that the leaker would ever be prosecuted, even if discovered. "The agencies never want to declassify the relevant documents for use at trial," one expert in the field said.

The grounds for investigation would be possible violation of the espionage statute barring unauthorized disclosure of classified communications intelligence.

The first step in an FBI investigation of a national security leak normally is to send the complaining agency a letter asking for answers to what are known as "the 11 questions."

These include a verification that the disclosed material was properly classified, a statement of how many persons had access to it and whether the agency is willing to make the material public at a trial.

A Senate study of such investigations last year showed that only three of 30 recent leak cases were ever referred to Justice and that none of those was pursued after the 11 questions were answered.

One intelligence official said that, in recent months, the number of requests for criminal investigations has increased. Lately, the key question of whether the agency is willing to declassify the documents needed for prosecution has not been stressed.

One official acknowledged that the goal of such investigations isn't prosecution as much as deterrence.

It is just that knowledge that has made the Justice Department and FBI reluctant to get involved in these cases. "The intelligence agencies just want us to do their dirty work for them," one Justice official said.

Another Justice official expressed concern that the continuing debate on the SALT treaty will lead to more leaks of classified information. This is because one of the most contentious issues in the debate, verification of Soviet compliance, centers on some of the nation's most tightly guarded secrets, satellites and U.S. electronic intercept stations in other countries, he said.

In April Times reporter Burt wrote an article about plans to use U2 flights from bases in Turkey as part of the verification process. That classified disclosure led to a political controversy in Turkey that has threatened that plan.

And Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, complained publicly that the administration was leaking such information to defend its pro-SALT position.

One intelligence official said yesterday that the disclosure about Turkey worried the Norwegians and led to Mondale's personal assurances in April that the same thing wouldn't happen to them.

"You can imagine how nervous our allies in the intelligence business are getting," the official said.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

17 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-2

# Focus

## U.S. Satellite Sites in Iran Buzzing — With Rumors

By Raji Samghabadi  
Time-Life News Service

BEHSHAHR, Iran — On a hill a few miles off this Caspian Sea resort is a beautiful mansion that served as a love nest for Qajar princes in the 19th century.

The beige building, constructed in a delicate Perso-Islamic style, is fenced off and closely guarded by Iranian air force troops. Behind it, in a dense, plush forest, sits one of the Western electronic intelligence sites established in Iran to monitor Soviet military movements and messages during the former shah's rule.

Contrary to published reports, there are four such sites — one British and three American. The American sites are here in Behshahr, in Moghan, East Azarbaijan, and in Kabkan, 30 miles from the Soviet border town of Ashqabad. None is now functioning, sources say.

The British site is in Babolsar, on the Caspian Sea.

The four units were being used to intercept Soviet military messages and trace Soviet troop movements. The sites fell into Iranian hands after the collapse of the former regime last February.

"We got very little of the stuff," said a former agent of the Iranian secret police, SAVAK. "They taped it all and shipped it home for processing via a secret air route."

### 'An Eerie Half-Egg'

An urban guerrilla who participated in the occupation of the Kabkan site, said recently, "All we could see was an eerie, white, huge half-egg nestling on the ground."

The half-egg is the site's radum, or "bubble radar," a fiberglass structure that serves both as the roof of the unit's headquarters and as a "one-way radar."

A Western expert who used to work at a similar site in Vietnam notes, "It intercepts electronic messages in its range, but gives off no rays itself. It is immune from detection by electronic surveillance devices."

The loss of the sites was billed as a major setback for American capabil-

ity to monitor Soviet compliance with the terms of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Western correspondents reported from the Kabkan site that they could hear "whirring and buzzing" inside, touching off speculation that the units were still functioning, and Iranians, given to a propensity to believe in conspiracies, kept accusing the U.S. of still running the stations by remote control. But, sources insist, they were all wrong.

The whirring and buzzing came from fans left turning to keep the place cool.

### Iran Feared Booby-Traps

For three months, Iranian officials did not open the units, fearing they might be booby-trapped. Some revolutionaries bent on "destroying imperialism" proposed that the structures be demolished.

Finally, Iranian air force units opened the stations and ran into no major surprises. According to a senior civil servant, "Most highly classified instruments have either been taken away or gutted."

The fate of the electronic espionage bases will be decided, he said, when the treaties under which they were built come up for review.

He explained that the government is systematically reexamining all contracts and treaties, especially military ones, signed between the former shah and "his foreign allies."

"However," he noted, "on principle, we are opposed to the use of our territory by one power against another."

The official said government teams had unearthed documents proving that the British had shown "an inordinate desire" to sell their site to Iran toward the end of the shah's rule.

### 'A Technological Museum'

"The British site is composed of ancient instruments, modified successively into monstrosities resembling no factory product in the world," quipped a Western expert.

The British, he pointed out, used to watch the Soviet Caspian Sea fleet and naval installations. "Their in-

struments apparently worked. But . . . they looked like pieces in a technological museum," the expert added.

Sources reveal that the British and Americans were supposed to operate independently of one another other according to their treaty obligations. "But they consistently cheated, and the shah took it with good grace."

"They did not even have the courtesy to give us part of the cream they skimmed off Soviet secret messages," said an insider of the disbanded intelligence community. "They used to tell us not to feel shy and ask for whatever specific information we wanted. Of course, by doing so, we invariably ended up letting them in on our own clues."

He also claimed that the British used their facility to spy on Iran.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1HUMAN EVENTS  
14 July 1979Secret CIA Memo Discloses Plot

# Castro's Plans to Conquer Central America

While Americans were joyfully celebrating their independence last week, a serious new threat to their liberties was developing at their very own doorstep: a Cubanized Central America. Thanks to Jimmy Carter's enfeebled foreign policy, Fidel Castro, whom the Administration used to insist was something of a benign tumor in the Hemisphere, has been making significant inroads into virtually every nation between Mexico and Colombia. Those advances, furthermore, have now been confirmed by a May 2 Central Intelligence Agency report, a copy of which has been obtained by HUMAN EVENTS.

And if Central America, with its strategic Panama Canal, falls to the revolutionary left, can Mexico and Venezuela, with their strategic oil supplies, be far behind?

A quick look at Central America shows the following: Nicaragua is on the brink of a takeover by the Sandinistas, which are Cuban-spawned, trained and supplied. El Salvador is under mounting terrorist attacks, also fostered by the Cubans. Guatemala is now threatened by Cuba as well. Panama's rulers, of course, are working hand-in-glove with Castro, especially in the effort to topple Nicaragua's President Somoza.

The Administration, from the President on down, has aimed a few, low-keyed barbs at Castro, but its rhetoric, soft as it is, is still louder than its actions. There is some real concern, however, even in the most dovish quarters. Robert Pastor, the National Security Council's expert on Latin America, has sent a secret memorandum to the White House about Castro's rising influence and the deep fears of non-Communist leaders in the Caribbean area.

In a June 18 report prepared for the President, Pastor relayed information given him by Henry Forde, the foreign minister of Barbados, an island nation in the Caribbean. The secret report was first broken by the Chicago *Tribune's* John McClean. According to the Pastor memo, the "Cubans are all over the place in the Caribbean," and what especially worries Forde and such men as Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago and Premier Lee Moore of St. Kitts and Nevis is the total lack of an American response.

The May 2 CIA memo confirms that the Cubans are everywhere, but it also shows they are concentrating their fire on Nicaragua's President Somoza, believing him to be the linchpin that keeps Central America from falling into Communist hands. The memo also shows that the key vehicle Castro is using to try to knock off Somoza is the Sandinistas or FSLN, which, even the State Department acknowledged in 1977, "was founded in Havana in September 1962 by a group of leftist extremists who had been active for some years in revolutionary causes in Nicaragua. Carlos Fonseca Amador, perhaps their most significant leader, was a proponent of Marxist-Leninist theory."

According to the CIA memo, the Castro government believes that prospects for revolutionary upheaval in Central America have "markedly improved" because of the weakened position of Somoza and "the ripple effect his removal would have on other countries in Central America." As a result of this belief, Cuba has intensified its efforts to "unify insurgent groups not only in Nicaragua—where Cuba has concentrated its efforts—but in Guatemala and El Salvador as well."

Not only has Cuba "stepped up its on-island training of guerrillas from each of these countries," but, for the first time in several years, has begun to actively supply arms to the Sandinistas. It has also been successful in persuad-

ing leftist movements and parties in the Central American region to "increase their assistance to the FSLN" and to funnel Cuban aid to the Sandinista forces as well.

A reader could reasonably infer from the memo that, without Cuba's critical assistance, the FSLN threat to Nicaragua would be dramatically diminished. Indeed, it was Castro who managed to fuse the various FSLN factions into a relatively cohesive, anti-Somoza unit. In early March, leaders of the three major FSLN factions traveled to Cuba to meet with Fidel.

"The Cuban leader," notes the memo, "is said to have spent nearly 48 hours over a four-day period helping to hammer out a basis for cooperation. As a result of the meeting, a unified FSLN directorate was established, containing three members from each faction. In return, Castro reportedly promised that Cuba would increase its assistance in the form of money, arms and ammunition."

In addition, Castro "reportedly urged them to play down the Marxist nature of their programs... and to offer to join with non-Marxists in forging a broad coalition. FSLN leaders have taken steps to comply with his request."

Key passages from the memo suggest just how deeply Cuba is involved; they

CONTINUED



also show that Castro's major ally in the undermining of Somoza is Panama. Here are some of the memo's most important excerpts:

- "Since late September, our information indicates that Cuba has on at least two and probably three occasions supplied arms to the FSLN. On each occasion, Havana has limited its own direct involvement by relying on the Panamanian government to transport the arms. Reporting from several sources indicates that in late September Cuba shipped eight crates of arms—including 50-caliber machine guns designed to serve as an anti-aircraft weapon—to Panama via a Panamanian air force plane for later transshipment to FSLN forces in Costa Rica."
- "In early November Cuba made its second delivery of arms destined for the FSLN. According to a reliable source, during the week of 5-11 November three Panamanian air force planes returned to Panama from Cuba carrying crates that contained AK-47 rifles, 50-caliber machine guns, and hand-held mortars. By the end of the month, the Panamanians had flown these arms to Liberia, Costa Rica, where they were given to the FSLN."
- "Circumstantial evidence indicates that the Cubans were involved in the recent activation of the Panamanian-Costa Rican resupply route to the FSLN. Members of the FSLN 'General Staff' reportedly stated at a meeting on 13 April that their inventory included an undisclosed number of anti-tank rockets of Soviet and French manufacture that Cuba had provided via Panama."
- "Training in Cuba of FSLN guerrillas—which has continued at low levels for years—has apparently been on the upswing, especially since January. Early that month a Panamanian emissary reached an agreement with Fidel Castro to send to Cuba FSLN exiles. . . . On 10 March, a subordinate of Noriega's [head of Panamanian intelligence] said that Panama is serving as a bridge to transport FSLN personnel to Cuba where they undergo training before returning to Nicaragua."
- "Evidence on the total number of FSLN guerrillas who have received training in Cuba is spotty. Members of the FSLN 'General Staff' reportedly said on 13 April that Cuba has trained 300 of the FSLN combatants currently in the field. In early April, an official of the FSLN Terciaro faction reportedly said that half of his faction's regular combatants have received training in Cuba."
- "A major element in Cuba's approach to the Nicaraguan situation has been its effort to encourage leftist groups in neighboring Central American countries to aid the FSLN. Havana especially wants regional Communist parties to give support to the Sandinistas. Toward that end the Cubans in early February promoted a meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, that was attended by the Communist

parties from the Central American countries as well as from Mexico and Panama. Cuban delegates used the occasion to urge their counterparts to bolster their assistance to the FSLN by creating safehavens in their countries, providing facilities for military training, and supplying arms and other equipment. Plans were also discussed for a follow-up meeting later this spring probably in Havana that would prepare a strategy for assisting revolutionary activity throughout Central America."

But Fidel has his eye focused on other areas as well. So far as Guatemala is concerned, says the CIA memo, the "main thrust of Cuban policy at this point—as it has been for several years—is to encourage the various insurgent groups to join together in a common effort to undermine the government."

Havana's closest links "are to the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), and the Cubans have used it as a hub to broaden their ties with other insurgent groups. According to a reliable Guatemalan source, on 12 January a Cuban official met in Guatemala with leaders of the EGP, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Communist party (PGT) to urge these three action-oriented groups to unify.

"The Cuban official counseled them to coordinate plans of actions, to integrate training of their respective members, and to make a greater effort to infiltrate labor movements. . . ."

In late January, a follow-up meeting was held at which two Cuban advisers offered to furnish training in Cuba for "PGT dissidents" and "FAR members." For some time, the Cubans have trained EGP guerrillas in Cuba, but are apparently branching out.

There is also evidence to suggest that the Cubans may be willing to take a more direct role in counseling Guatemalan insurgents. A reliable intelligence source says that "in late February, representatives of the EGP offered the services of three Cuban 'experts' to work in Guatemala with the FAR and PGT dissidents to 'coordinate' the assassinations of several government security officials. . . . The Cubans have also worked hard to encourage the orthodox faction of the Guatemalan Communist party (PGT) to lend its support to local insurgent groups."

Cuban actions on behalf of insurgents from El Salvador have also been on the upswing. An untested CIA source reports, for instance, that in February "about 50 members of the military army of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)—the group with which Cuba has maintained the closest ties—were in Cuba receiving four months of military and ideological training. The source said that upon returning to El Salvador these guerrillas were slated to serve as leaders for a force of 2,000 newly trained Salvadorans representing the 'Popular Militia' of the FPL-dominated Popular Revolutionary Bloc. . . .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Cuba has also had links with at least one of the two smaller Salvadoran terrorist groups, the Armed Forces of the National Resistance (FARN). Eduardo Sancho Castaneda—reportedly the FARN's leading strategist—has apparently been his organization's chief conduit to the Cubans. He has maintained regular contact with Cuban officials in Costa Rica and Mexico and has occasionally travelled to Cuba. For some time the Cubans have also been pushing for greater cooperation between the El Salvadoran Communist party and the various insurgent groups."

In other words, Castro is on the march, and the question, as always, remains: what does Jimmy Carter propose to do about it other than talk or temporarily join hands with the Communists to call for the removal of rightist Latin leaders?

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THE WASHINGTON POST

20 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page C-11

# Founder Denies Language Institute Is Tied to CIA

By Marjorie Hyer

Washington Post Staff Writer

William Cameron Townsend, the octogenarian founder of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) has categorically denied charges that this staff has acted as American spies.

"My institute has no relation with the CIA," Townsend declared. "If any member cooperated with the CIA he would be dismissed."

Townsend made the statements both in an interview here and in a letter addressed to Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, which he presented to the Mexican Embassy in Washington. The letter denied that the institute was an agent of the CIA.

Townsend, who said he was received cordially by the Mexican ambassador here—"He's a great friend"—blamed the troubles of his institute on Communists and on the World Council of Churches.

"The World Council of Churches financed two meetings of anthropologists and they (the anthropologists) recommended that the governments get rid of us," he said.

(In WCC-sponsored consultations on missions, held in the Caribbean several years ago, anthropologists were sharply critical of the kinds of missionary activity that destroyed indigenous cultures in the process of convert-making.)

Bud Hancock, director of the institute's government liaison office here, described his organization as a "scientific, educational organization" formed "to provide educational materials of a high moral order" in the language of peoples in remote parts of the earth.

"In no way do we proselytize," Hancock said. "We do believe the Scriptures themselves provide a philosophy of life that motivates people to change their way of life."

Currently the SIL is operating in more than 30 countries on the basis of contracts negotiated with each country.

In addition, the organization operates four graduate level training programs in linguistics, Townsend said,

at the Universities of Texas, North Dakota, Washington and Oklahoma. In addition to training SIL staff members for their work with remote people, level courses are open to the general public.

In the field, Townsend explained, "Our job for each tribe is to analyze their language and their grammar, collect words for a dictionary. Then we translate the New Testament, or parts of it, for them—and oh, what a difference it makes."

Both Townsend and Hancock insist that it is the Scriptures themselves and not the missionaries that effect conversions. According to Townsend, the Indian forsakes "drunkenness, witchcraft and manslaughter because he reads in his own language about the love of God."

SIL currently has some 4,000 staff members deployed around the world, Townsend said. About half that number are linguists; the other half are teachers, printers, mechanics, pilots and other support personnel.

It has a budget of \$23 million. "But we're a faith mission, which means that every worker has to raise his own support" from interested congregations in this country, Townsend said.

While disavowing cooperation with CIA as a matter of policy, Townsend acknowledged that "there was a time when the CIA would come to Oklahoma (to the summer program at the university) and try to get people to answer questions."



WILLIAM CAMERON TOWNSEND  
... writes to Mexican president

THE WASHINGTON POST

20 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-24

# Australian Opposition To Support U.S. Base

By Peter Costigan

Special to The Washington Post

CANBERRA, Australia, July 19—Australia's opposition Labor Party today reversed itself and agreed to support continued operation of a remote American military base where more than 1,000 U.S. technicians work.

The party's decision to join the ruling Conservative Party in backing the base's presence here came after opposition leader Bill Hayden disclosed that the base has no missile systems but is instead a monitoring station that is expected to be an important part of the network for verifying Soviet compliance with the SALT II agreement.

Hayden overcame opposition to the base from extreme leftists in his party by arguing that adoption of their position, which could have meant the closure of the base if Labor returns to power here, might hinder prospects for passage of the SALT II treaty in Washington.

"The hawks in the American Congress will latch on to a decision to terminate these base arrangements as further grist to the mill of opposition to the SALT II agreement," he told the party's biennial conference in Adelaide.

The Labor Party's decision means that the base, located on more than one hundred square acres at Pine Gap in central Australia, will remain open regardless of changes of government here.

Hayden, 47, won the support of the party by a vote of 25-20. The victory, at Hayden's first conference as party leader, helped solidify his position as head of the socialist-oriented party.

Leftists in the party have been campaigning to have the base closed since it was built 10 years ago under the supervision of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The base has been described as an Australian-American

space research facility, but its exact purpose had not been publicly revealed until today.

The current government of Australia, headed by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, has been a warm and willing host to Pine Gap and other American bases. The Fraser government has another 18 months in power before it must call another election.

In his speech today, Hayden said, "Pine Gap is not part of any missile system. But its purposes are related to the SALT II verification processes.

"It is very important that we bear in mind what is the situation with SALT II, which is yet to be ratified by the U.S. Congress."

He said it would be a "painful paradox" if the Labor Party, "with its concern about international tension and conflict," took steps that could "subvert" the arms control agreement.

"If we were to adopt a hard line and make it obvious that the American bases were imperiled with the advent of a Labor government, we would be playing into the hands of the hawks in the American Congress," he added. "It is as simple as that."

9 JULY 1979

**COUNTERCOUP: The Struggle for the Control of Iran**

Kermit Roosevelt. McGraw-Hill.  
\$12.50 ISBN 0-07-053590-6

Back in 1953, convinced that Iran's Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh would bring his country into the Soviet orbit, Kermit Roosevelt, then in charge of Middle East operations for the CIA, coordinated and successfully carried out a coup that deposed Mossadegh and restored the Shah to power. This fast-paced account reveals the plan developed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, head of the CIA. Roosevelt discloses how the coup was nearly wrecked at its inception, names which Iranian military and government officials cooperated with the CIA, and discusses Britain's involvement. He tells how the Shah rewarded Roosevelt, and how old, ailing, sleepy Winston Churchill expressed his own appreciation. Theodore Roosevelt's grandson recalls the tension, and even the conversations, of a turbulent political event. *First serial to the Washington Post; Macmillan Book Club selection.*

THE WASHINGTON POST

19 July 1979

Article appeared

page C-4

# Ins, Outs At Belgian Farewell

By Elisabeth Bumiller

Poor Brock Adams. He innocently showed up at your standard middle-of-the-week embassy reception last night, only to be surrounded by people who asked: "Are you out yet?"

But no, Jimmy Carter had not accepted the secretary of Transportation's resignation, offered en masse with 33 others from Cabinet members and top-level White House aides Tuesday.

The resignation fracas hadn't affected Adams, who with his wife Betty adopted a more or less high-on-life approach to the recent brouhaha. "I'm not worried in the least," insisted Adams, "I like my life." Said Betty Adams: "Never a dull moment."

Who is in and who might be out was without doubt the No. 1 conversation item at a goodbye party the Belgian Ambassador and Mrs. Van Cauwenberg gave for themselves at their Foxhall Road home. As a portion of some 500 invited guests hunched two and three deep over the bar and a liver pate shaped into an airplane, speculation was rampant on what the president might spring next.

But Chief Justice Warren Burger wasn't speculating, saying he was glad to be chief justice and not a Cabinet member. "I'm not going to be out," he chuckled, adding that he plans to stay "around for a while" because his office is being redecorated.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner was one of those who was speculating even though he claimed to know nothing. "No domestic spying going on," he explained.

As for other conversation beyond

the we-re-going-to-miss-the-ambassador sort, a good many guests marveled at the Van Cauwenbergs' elegant home, modeled after the Hotel de Charolais in Paris and smelling of the flowers that were just about everywhere.

"I'm impressed," said Louis Balla, an 18-year-old who normally might have been at a movie with a bunch of his friends. The reason for his presence at a party filled with people old enough to have been his mother—or grandmother? "Escort service," he said, explaining that his dad was out of town, and his mom needed a date.

Speaking of dates, socialite Allison LaLand had a hard time finding hers. The problem was the bus shuttle, a

service the Belgian ambassador and his wife had for guests forced to park their cars down the road near Mt. Vernon College. "I had a hard time catching it," said the date, John Gruber of Price, Waterhouse, who couldn't remember taking a bus to a party in his whole life.

As for the retiring Belgian ambassador, in whose honor the party was given: After five years on the job in Washington, soon he'll be back in Antwerp doing, he said, "as little as possible."

Incidentally, last night was also the ambassador's 65th birthday. He hates the thought of it.

"A birthday means you're a year older—right?" he said. "What's there to celebrate about?"

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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
13 JULY 1979

# President Starting to Choose New Cabinet and Staff Aides

EXCERPT:

## Vance, Brown And Brzezinski All to Stay

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter is expected to decide within the next few days which of the resignations to accept from his Cabinet and senior staff.

Carter's entire Cabinet yesterday offered him their resignations in a gesture intended to give Carter a free hand to reorganize the top level of government. Within a few hours the president's 18 senior White House staff assistants also offered to resign.

White House press secretary Jody Powell, after announcing that the resignations had been offered, said Carter will carefully and expeditiously review the performance record of each of his 33 key lieutenants and decide which resignations to accept.

The highest administration sources later went out of their way to pass the word that Carter's national security team — Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski — will remain intact. CIA Director Stansfield Turner was not part of the mass resignation offer.



APPROVED-APPEAR 27  
ON PAGE A-19

NEW YORK TIMES  
19 JULY 1979

## ESSAY

# Tricks Of The Trade

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, July 18 — In a flurry of speeches and background massages of newsmen, Jimmy Carter accused the American people of being self-indulgent, materialistic and morally dispirited. This from the man who promised to provide "a government as good as the people."

In this first week of his campaigning for renomination in 1980, he came down from the mountain with a hatful of tricks:

1. *The following-leadership trick:* With his support eroding, he reached back for his 1976 campaign gimmick: make a show of "listening to the people." This costs nothing and shows respect.

The point of the long buildup was that he was a good listener, which is to say he would do what most people wanted. He then came before us to say "I will lead." But that is the opposite of leadership: that's followership. The trick is to call it leadership.

2. *The can't-lick-'em, join-'em trick:* He apologized for his 30 months of failure ("mixed success") and offered this alibi: that he had been too busy "managing the Government" to lead the people. But if you would lead a nation, you must show some talent at managing it: most Americans have concluded that he has not been good at that.

Mr. Carter will even join in that criticism, too: With much fanfare, he has elicited the mass resignations of his Administration. And in front of a gaping Cabinet, he has finally given a tongue-lashing to Ambassador Andrew Young. Thus, he shifts the blame for his own mismanagement to his aides, with whom he was supposedly so busy managing the Government instead of leading. (Neither Stansfield Turner of the C.I.A. nor William Miller of the Federal Reserve, his most disappointing appointments, were included in "the Tuesday Morning Massacre.") As one wag puts it: "They're serving Kool-Aid in the White House Mess."

3. *The switch-the-target trick:* With pollster Pat Caddell holding the weathervane aloft at Camp David, the President diagnosed a "crisis of the spirit" and did for the French word "malaise" what Henry Kissinger did for "détente."

But the "crisis" is not of the nation's spirit, it is of the Carter Administration's aptitude. The American people have not lost confidence in themselves; they have lost confidence in Mr. Carter. The way he turned that around was neat.

4. *The satisfying non-sacrifice trick:* People like to be called on to make sacrifices in general, which is ennobling, but when the sacrifice is specified, it becomes unfair. The President could have stimulated U.S. oil production by removing the price controls that subsidize waste, or — if the "crisis" is as severe as he says it is — could have cut demand by rationing.

But that would have meant specific sacrifice by real people rather than satisfying non-sacrifice. He took the route least likely to upset anybody. He appointed a committee (or "board") to "cut through red tape," which draws applause until the tape turns out to be the clean air law.

5. *The timid boldness trick:* "We will protect our environment," he intoned forcefully, and 65 million viewers leaned forward to hear what he would do about nuclear power. Silence; that was too controversial. Next day, when fewer people were listening, he put in a line in its favor. The oxymoronic trick in this is never to be timid in using a strong voice to say the word "bold."

6. *The high-base statistic trick:* The most dramatic moment in Mr. Carter's War on Prosperity came with his resounding "Never!" He was quothin' at not importing more oil than in 1977. Why pick that year? Because it was the highest import year, higher than 1978, higher than this year. Contrary to his audience's belief, the President promised no belt-tightening at all. No ceiling for Mr. Carter, perhaps a headache for his successor in 1981: that trick was one he learned in the SALT negotiations.

7. *The bully-in-the-pulpit trick:* With a severe recession on the way that will overshadow even the Lance trial and Curran grand jury findings this fall, Mr. Carter has laid the blame on (a) OPEC, per Stu Eizenstat's memo, and (b) Washington, run by a Democratic Congress and opposed by the leading resident of Camp David, Maryland.

8. *The changing-characters-in-mid-stream trick:* The man on the screen, in a last-ditch effort to save his political skin, shed his skin. Having changed the part in his hair to no avail, he proceeded to change the part in his mind.

No longer did we see the real Jimmy Carter — cool, soft-spoken, managerial, the smiling preacher promising salvation. We now see the "new" Carter — strident, loud, fist-clenching on cue, the preacher threatening hellfire and damnation. It is not the same man, nor is this Raifshoon concoction the real man. If we have come to distrust the real Carter, will we trust the unreal Carter?

He seems not to care if his tough demeanor and slap-dash decisions have weakened the dollar and shaken the institution of the Presidency. To save his political life, the President has been willing to plunge the nation into an artificial crisis; to meet that crisis, he has created a false and unnatural personality. And that is quite a trick.

14 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-14

# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## *'A Damned American Patriot'*

So Dr. Tom Dooley has been unmasked! [A7, July 5]. The man may have brought medical care and hope to half a million deprived souls, but he turns out to have been a damned American patriot. Very sad.

There were a number of lamentable statements in this Associated Press story. For example, Father Kegler is quoted as saying, "The CIA looked for dirt on Dooley.... It was like what they did to Martin Luther King." We know the FBI harassed Dr. King, but I'm not aware of any evidence that the CIA did.

Your headline—"Dr. Tom Dooley's Ties to CIA Are Chronicled"—was not helpful. Intermittent and voluntary

contact hardly constituted a "tie." But, of course, what people like me find hard to understand is why Dr. Dooley should be condemned for his willingness to be debriefed on Communist troop movements, etc., at a time when the free world believed it was in a war for survival against communism.

There is an annoying pattern in the ahistorical use of historical documents under the Freedom of Information Act to besmirch good Americans and American institutions. I wish The Post could find some way of guarding against uncritical publicity for such "findings."

ARTHUR W. JOHN

Annandale

Article Appeared  
On Page 9

THE BOSTON GLOBE  
16 July 1979

### Dooley a spy? Why not?

Re: the article, "Tom Dooley, a saintly spy," why not? Was Joan of Arc disqualified for helping her country? I didn't realize Dr. Dooley had "entered politics" but surely we need more "saints" in politics. Although their chance of accomplishing anything is slight, they should be admired for trying.

MRS. JAMES ATKINSON

Saugus.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 18A

FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS  
10 July 1979

Dr. Dooley Was Inspiration

# Patriotism Needs No Apology

Tom  
Braden



WASHINGTON — I read the lines of type so quickly that it took me a moment to realize what they meant. The story was from United Press International and it revealed that Tom Dooley, the famous jungle doctor of the '50s whose work in Laos had drawn such favorable attention that the Catholic Church investigated him for possible sainthood, had ties to the CIA.

Here are the lines which first drew my attention and then my ire:

"Although Dooley inspired people to greater Christian service, nearly 500 CIA documents reveal that he kept the agency posted on troop movements and villager statements around his hospital in Laos in the 1950s."

The key word is "although," which, according to my dictionary, means "notwithstanding that" or "in spite of the fact."

Am I not correct then in understanding Dooley as follows: "In spite of the fact that Dooley built several hospitals in four Asian countries, provided medical care for half a million people, won a special gold medal from Congress and 'inspired people to greater Christian service,' he provided intelligence to the CIA."

When in heaven's name is this generation of Americans — I mean the generation which is now presumably writing news stories for United Press International — going to discover that the act of performing a service for country does not require apologetic "althoughs."

What has happened to us? Will we soon be reading obituaries which tell us that so and so invented a medicine which cured hundreds of thousands "although" he served in the front lines during the war in Vietnam?

Will somebody discover that President Carter did great work as peace maker between Israel and Egypt "although" he once served in the U.S. Navy?

That Robert McNamara has saved millions from starvation through his work as president of the World Bank "although" he once also served as Secretary of Defense?

What is all this about? Is this the reason young people protest the idea of registering for the draft? Has mistrust of government turned to hatred of country? You'd think nobody wanted to live here any more.

I must say I find the revelation that the late Dr. Dooley (he died of cancer at the age of 34) found time to brief the Department of State and the CIA on Laotian troop movements enhances rather than diminishes his reputation.

I once knew many men like him, not so meteoric in achievement perhaps, but solid achievers nonetheless: businessmen, journalists, scientists, even tourists who took the time and trouble to visit the State Department or the CIA on their return from trips abroad and to report what they had learned.

Some of them were self-important people without important information. But many had fresh insights and morsels of gossip about people which helped desk officers get their jobs done well. I should think the Department of State and CIA were intensely interested in what Dr. Dooley had to tell them about Laotian troop movements. What better and more disinterested source than this American doctor who was on the ground?

And the UPI story goes on to say that at one time, when Dr. Dooley was accused of spying for the CIA, he called the accusation "absurd." So he was a liar too? What should we do? Exhume his body and put his head on a pole?

Or should we try to find new ways and means of teaching this generation that service to country is a duty and an honor and something of which a man or woman ought to be proud?

I didn't know what to do when I read that UPI story. I found myself muttering, "I give up."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE D-16

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 JULY 1979

## C.I.A. Estimate Of Saudi Oil

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 17 — The Central Intelligence Agency has lowered its estimate of the maximum amount of oil that Saudi Arabia can produce on a sustained basis by 500,000 barrels a day, according to the agency's latest data.

The July 11 issue of the International Energy Statistical Review, the agency's public version of foreign oil production statistics, estimates that current Saudi "maximum sustainable capacity" has dropped to 9.5 million barrels of oil a day. The May 2 issue of the Review had estimated maximum sustainable capacity, or the rate that can be sustained for several months, at 10 million barrels a day.

The publication did not explain the reason for the production-capacity reduction, but it was reported last month that the seepage of water into reservoirs at Saudi Arabia's Safaniyah field, the world's third largest, had required the Saudis to reduce their estimates of sustainable capacity.

ARTICLE APPEARED

IN PAGE A-10NEW YORK TIMES  
17 JULY 1979

## C.I.A. Used Satellites for Spying On Antiwar Protesters in U.S.

WASHINGTON, July 16 (UPI) — The Central Intelligence Agency used intelligence satellites in the late 1960's to spy on American students engaged in antiwar demonstrations, a series of formerly classified documents disclosed today.

The papers revealed the C.I.A. also monitored foreign broadcasts of antiwar activities by Jane Fonda, the actress, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

The C.I.A. papers said the questionable spying on Americans — ordered "at the request of" President Johnson's White House — was an attempt to check "possible foreign connections with the U.S. antiwar movement."

The C.I.A. eventually conceded the spying — a possible violation of the agency's charter — had failed to find any links between foreign institutions and American antiwar activists.

The Center for National Security Studies, a privately financed research organization generally critical of American intelligence activities, obtained the documents under a Freedom of Information Act request.

The C.I.A. collected the documents, known colloquially as the "family jewels" because of their closely guarded, sensitive nature, during an in-house investigation ordered by James R. Schlesinger, the agency's Director at the

time.

Mr. Schlesinger, now Energy Secretary, requested a report on all C.I.A. activities that might be considered outside the agency's authority. The agency's charter forbids the it from engaging in domestic intelligence activities.

The key document in the package — a May 8, 1973, memorandum to Mr. Schlesinger from Edward Proctor, then deputy director for intelligence — provided a list of activities "possibly outside C.I.A.'s legislative charter."

The area garnering the most interest was the spying from space on American students; called in the documents a "review of satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photographs too 'sensitive' for public release."

The document did not indicate whether the pictures were used to estimate the size of demonstrations or were enlarged to identify individuals taking part.

The cameras on the American spy satellites, which operate at altitudes higher than 100 miles, are said to be accurate enough to record objects the size of a suitcase.

The C.I.A., according to the documents, also kept unclassified files — mostly newspaper clippings — on "extremists" such as H. Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, the black activists.

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

15 July 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 22

# American Express: Don't leave CIA without it

By Dick West

WASHINGTON — The next sound you hear will be that of another illusion biting the dust.

I have just learned that the CIA now accepts credit cards.

The CIA — once so secretive it had markers identifying its Langley, Va., headquarters as an Alaskan road bureau.

The CIA — where security was so tight the switchboard operator wouldn't give the name of the agency when she answered the phone.

That CIA.

THAT CIA not only now makes some of its publications and maps available for

sale to the public; you can charge them to your American Express account.

Suffering spooks! The next thing they'll be publishing mail-order catalogs for cloaks and daggers. Or opening a rent-a-spy service that gives green stamps.

And where did I learn of this latest diluting of the CIA mystique?

Did the information come from the Los Alamos library where Progressive magazine learned how to build an H-bomb?

Was it whispered to me in a dimly lit parking garage by a disgruntled agent wistfully yearning for the good old days when everybody had a cover story?

Would the source have been even half so dramatic!

Though it pains me to say so, my information came from — yes! — a CIA press kit.

It's true, fellow-espionage buffs. The

CIA, that long-time symbol of clandestine manipulation, king of undercover, master of the "burn bag," has sunk to the lowest level of bureaucratic flackery — a press kit.

A press kit complete with a diagram of the director's "command responsibilities."

During the past couple of decades, novels based on covert CIA operations have risen to the status of a cottage industry in this country. Even now, we may assume, some enterprising hack is at work on an updated plot.

IN THE first chapter, a Soviet secret agency parachutes into a remote section of the Maine woods. His assignment is to obtain a copy of CIA document number SI 78-10058.

Authentic touches are the hallmark of

CIA novels. There really is a document bearing that number. According to the press kit, its title is "Influence of Agrotechnology and Geoclimate on Grain Yield Potential in the U.S.S.R."

Moscow is eager to get its hands on the document because nobody in the Kremlin has been able to figure out what the influence of agrotechnology and geoclimate on Russian grain might be.

Eschewing microfilms, tiny microphones embedded in wisdom teeth, secret decoder rings, exploding cigars, and other conventional spy paraphernalia, the Soviet agent carries only one trick device — a clever imitation of an American Express card.

And in the next James Bond movie, 007 will be an insurance agent.

Dick West is a writer for United Press International.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-5

NEW YORK TIMES  
15 July 1979

## World News Briefs

### Moscow Says C.I.A. Places Agents at U.N. in Geneva

MOSCOW, July 14 (Reuters) — A Soviet weekly said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was placing agents in key posts at the United Nations in Geneva.

The weekly, New Times, also said the agency had set up eavesdropping devices in the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

The report said that, according to Swiss experts, 30 of the 44 diplomats at the United States mission in Geneva worked for the agency. It went on to name nine other Americans in United Nations posts.

The bugging devices reportedly installed at the headquarters of the nuclear energy agency in Vienna were said to be monitored by a 30-man team from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service at the American Embassy in Vienna, the article said.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 7THE MORNING NEWS (WILMINGTON, DEL.)  
12 JULY 1979

# Biden solution to 'graymail' brings intelligence agencies closer to law

By PAT ORDOVENSKY

Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A solution to the "graymail" problem, that has hampered prosecution of cases involving national secrets, was offered yesterday by Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del.

It came with the blessing of the Justice Department, the American Civil Liberties Union and a half-dozen other congressmen of both parties.

"Graymail" is federal jargon for the problem that arises when classi-

fied information could be disclosed at a criminal trial. In some cases, the mere threat to disclose such information by defense attorneys has caused prosecutors to drop the charges.

In the bureaucratic lexicon, that's not quite blackmail but perhaps a shade lighter.

Biden, who has been studying the problem for two years as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, offered a bill yesterday that would permit the issue to be resolved in the privacy of a judge's chambers before a trial begins.

Almost identical measures were submitted by three House members

and the Justice Department and unveiled simultaneously at a Capitol Hill news conference.

The legislation would require defense attorneys to notify prosecutors in advance if classified information is to be disclosed as part of their case. The judge, after hearing both sides' arguments in private, would decide if the secret data is relevant to the case using the standard rules for admissibility of evidence.

The Justice Department's bill also would require the judge to determine if the information is properly classified. Biden's version would allow that decision to be made by the attorney general.

If a judge rules a classified document is essential to a defendant's case, prosecutors could appeal immediately before the trial begins.

Biden, who chaired hearings on the "graymail" problem a year ago, said he "became fed up" with repeated examples of defendants "who ranged from intelligence officials to foreign spies" escaping prosecution through a threat to disclose secrets.

Perjury indictments against two ITT officials and former CIA Director Richard Helms were dropped because of just such a dilemma, the senator said.

Biden called his bill "one small

but important step toward insuring that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law."

Passage of the bill means "the guesswork will be gone" in national-secrets cases, said Philip B. Heymann, assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division, who represented the Justice Department at the news conference.

"We will not dismiss cases by mistake," Heymann said, suggesting that prosecutors now are reluctant to call a bluff by defense attorneys who threaten disclosure or are unwilling to wait for a judge to rule on the relevance of classified information after it is disclosed in open court.

"It protects national secrets, it protects the defendant's rights and it protects the prosecution," Heymann said.

The ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies issued a joint statement saying they "welcome" the bill as a method of resolving the "graymail" dilemma while protecting "the existing rights of criminal defendants."

The similar House bill was offered by Reps. Morgan Murphy, D-Ill., Robert McClory, R-Ill., and Romano Mazzoli, D-Ky.

# State Dept Blasted By Murphy

By Walter Riley

Washington, July 10—Congressman John Murphy (D-NY), Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, assailed State Department denials of Cuba-Panama involvement in the shipment of arms to Sandinista guerillas (FSLN) in Nicaragua.

At the beginning of a meeting of the full committee Chairman Murphy said that according to a recently leaked CIA report dated May 2, 1979, arms and ammunition were flown by Panamanian air force planes from Cuba to Costa Rica from where the munitions were later smuggled to guerillas in Nicaragua during the last week of September and November 5 to 11, 1978.

Murphy accused State Dept. witnesses of having denied any knowledge of the Cuba-Panama arms shipments in their testimony before the House Subcommittee on Panama during hearings held on June 6 & 7, 1979.

Murphy stopped short of actually calling the witnesses liars when he said: "It is now apparent that they were aware of specific shipments from Cuba via Panamanian military aircraft to Sandinista guerillas...Further, they were aware that the Cubans were involved in the recent reactivation of the Panamanian-Costa Rican resupply route to the FSLN..."

Chairman Murphy made his statements at the opening of the meeting of the full committee which had been called: "To consider the matter of possible testimony before the Panama Canal Subcommittee by Mr. Antonio Alvarez on a subject of some sensitivity."

Antonio Alvarez was indicted in Miami as an alleged participant in the smuggling of guns from the U.S. to Panama. The same guns were later captured from Sandinista guerillas in Nicaragua by the Nicaraguan National Guard. Alvarez admitted to federal agents at the time of his arrest that he was acting as an agent of the Panamanian intelligence service in the procurement of weapons for the Sandinista guerillas.

Alvarez, on June 11, 1979, offered to testify in public session before Congress if he were granted immunity from prosecution. Several sources close to Alvarez have said that he is in a position to be able to "blow the whistle" on the intelligence operations of Cuba, Panama, Venezuela and the U.S. where Nicaragua is involved.

Chairman Murphy said: "During some two hours of conversation with Mr. Alvarez, conducted in the presence of his attorney, I concluded that he does have broad personal experience in intelligence operations in the service of several governments, including the United States." Murphy added that the people have a right to know of military or intelligence activities which have a bearing on American national interest.

The Committee, after very little debate, unanimously voted to subpoena Mr. Alvarez and grant him limited immunity against prosecution for his testimony before Congress. Because of Justice Department opposition, there is little hope that Congress or the public will hear Alvarez' testimony before September.

The White House and the State Department appear to be content with this delay, because Congress will have long since passed Panama Canal implementing legislation before Alvarez' testimony can rock the boat.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Red Line)  
19 July 1979

19 JUL 1979  
ON PAGE 6

## Moscow Again Beaming Radiation at U.S. Embassy

MOSCOW — The mysterious Soviet station that directs microwave radiation at the U.S. Embassy here has gone back in action after an apparent layoff for the Vienna summit, an embassy spokesman confirmed today.

"During the week ending July 15 a microwave signal (the so-called Moscow signal) was active, although at a low level," a U.S. spokesman said. The Soviet station had last beamed microwave radiation at the U.S. embassy on April 27.

DEFENSE/SPACE DAILY

9 July 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 32

CONGRESSMAN SAYS SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING OVERESTIMATED. Rep.  
Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) says that the CIA estimate that the Soviet Union is spending  
45 percent more on defense than the United States is exaggerated and misleading. He  
said this is because the CIA calculates Soviet spending in the dollar prices that the U.S.  
would pay for the same forces. "This means that the high pay scales of our volunteer  
army are applied to the Russians' conscripted force of over 4 million men, which grossly  
distorts the total cost figure," he said. Calculated in rubles instead of dollars, Soviet  
spending on defense is estimated by CIA to be "only 25 percent larger than our own,"  
Bingham said, and the CIA admits that this estimate could be 10 percent too high -- leaving  
the Soviets with "only" a 15 percent advantage.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
25 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-12

# Sen. Jackson Suggests Joint Chiefs Hedged on SALT; Gen. Jones Says No

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) suggested yesterday that the Joint Chiefs of Staff altered their testimony in support of the new SALT treaty on instructions from the Carter administration, a charge ~~timidly~~ denied by Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the JCS.

In the second day of Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, Jackson appeared to anger Jones with accusations that the general was over-optimistic about future U. S. strategic programs and that he had agreed with President Carter's decision to cancel the B1 bomber. Jones said Jackson was wrong on both points.

Neither Jackson nor other committee critics of the new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) produced any surprises or evoked any embarrassing testimony from the joint chiefs at the hearing, a non-event that led the administration's SALT-sellers to allow themselves a guarded sigh of relief.

Senators and aides friendly to SALT expressed surprise last night that the critics' arguments "lacked freshness," as one put it. Like the administration, these senators had expected more fireworks on the Armed Services Committee than they have seen in two days of hearings on SALT.

Treaty supporters were also encouraged by the comments of committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), who seemed to come close to endorsing SALT II yesterday with his effusive praise for the administration's witnesses and his observation that "what really counts is what we're going to do in the future."

Stennis appeared to mean that the country's security would depend on future arms procurement policies, not on SALT. "The sentiment is firm

among the people for adequate military protection," Stennis said. "Count on the people."

He also observed that sentiment for military programs in Congress is more favorable now than just a few years ago.

Between sessions of the hearings, Stennis said he was putting great store in the joint chiefs' testimony, all of which continued to be staunchly pro-SALT, though qualified by repeated statements that major programs must be aggressively pursued to restore a satisfactory U.S. military posture.

In a long day of questioning, the joint chiefs revealed some differences among themselves, and went further than they had with the Foreign Relations Committee earlier in decrying the level of U.S. strategic programs in recent years.

But once again they did not budge from their collective assessment that SALT II is a "modest but useful step" — "modest but highly significant," according to Gen. Lew Allen Jr. of the Air Force—provided it is accompanied by acquisition of a new MX super-missile and other expensive defense programs.

And Jackson's attempt to suggest that the chiefs colored their testimony to please their civilian bosses, or that Jones suffered from unfounded optimism about the future of U.S. strategic policy, made no apparent headway.

Jackson challenged Jones on his support for the B1 cancellation decision, but Jones said he had only supported a vote not to spend \$750 million more to produce the last two B1s when he knew the plane would not go into full production.

Sen. John C. Culver (D-Iowa) interjected to note that Jackson had voted

to go along with the B1 cancellation, which Jackson then acknowledged.

Later in the hearings, Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) both came to Jones' defense. Goldwater told Jones he had noted "the little ribbing Sen. Jackson gave you," but said the failure to build more strategic weapons was the fault of five straight presidents and Congress, not of Jones or the JCS.

Nunn told Jones, "You are a credible witness with me, and I believe you to be a man of complete integrity."

Under questioning, Jones said that the best situation from his point of view would be approval of SALT II plus a clear commitment to a range of new strategic programs. If that were not attainable, he added, and he had to choose between the two, he would prefer to have the new programs rather than the treaty. This was as far as any of the chiefs would go toward the hard-line position that no treaty might be better than this one.

Responding to questions from Nunn, Jones acknowledged that the Carter administration's much-advertised commitment to real increases in defense spending was fast dissolving under the pressures of inflation. There may not be any real growth now, he acknowledged.

He and two other of the chiefs agreed that the United States would, at least literally, lose "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union sometime in the early 1980s. They based this on the view that at that time Soviet land-based rockets will have the theoretical ability to wipe out all U. S. land-based rockets, though U. S. submarines and bombers could retaliate.

Even with SALT II, Jones said, the world would be less secure in the 1980s than it is today. The United States must take urgent action to enhance its strategic position, the chiefs agreed.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-3NEW YORK TIMES  
25 JULY 1979

## *Joint Chiefs Affirm Pact Support, But Stress Need for More Spending*

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 24 — The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated today their support of the arms treaty with the Soviet Union. But one of them, the Chief of Naval Operations, said that, if the United States did not have the will to match Soviet military spending, he saw no value in the treaty and would not recommend its approval by the Senate.

As the four service chiefs and their chairman did before the Foreign Relations Committee two weeks ago, they told the Armed Services Committee today that the treaty merited the Senate's support.

But Adm. Thomas B. Hayward of the Navy said the treaty was "a mixed blessing" with disappointing faults and he came close to making his support conditional on the approval of programs to increase military spending.

His colleagues, in varying degrees, placed greater emphasis today than they had in previous testimony on linking their endorsement of the treaty with programs to modernize American nuclear and conventional forces.

### **Commitment on the MX Stressed**

Gen. David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the senators that he found it difficult to say whether he would have supported the treaty without a White House commitment to go ahead with certain weapons systems, such as the MX mobile missile.

He said he did not want to imply that the Administration was able to buy off the Joint Chiefs with weapons systems.

Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat who is one of the more influential Senators on military policy, urged General Jones and the other chiefs to abandon any inhibitions on that score, asking, "Why is it evil to impose conditions?"

Senator Nunn himself has made clear that he intends to use the debate over approval of the treaty as a tool to extract a firmer commitment on military spending from the Government.

General Jones noted that it was not possible legally to obligate future Congresses to spending programs or, in a practical sense, to extract a firm obligation from the Armed Services Committee.

Before the day was out, General Jones himself said that if the treaty caused euphoria and caused the country to "go to sleep" about the need for military modernization, then "probably" the Senate "should not ratify it."

Admiral Hayward, who two weeks ago said there was no "raging" enthusiasm for the treaty among the military leaders, today read a separate statement that gave what seemed to be guarded approval of the treaty. But he said the treaty should be accompanied by greater efforts to redress Soviet military advances so as to create a bargaining atmosphere that would lead to large reductions in strategic forces in a subsequent treaty.

In answer to a question, he said that, if the United States "does not have the will" to compete militarily, he could not see value in the treaty and "would not recommend any Senator to support it."

The qualifications in the testimony of some of the military chiefs was welcomed more by Senators like Mr. Nunn who hope to use the treaty as a tool to get bigger military budgets than by outright treaty opponents like Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

### **Tough Questioning by Jackson**

Senator Jackson, in vigorously challenging General Jones, suggested that the Joint Chiefs, in unpublished memorandums to the White House and to the Secretary of Defense, had expressed greater reservations about the treaty than in their public testimony.

At one point, Mr. Jackson said General Jones's tenure as Chief of Staff of the Air Force and later as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had been "negative in terms of results" in getting approval of the kind of weapons systems he now advocated. Senator Jackson also seemed to suggest that General Jones had not fought with sufficient tenacity for the B-1 bomber, which was canceled by President Carter.

Several Senators, including Mr. Nunn and Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, came to General Jones's defense, Senator Nunn calling him a "man of integrity." However, Senator Jackson was expected to resume his tough questioning when the Joint Chiefs return tomorrow.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line)  
24 July 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C-6

## Soviets Said To Misuse Computer

By Leonard Curry  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has used sophisticated U.S. computers and other machines, which it imported for production of farm and general purpose trucks, to make diesel engines for military vehicles, according to Commerce and Defense Department documents.

Intelligence reports indicate that 30 percent of the engine production at the Soviet truck factory on the Kama River, is being used for military purposes, Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., says.

The Kama River plant, which is about 500 miles east of Moscow, will produce 250,000 multi-axle vehicles a year when it is completed. This is greater than the combined annual output of all U.S. manufacturers of similar vehicles.

Commerce Secretary Juanita M. Kreps said Soviet production of military engines does not violate the 1971 license that permitted the export of U.S. equipment that is critical to the plant's operations.

"The Kama River truck plant licenses were issued during the Nixon administration and contained no restrictions which we can identify limiting the use of the trucks and engines produced at the factory," Kreps said in a letter to Jackson last Wednesday.

"Accordingly, military use of the trucks or engines produced at Kama River would not constitute a diversion or violation of the law because the licenses contained no restrictions pertaining to the use of those trucks or engines."

Kreps sent the letter to Jackson to counteract statements and memoranda of a Commerce Department career official, Lawrence J. Brady, who contended that the Soviets had not lived up to the spirit of the license. Brady also said the breach did

"not bode well for the SALT II Treaty in which we are told that verification rests partly on good faith between the parties and the 'spirit' of the agreement."

In closed-door testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on May 23 and 24 and in a memo last Thursday, Brady, deputy director of the Office of Export Administration, warned that the department was covering up Soviet violations.

Kreps said, "A diversion occurs only when end-use restrictions pertaining to a license are violated." The license did not specify how the final product was to be used, she said.

"I believe this definition of diversion is excessively narrow," Brady said. "Diversion occurs when the product exported, or the product manufactured from the technology exported, is used in a manner contrary to the end-use representation made to the U.S. government at the time of licensing. We know that this has occurred at the Kama River truck plant."

Although the plant is not complete, it has been producing at about half capacity for several years. The first vehicles came off the assembly lines in 1975 and were designed to replace military transport equipment that the United States destroyed on the Ho Chi Minh trail during the height of the Vietnam war, government officials said.

Under an agreement negotiated between former Secretary of State Henry S. Kissinger and the Soviet Union, a \$500 million license was granted to a consortium of American companies to supply computers, machines and tools for the world's largest truck factory.

International Business Machines Corp. of Armonk, N.Y., supplied the computers. Other suppliers were Ingersoll-Rand Co. of Woodcliff, N.J., and Swindell-Dressler, now Pullman Swindell, a subsidiary of Pullman Inc. of Pittsburgh.

The Commerce Department is now considering requests for licenses to export spare parts for Kama River plant.



## ARMED FORCES JOURNAL JULY 1979

# SALT I Leaks vs. SALT II Leaks

by W. Donald Stewart

LEAKS and techniques of leaks occurring during the development of the SALT I and SALT II agreements are similar in all respects. The Carter Administration and the Nixon Administration desired to have their respective SALT agreements ratified by the US Senate before the Presidential election. In an effort to expedite the finalization of their SALT agreements, each Administration has been inclined to make concessions to the Soviets. These concessions were often not believed to be in the best interest of our national security by certain members of the Senate Armed Services Committee; hence, each side aired its feelings by "leaking" highly classified data to the press to sway public opinion.

Now that we are in the fourth quarter, so to speak, of the Arms Race Superbowl, also more commonly known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreements, we can expect a rash of leaks until the final whistle blows. Rest assured that there will be one loser—the US public.

My knowledge of and interest in leaks stems from my experience in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Chief of the Investigation Division, Directorate for Inspection Services. This office investigated major criminal and security matters for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. From August 1965 until December 1972, while Chief Investigator, I handled 222 leak cases. Even after I left the Directorate for Inspection Services in December 1972 for the position of Inspector General of the newly formed Defense Investigative Service (until my retirement in June 1975), I was recalled to handle certain sensitive leak cases.

### Why SALT Leaks

We have SALT leaks because we have two principal US groups involved with different objectives. We have the present Administration I shall call the "Vote Getters" and we have the Senate Armed Services Committee which has the responsibility to insure that any SALT treaty signed provides adequate national security. This group I shall call the "Protectors." There are two other minor groups who play a lesser role but cannot be ignored. They are the liberal Senators whom I shall call the "Detractors." They aren't exactly sure what they want, but to me it doesn't appear that the strongest form of national security is their quest, and finally we have the "Extortionists," a group of Senators who are more concerned with their personal interests than they are with our national security interests. Accordingly, the Vote Getters are sometimes pressured into buying their vote to insure ratification of the treaty. However, as far as SALT leaks are concerned, the Detractors and the Extortionists have shown little need to engage in leaks.

### Top Secrets Become Weather Bulletins

Probably the first open sword rattling between the Vote Getters and the Protectors in the SALT II debate appeared in the press on November 30, 1978, when Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), voiced his discontentment with the developing SALT II agreements. Things may have gone somewhat smoother except for the fact we lost a vital intelligence capability in Iran. As a result we no longer have the ability to closely monitor Soviet adherence to any SALT agreement.

Accordingly, the April 4, 1979 issue of the *New York Times* evidenced the first act of desperation on part of the Vote Getters. It came in the form of a leak of highly classified data to the effect that the US would be able to monitor Soviet adherence to SALT II agreements through the use of a modified version of the U-2 aircraft, the type Gary Powers flew over the USSR for CIA until he was shot down in 1954. Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) was incensed over this leak and charged in the letter-to-the-editor column of the *Washington Post* on April 11 that the leaked data was made available to the public to create a misimpression of our monitoring capability. (See May 1979 *AFJ*.) It was obvious that the Protectors were not responsible for the leak, because it served them no purpose. Moreover, that particular area was not the chief concern of the Detractors.

In the typical fourth quarter fashion of the Arms Race Superbowl, we could expect and did receive a counter-leak, obviously this time by one of the Protectors. The leak appeared in the *New York Times* issue of April 17, to which hip-shooting press secretary Jody Powell quickly and heatedly responded in so many words that Senator Garn was responsible. The Senator denied the accusation, and Jody Powell later backed off his charge.

Let's look at the new leak. It disclosed that CIA Director Stansfield Turner briefed a Senate committee on our Iran intelligence capability loss and stated it would be at least five years before we could attain a comparable capability to monitor Soviet adherence to the SALT II agreements. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown instantly countered in a Vote Getter rescue effort that we would be able to retain our former capability in a year.

The bottom line is that once again the public is the loser. Now the Soviets know how badly we've been hurt by our Iranian intelligence capability loss, and they also know of the U-2 as our second rate alternative. Top secret information was given out like a public weather bulletin.

SALT I leaks took a slightly different pattern than SALT II leaks. That is, there were continuous leaks from 1968-

1972, each time there was to be a SALT I discussion. At the expense of National Security, the Vote Getters made their Top secret point and the Protectors made their Top secret point. On one of the more explosive leaks in 1969, I had occasion to interview Paul Nitze, then our chief SALT I negotiator. His comment was, "I consider the disclosure to be a deliberate leak of information by well-informed sources who indulged in a very dangerous practice for the purpose of placing the Soviet missile warfare capability before the US public." He further advised that the figures disclosed in the news story were very accurate and highly classified.

### Beecher's 22 Investigations

Probably the greatest SALT leak of all times appeared in a *New York Times* article by William Beecher on July 23, 1971; it was entitled "US Asks Soviets to Join in Missile Moratorium." The article appeared one day before a scheduled SALT I meeting on July 24 with the Soviets in Helsinki, Finland. President Nixon was absolutely livid, as the article exposed our fall-back position to the Soviets. Let me say bluntly that all hell broke loose. I was called at home on Saturday morning to begin an investigation. I had my first meeting with the newly appointed White House "plumber" chiefs, Egil Krogh and David Young. The FBI was also called; however, since I had developed the prime suspect, Dr. William VanCleave, Paul Nitze's top aide, I more or less carried the ball. President Nixon's blind anger toward VanCleave (whom we later proved innocent) was displayed on the now released White House tapes. But VanCleave enjoyed the same reckless public hip shooting from the Nixon Vote Getters that Senator Garn recently did from Jody Powell. VanCleave became a suspect because two days before the Beecher article appeared, Beecher visited VanCleave. Also, VanCleave, like so many top government aides, could not be bothered with security regulations such as "do not reproduce the original," a statement which appeared on a highly sensitive document in his possession and which he nevertheless, chose to reproduce.

Although vindicated of the major crime, he was censured for security violations uncovered during the investigation. The investigation was probably one of the most intensive ever undertaken. Beecher's path, for instance, was retraced on a minute-to-minute basis. His past *modus operandi* was well known to us, and it was of help. His travels led him to Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson's office. The Senator had been briefed earlier in the week by State Department aides. Naturally, the obvious

**CONTINUED**

next step was to interview Senator Jackson. This required White House approval, but it was never obtained.

The last and final SALT I leak that I investigated appeared in the *New York Times* on March 21, 1973—another article by William Beecher, this one entitled "US Says Soviets Improve ICBMs." Although the SALT I treaty had been signed, this leak was made to show the public we lagged the Soviets in arms and to develop support for the Nixon Vote Getters in their efforts for a larger supplemental appropriation. Actually, neither Defense Secretary Melvin Laird nor his successors knew the Vote Getters were handing out these leaks, because to give the leak more credibility the Vote Getters would raise a storm—and I'd be hurriedly called to investigate again. The most interesting thing about this last leak was that it suddenly occurred to me that on every major leak we had on SALT I, William Beecher was the reporter with all the hard facts. (Other prominent reporters had stories, but as I explained to one later, he and the others just had "crumbs." That reporter demanded to know how I could state that. I said, "Very simply, if you had the hard facts, we would have opened a case on your article." Only then did he realize that he had been part of the Nixon Vote Getters' smoke screen.)

In my final report, I showed how I arrived at the fact that the Nixon Vote Getters were responsible for several contrived leaks.

Being the "favorite son" reporter was not all bad for William Beecher: in April 1973, just one month after the above leak and six months after SALT I ratification, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Subsequently, he became the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, complete with the car and chauffeur which then went with that position.

**Now the Soviets know how badly we've been hurt by our Iranian intelligence capability loss, and they also know of the U-2 as our second rate alternative.**

Beecher left the Pentagon in May of 1975 and on June 1st he joined the *Boston Globe*. On July 31, Beecher printed another big leak: "US Believes Israel Has More Than 10 Nuclear Weapons." Although I had already retired, I was called at home by a high Pentagon official and asked where I thought Beecher got his story. I laughed and recall saying, "Where else? You left the fox in the hen house."

The fact that my office had run 22 leak investigations of William Beecher's articles certainly had no bearing on his Pentagon appointment. Therefore, the question

naturally arises: after all the SALT II leaks are tabulated, which prominent news reporter will be as lucky as William Beecher?

#### Can Leak Cases Be Solved?

Contrary to popular misconception, leak cases *can* be solved. Unfortunately, as far as national security interests are concerned, the cure most often is worse than the illness. By that I mean: in an effort to put the guilty party in jail, we must declassify the classified data involved in order to go to trial. In doing so, foreign enemy intelligence becomes privy to our secrets—that we cannot afford as a rule, and thus must forego prosecution.

Prosecution is not the only form of punitive action. During my tenure, I've seen three flag officers punished—one was transferred, one was requested to retire, and one had his career advancement terminated. A civilian was reduced from GS-18 to GS-15, and others in the civilian ranks and military were administratively disciplined. The most effective tool for Schedule "C" appointees (political appointees) was to neutralize them—excluding them from receiving sensitive documents and from high level conferences. One former high level civilian employee serving as a consultant lost his security clearances. Our best security contributions frequently came from our investigative by-products—such as developing "holes" in our own security operations.

#### Prosecution Problems

Prosecution was not always thwarted by so-called "grey mail," documents in question which couldn't be declassified. Politics on part of President Nixon, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sen. John Stennis (D-MI), and Justice Department officials late in 1971 and early 1972 and later in 1974 obstructed the possible successful prosecution of Yeoman Charles E. Radford III, Rear Adm. Robert Welander and Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Radford admitted stealing highly classified documents from the briefcases of Dr. Henry Kissinger, then head of the National Security Council, and from General Alexander Haig, then a Presidential aide. Admirals Welander and Moorer admitted receiving those documents. But President Nixon couldn't stand the public embarrassment. Sen. Stennis dedicated himself to protecting the military establishment during his 1974 hearings on this matter—known as the Pentagon Spy Case. The Justice Department performed in its typically lethargic manner. No action was ever taken against anyone involved.

Earlier in 1970, the Justice Department failed to take action against an Air Force captain who distributed to the press a secret-sensitive memo on our ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) position, prepared by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The case was turned over to Justice, which accepted it but later allowed Secretary Laird to withdraw it. Laird informed Justice he had made a deal with Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* that if

Wicker returned his copy of the memo in question, no prosecutive action would be taken. Wicker returned the memo, and through it we trapped the suspected Air Force captain. Later, Wicker denied in a memo to Justice that he had ever made such a deal. I received the above data under the Freedom of Information Act. Personally, I believe Wicker. He couldn't have known that we could use the memo to trap the suspect. No action against the suspect was taken.

Another case from which Justice ran was when it was presented with evidence that Elliot Richardson, while Under Secretary of State, has caused top secret data to be leaked to Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame. That data subsequently turned up in a newspaper story in March of 1970.

The long and short of leak prosecutions is that you can only be prosecuted if you meet the two following criteria:

- (1) You cannot be an important person; and
- (2) You cannot know an important person.

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ON PAGE A-1

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
24 July 1979

# Turkey entangled in SALT

## U.S. sure of right to monitor; Ankara seeks Soviet O.K.

By MICHAEL BURNS  
*Sun Staff Correspondent*

Ankara—Americans seem confident that the U-2's will be flying over Turkey to monitor Soviet missile tests under the new strategic arms limitation treaty, though it will be one year before the high-altitude spy planes are equipped for the job.

The Turkish government is delicately weighing the matter, insisting that it wants Soviet approval of the overflight so that, in the words of one diplomat, "the Soviets won't use it against us," while quietly letting it be known that Ankara would settle for a grudging tacit acquiescence from Moscow.

The U-2's—a generic name from the 1960's, the aircraft are known today as the TR-1—will fly 24 hours a day, in shifts from the British Akrotiri base on Cyprus to snoop on Russian missile tests in Tyuratam, 1,000 miles across the border.

The Turkish chief of staff, Gen. Kenan Evren, said last month that "under the present circumstances we cannot allow U-2 flights over Turkey. Even if they gave us \$150 million, we can make no concessions." But the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit subsequently softened that position.

U.S. efforts are now directed at the Soviet Union, insisting that the U-2's fall within the "national means" of verification mentioned in the SALT II treaty, as much as the two ground-based electronic monitoring stations in Iran that Washington had counted on before they were lost in that country's revolution.

Soviet officials have indicated they would not agree to border flights though no formal reaction has been received by Washington.

"I expect we would be saying to the Soviets 'Here is what we expect to use for verification to make the treaty work. If you don't like it, let us put a monitoring station inside the Soviet Union,'" an American official said.

"If they want to use the issue here, they can destroy the treaty."

The United States has quietly accepted

similar Russian spy flights from Cuba along the coast, he added.

Always sensitive to the oscillations of its military ties with the United States, Turkey is particularly nervous about the term U-2. Francis Gary Powers, whose U-2 was downed inside the Soviet Union in 1960 on a spy photo mission, took off from Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.

Since the U.S. arms embargo that followed Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turks have been mistrustful of their total military reliance on Washington.

Mr. Ecevit is pursuing an active policy of detente with Russia and he is under pressure from the extreme left wing of his Republican Peoples party to avoid further western military commitments.

The question became a volatile domestic political issue after Mr. Ecevit described Turkey's position to a journalist. He was strongly attacked by the conservative opposition leader, Suleyman Demirel, who had earlier said he would not exploit the issue.

The Americans would like to let the matter sit for about six months, until Mr. Ecevit gets by crucial October elections and has a chance to reconsolidate his minority government in the National Assembly.

If Ankara's approval becomes necessary before then, to win U.S. Senate ratification of the SALT treaty, it is believed that Mr. Ecevit would grant it though he would prefer to wait. In either case, the agreement would be low-key, without formal announcement.

Mr. Ecevit said he advised Washington more than a year ago that the United States and Moscow should discuss any Turkish contribution to the verification of SALT, although he was apparently referring only to the intelligence-gathering ground posts in Turkey at that time. The United States still enforced a partial arms embargo on Turkey at that time.

Two of those posts will contribute to monitoring SALT enforcement. Pirinlik in eastern Turkey can monitor telemetry data from missiles. Sinop on the Black Sea listens to communications that relate to missile launches. A third facility, Belbasi near Ankara, gathers information related to the nuclear test ban treaty.

Two dozen other U.S. facilities in Turkey include relay and communications stations linked to these intelligence gathering posts, which are said to provide 30 per cent of American electronic intelligence on the Soviet Union.

Observers here were amazed by the outspoken statements of Gen. Evren on his return from an 18 day visit to the United States and Canada. They noted that he spoke at the airport after an exhausting trip, when reporters hit him with news that the U.S. House of Representatives had changed a \$50 million military grant to a loan of the same amount. The general

has refused comment on the matter since then.

The Turkish military is sensitive to the difference between a grant and loan because a grant makes Turkey eligible for cut-rate purchases of U.S. surplus defense equipment.

Turkish and U.S. officials deny that any attempt has been made to link the U-2 permission with the military aid package now before Congress. But the atmospherics of aid decisions can make it more or less difficult for a struggling Turkish government to grant that permission.

A year will be needed to outfit enough of the modern U-2's with the electronics

needed to monitor missile tests, which could mean their active role will be limited to three years or less.

By 1983, the United States is expected to have a new satellite that would be able to collect almost all the data formerly gathered by the sites in Iran.

Harold Brown, the U.S. defense secretary, concedes that U-2 flights along the Soviet border will not provide all the test information previously collected by the Iran posts. Nor will the large radio antenna in Norway, combined with a satellite, fill all the gaps, he said, though adequate information will be available to prevent Soviet cheating.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 13AVIATION WEEK  
23 July 1979

## Washington Roundup

### SALT Balance

Staunchest opponents of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 2 concede the momentum in the ratification debate currently belongs to proponents because of a carefully coordinated strategy calling for attachment of "understandings" to the treaty (AW&ST July 16, p. 24) that give the appearance of toughness. The understandings, which do not change the treaty or require Soviet agreement, are tailored to the concerns of opponents. Opponents hope the momentum will shift when Senate Armed Services hearings begin this week. Skepticism about the treaty is considered greater in the Armed Services Committee than in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where hearings are under way.

Opponents regarded an appearance by former Ambassador W. Averell Harriman last week as a setback. Harriman warned that rejection of SALT 2 could lead to a hardline successor to Soviet Presidium Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev, while acceptance could strengthen "the more reasonable group" of Soviet political leaders. But Harriman conceded the Soviets have far exceeded the conventional arms buildup needed to protect eastern and western borders from invasion. Harriman supported a contention by Sen. George McGovern (D.-S. D.) that U. S. satellite reconnaissance photos ought to be published in newspapers to show the American public this country's verification capability.

AVIATION WEEK

23 July 1979

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## ***SALT Abrogation Urged On Verification Tampering***

Washington—Abrogation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 2 treaty by the U. S. upon probable evidence of Soviet interference with U. S. national technical means of treaty verification has been demanded by Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R.-N. Y.).

"If we have grounds for not trusting them, I couldn't care less about the rest of the stuff you have in here," Sen. Javits told Defense Secretary Harold Brown during SALT 2 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Brown told Sen. Javits a U. S. decision to abrogate, based on probable interfer-

ence by the Soviets, depends on how sure the U. S. is of its information and the seriousness of the intervention.

"I need more than that, and so does the Senate," Sen. Javits answered. Brown then told the committee that interference would be grounds to terminate the treaty. Sen. Javits also won a promise of abrogation from Brown if the Soviets convert missiles in ways that violate SALT 2. The position of Sen. Javits was supported by Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (D.-Del.).

Sen. Biden and Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio) were critical of the committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church (D.-Ida.), for allowing inadequate time for questions and answers during a closed hearing on verification.

Sen. Glenn charged the committee held its open hearing the following day without adequate background information on verification of launch weight, throw weight, yield and numbers of multiple independently targetable warheads, simulations, monitoring of the ban on SS-16 third-stage production, mobile ICBMs and determining the 5% size and weight difference between new and old missiles. He said he remains concerned that verification capabilities are, in some instances, still on the drawing boards.

Latest changes or additions to the treaty that will be introduced in the Senate are:

- An amendment by Sen. Jake Garn (R.-Utah) banning all missile test telemetry encoding. Administration witnesses have told the committee repeatedly the Soviets are not likely to decode telemetry

revealing technology not covered by the treaty, such as missile guidance methods.

- Sen. George McGovern (D.-S. Dak.) said he will attach arms reduction legislation to the SALT 2 resolution of ratification to establish three things: a one-year freeze on development or deployment of additional strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads, annual reductions of 10% in the arsenals of both sides for three years and a summit meeting every three years to review the percentage reductions.

Brown did not try to defend the U. S. ability to determine accurately whether the Soviets hold to the SALT 2 requirement that new missiles not exceed 5% of length, diameter and throw weight of the older missile. Instead, he noted that missile growth could be 100% without a SALT 2 treaty. Treaty opponents and others doubt that the U. S. would be able to detect changes smaller than 30%.

Sen. McGovern added that the MX missile, which he opposes as a "preposterous waste of dollars," adds verification problems to the treaty. Administration sources have indicated the MX probably will not be deployed before the treaty expires in 1985.

Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R.-Ind.) said he is not sure the Soviets will care if they are caught violating the treaty, adding the treaty will give the world the perception that "we're on the run."

Sen. Richard Stone (D.-Fla.) said he doubts the U. S. has the willpower to prosecute a case of violation quickly and fully before the Standing Consultative Commission, based on the record during SALT 1.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) said he is concerned that the Soviets will convert SS-20 missiles, which have limited range for use as a mobile theater ballistic missile, to SS-16 intercontinental missiles "at night." The SS-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-16. All that is necessary for an SS-20 to become an intercontinental missile is attachment of the SS-16 third stage. Brown said he could not address Helms' concerns in public, but said the Soviets "can't get away with it."

### **Test Ban Shift**

Washington—Soviets have reneged a portion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, now under negotiation, that would allow placement of U. S. seismic sensors on Soviet soil, Rep. Jack F. Kemp (R.-N. Y.) said last week.

Rep. Kemp, who learned of the development two weeks ago, said the Soviets now insist only Soviet equipment be installed to aid in verification of Soviet compliance.

Rep. Kemp called for cancellation of a visit to the U. S. by Soviet scientists in August to study American seismic technology. He termed the scientists' trip "espionage" rather than scientific study.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE **A-3**NEW YORK TIMES  
24 JULY 1979

# Pact Debate Shifts to Armed Services Panel

## Skeptical Senators Seek to Pick Holes in Case Presented by Brown

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23 — Senators critical of the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union today attempted to pick holes in the Government's case for the accord as discussion shifted to the Armed Services Committee.

However, there was also articulate defense of the treaty, and one conservative, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, said secret testimony on verification had satisfied some of his doubts "to the point where I would not be too exercised over it now."

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in many hours of testimony, made the same points he had made previously before the Foreign Relations Committee, asserting that the treaty would tend to limit the Soviet military arsenal.

The Armed Services Committee does not have formal jurisdiction, but some of its members, by virtue of their position, know more about strategic weapons and strategic doctrine than some of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

### Foreign Relations Panel Today

The Armed Services Committee hearings will continue for the rest of this week and pick up again in September, after the summer recess. The Foreign Relations Committee will resume its hearings tomorrow.

Today's session in the Armed Services Committee did not produce as much in the way of argumentative fireworks as some had expected.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who is an avowed opponent of the treaty, said it did not establish equal levels of effective nuclear force, as required by a law enacted in 1972. He said Secretary Brown was using scare tactics and was exaggerating probable Soviet military developments if the treaty were rejected.

Senator John Tower of Texas, the ranking Republican on the committee, also followed a line of questioning that showed he considered a predicted vulnerability of United States land-based missiles in the early 1980's to be a greater threat to the strategic balance than did Secretary Brown.

Alluding to the existence of submarine-launched missiles and bombers in addition to the ICBM's, Mr. Brown said at one point, "ICBM vulnerability is not the same thing as the vulnerability of the United States."

On the other hand, Senator John C. Culver, Democrat of Iowa, and Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, used their allotted question time to establish that the treaty placed worthwhile restraints on the Soviet Union while not significantly precluding the modernization of United States systems.

Senator Goldwater, did not say that his

"The treaty appears to be grossly unequal and it may presage the emergence of Soviet nuclear superiority in the early 1980's." — Senator John Tower, Republican of Texas.

"There is a strong presumption in favor of this treaty. The critics of SALT are embarrassed by their own premises. The more pessimistic they are about the Soviet threat, the more valuable SALT restrictions on that

threat are." — Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado.

"The burden of proof on SALT II rests with the proponents. While I won't rule out the notion that a good case is made for SALT II, I just want to put the committee on notice that this will take, as we say back home, a heap of doing." — Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona.

worries about verifiability had been completely dissipated, but he made clear that they had been significantly diminished.

He urged Secretary Brown to consider the advisability of an amendment that would count the Soviet-TU-22M bomber, called Backfire in the West, as a strategic weapon, even if it were necessary to count more than 100 United States FB-111 bombers as strategic weapons also. Senator Goldwater seemed to imply that such an amendment would make the treaty easier to guide to final Senate approval.

Mr. Brown said he could see no way to write such an amendment that would be militarily profitable to the United States, adding that opening up the Backfire issue might open other issues the United States had settled to its advantage.

In another potentially significant step, the committee chairman, Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, said the array of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union was so vast that the two parties are "actually driven" to this treaty "or a similar step, lest each destroy the other."

While this was by no means a pledge of support for the treaty, it tended to underline an appraisal by a pro-treaty source that Senator Stennis was "horrified by the prospect of nuclear war" and might be a possible "yes vote."

Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, a key figure in the Senate debate, gave few hints today of how he viewed the treaty. But he indicated that he might vote for the pact if the Government committed itself to greater military spending.

### Brown Notes Erosion by Inflation

In response to Mr. Nunn's questions, Mr. Brown said planned increases in spending had been eroded by inflation to less than 2 percent a year. Mr. Nunn said he hoped that, at some point, the Defense Secretary would "go public and start to

jump up and down." Mr. Brown said that to jump up and down was not his style.

But he added that, if Soviet spending continued to increase without appropriate American budget increases, there was a risk that the Russians might become militarily superior.

Overall, Secretary Brown was not as roughly handled as some people had expected. However, a number of committee members, asked probing questions indicating that they found a good many shortcomings in both the treaty and in the Government's arguments for it.

Such questions were asked by Senators William S. Cohen of Maine, Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire and Roger W. Jepsen of Iowa, all Republicans. Among the Democrats who raised questions about the value of the treaty was Howard W. Cannon of Nevada.

THE WASHINGTON POST  
24 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-6

# Brown Defends SALT II Before Its Critics on Senate Panel

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Critics of SALT II on the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday pressed Defense Secretary Harold Brown on imbalances and omissions in the new treaty, suggesting that it is unfair to the United States.

It was harsher criticism of SALT II than Brown heard earlier from the Foreign Relations Committee, but few new points were raised, and Brown disputed the critics, invoking analyses and statistics to argue that the treaty is fair and useful.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), author of a congressional resolution adopted in 1972 that said SALT II should provide for equal Soviet and American strategic forces, yesterday told Brown the new treaty fails to meet that standard. Brown disagreed.

Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), a supporter of the treaty, elicited from Brown the prediction that the Soviet Union might deploy 13,000 to 18,000 nuclear bombs by 1985 if SALT II is rejected, 10,000 of them on systems accurate enough to destroy U.S. land-based missiles in their silos. With the treaty, those numbers would be 9,500 and 6,000, Brown said.

Hart said the figures demonstrated the value of the treaty. He challenged critics to show how the Soviet threat could be reduced by rejecting the treaty, or what U.S. strategic programs were prohibited by the pact.

But the critics on the committee declined this challenge, concentrating instead on specific aspects of SALT II that they think favor the Soviet Union. This was the theme Jackson keynoted with his charge that the new treaty fails to meet the test of his 1972 resolution calling for equality.

The resolution called on the executive branch to negotiate a SALT II that provided for equal levels of intercontinental strategic forces. SALT II does provide that both sides can have 2,250 strategic weapons launchers in 1982.

Jackson said floor debate in 1972 showed that the Senate wanted equality "taking account of throw-weight"—the payload each superpower's rockets can deliver to the territory of the other. SALT II permits the Soviets to maintain a large lead in this category.

Brown responded that SALT II granted the Soviets some advantages and the Americans some advantages,

which he said balanced out, leaving an equal agreement. Jackson rejected that view.

"A team of giants and a team of dwarfs might have equal numbers of players ... but they are hardly equal," Jackson said. Brown later replied: "If the dwarfs are just as strong and agile and able as the giants, that's not an unequal situation."

Later, Sen. John C. Culver (D-Iowa) contended that the Soviets' throw-weight advantage was largely neutralized by SALT II's limits on the number of individual warheads or nuclear weapons that could be placed on a single rocket. These limits prevented the Soviets from taking full advantage of their heavy rockets and superior throw-weight, Culver said.

Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) raised a new point in the hearings when he asked Brown about 75 older Soviet submarines that carry about 300 short-range cruise missiles, or pilotless drones.

Couldn't these be used to attack coastal cities in the United States with lethal effect, Warner asked? Brown said that hypothetically they could, but that the submarines in question were deployed for use against shipping at sea, not land targets. He noted that the Soviets once deployed these old submarines near American coastlines, but dropped that once they had their own submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which could better be used to attack the American mainland.

Culver later said that those Soviet submarine missiles were comparable to an American model from the 1950s that can now be found only in "the naval museum."

Several senators pressed Brown on the treaty's failure to cover the Soviets' medium-to-long range Backfire bomber. Brown repeated that the Backfire, like U.S. nuclear weapons

based in Europe and the Sovietst "heavy" supermissiles, was one of the areas removed from the treaty in a series of compromises.

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), one of the senators who raised the Backfire issue, revealed yesterday that he has now been satisfied that verification of SALT II is not a major problem. Goldwater is a senior member of the Intelligence Committee.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), whose vote on SALT II is regarded as crucial, failed to tip his hand yesterday, using his questioning time to query Brown on defense issues not specifically covered by the new treaty. Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), another key vote, was friendly to Brown and did not reveal his feelings about SALT II.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line)  
24 July 1979

# Goldwater Eases Stand On SALT II

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Sen. Barry Goldwater, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has given the Carter administration a potential boost in its attempt to gain ratification of its SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union.

The intelligence panel has been conducting its own examination of the issue of treaty verification, the term for the ability of the United States to determine if the Soviet Union is cheating.

Goldwater, who is also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, indicated at a meeting of that panel yesterday that his questions on the issue are being answered.

He was concerned about verification, Goldwater said, but, "I've had that overcome to the point where I wouldn't be too exercised over it now."

The verification issue is a controversial one that is important to treaty ratification. At least one senator, John Glenn, D-Ohio, has indicated his vote depends on satisfying his considerable skepticism about verification.

The administration hopes to get a positive report from the intelligence panel with Goldwater concurring in its findings.

If Goldwater's verification comments were encouraging for the administration, there were others, from the Arizona Republican and elsewhere, that were not.

## Jackson Opens Battle

The expected battle with SALT II critic Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., was joined as the armed services panel opened its own consideration of the treaty.

Jackson and Defense Secretary Harold Brown tangled over, among other things, a broad-ranging request from Jackson for SALT-related

documents the senator thinks will help his case against the treaty.

Making the request through the committee, Jackson asked Brown for documents in three categories:

- Memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff setting forth their views on the military issues in the SALT negotiations.
- Cable traffic between the U.S. SALT negotiating team and Washington bearing on the negotiating history of treaty provisions.
- Copies of the "joint draft text" at various stages of the negotiations. The joint draft text was the working SALT negotiating document, containing both agreed upon language and provisions on which the two sides disagreed. Viewed at various stages, the text would provide "snapshots" of the negotiations.

Brown wrote back, in effect refusing the memoranda from the chiefs. He said they would respond to questions when they appeared before the committee.

The secretary said the requested cables weren't under his jurisdiction, but added that it was not State Department practice to turn over day-to-day cable traffic. This infor-

mation, too, could be had from witnesses under questioning, he said.

Brown did indicate that copies of the joint draft text would be made available.

Brown's letter came up at the hearing and Jackson cautioned against using an "executive privilege" argument against supplying the documents.

Jackson received support from Republican William Cohen of Maine who served on the House Judiciary Committee that recommended articles of impeachment against Richard Nixon before being elected to the Senate.

Cohen criticized Brown's response and was prompted to recall the edited transcripts that Nixon offered the Congress when it was demanding the unedited versions of the White House tapes.

Brown, while not indicating the documents would be forthcoming, said he would be "glad to consider how we can make the substance of the information available to this committee."

Earlier, Goldwater had said he felt the failure to count the Soviet supersonic bomber called the Backfire in the treaty limits was coming to be the No. 1 hurdle to Senate ratification.



## Nation

## Spies in the Sky

*The fate of SALT II may depend on "verification"*

**W**ill the U.S. be able to catch the Soviets if they cheat under the SALT II treaty? The answer may determine the fate of the arms limitation accord in the Senate. As the Foreign Relations Committee ended its second week of hearings on the pact, Delaware Democrat Joseph Biden said last week: "Verification is going to be the cutting issue of the committee's vote on the treaty and ultimately on the Senate floor."

What has made verification so controversial was the loss early this year of two important CIA listening posts in Iran, close to the U.S.S.R. border. From these sites, U.S. computers and other electronic devices in tandem with spy satellites had been able to monitor most Soviet missile test firings and hence learn, among other things, the weapons' length, diameter and launchweight. This is precisely the kind of information that will be essential for determining whether Moscow abides by a crucial SALT II restriction: increasing or decreasing key characteristics of an existing intercontinental ballistic missile by more than 5% would classify that ICBM as a "new missile." SALT II allows each side only one "new" ICBM.

Despite the loss of the Iranian sites, the Administration insists that the U.S. can adequately verify the arms pact. At last week's hearings, Defense Secretary Harold Brown emphasized that U.S. spy satellites and other means of gathering intelligence keep close tabs on the development, testing and deployment of all Soviet strategic arms. He even claimed that every new Soviet ICBM is detected while still on the Kremlin's drawing boards, presumably a rare public allusion to U.S. cloak-and-dagger activities inside the U.S.S.R. Pointing out that development of a new missile system takes about a decade and requires some 20 to 30 test flights, Brown said: "It is inconceivable to me that the Soviets could develop, produce, test and deploy a new ICBM in a way that would evade this monitoring network." (Even as Brown was discussing Soviet testing, the deadly U.S. air-launched cruise missile was beginning a crucial phase of development. *See SCIENCE.*)

**B**rown's assurances did not satisfy Senator John Glenn, the Ohio Democrat who has devoted hundreds of hours to studying the complex verification issue. As a former astronaut with some firsthand knowledge of how highly sophisticated electronic devices work—or fail—Glenn is looked to for guidance on verification by many of his Senate colleagues. Said Glenn last week: "I want to vote for SALT, but I want to know that the Soviets are living up to it." He

believes that the loss of the Iranian posts left the U.S. with no way of sufficiently monitoring Soviet missile testing. He fears that the U.S. will have more trouble intercepting Soviet telemetry, the performance data beamed back to earth by the test missile. Noted Glenn: "Brown tends to minimize the importance of telemetry, while analysts say that telemetry is key."

To allay his doubts, Glenn is considering proposing three reservations to be attached to the Senate bill approving the arms pact. One would urge Moscow not to encrypt any of its telemetry. The second would require the Administration to inform Congress whenever it brought complaints about possible Soviet cheating to the Standing Consultative Commission,



**Skeptical Senator John Glenn**

*Still worried about Russian cheating.*

a U.S.-Soviet body that deals with charges of treaty violations. Because neither of these reservations would be binding on Moscow, they probably would not require new negotiations with the Kremlin.

That almost certainly would not be the case with Glenn's third reservation: a requirement that Moscow give advance notice of all its ICBM tests. The U.S. already gives notice, primarily because American test missiles fly over international waters. Advance Soviet notice, argued Glenn, would enable the Pentagon to get the maximum number of satellites, planes and ships in place to monitor the Soviet tests, thus significantly compensating for the capabilities lost in Iran. But it is very likely, according to State Department aides, that Moscow would balk at such a condition. Glenn's reservation could become the kind of killer amendment that SALT advocates fear may doom the treaty.

THE WASHINGTON POST

23 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-21*Clayton Fritchey*

# Common Sense on SALT

Gerard Smith is a distinguished corporation lawyer-diplomat, who served under President Nixon as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as chief negotiator of SALT I. He also served in the State Department under President Eisenhower as chief of policy planning. In reference to SALT II, he says:

"While the Senate alone has the constitutional mandate to give its advice and consent to treaty ratification, the collective common sense of the American people, all of whom have a very high personal stake in the outcome, will also be of crucial importance."

It is a timely warning to the public not to ignore the debate on limiting strategic arms simply because it is supposed to be so complicated, so technical and recondite, as to be over the heads of most citizens.

President Carter acknowledges that the details of the treaty are formidable, but he also notes that the fundamentals "are not so complex." And he too says, "When all is said and done, SALT II is a matter of common sense."

The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to bear this out, for the essence of the conflicting testimony, after being exposed to informed senatorial questioning, is not beyond popular understanding. In the end, it will come down to the public having to decide whose word to take. That's where common sense hopefully will prevail.

Will the people, for instance, ultimately rely on the advice and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who on balance are unanimously for the treaty, or will they be more impressed by the objections of Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny, who for six years represented the Joint Chiefs on the SALT negotiating team?

The Joint Chiefs are composed of the head of each of the four services, plus the chairman, Air Force Gen. David Jones. After prolonged study on their own plus the advice of the Pentagon's many experienced arms experts, the chiefs formally told the Foreign Relations Committee that "all of us judge that the agreement which the president signed in Vienna is in the United States' national interest, and merits your support."

Then came Gen. Rowny, who resigned from the Army on June 30. Although supposedly the representative of the chiefs on the negotiating team, Rowny has long been identified with the powerful cold-warrior congressional bloc, whose influence was instrumental in getting him the SALT job in the first place.

Rowny flatly told the senators the treaty was "not in the best interests of the U.S." He would not concede there might be honest differences of opinion. "The emerging treaty," he bluntly charged, "is not in our interests since it is inequitable, unverifiable, undermines deterrents, contributes to instability and could adversely affect NATO and Allied coherence."

The clear implication was that the chiefs and other backers of the treaty were either retarded, or indifferent to the security of the United States, or both. Sen. Edmund Muskie observed that Rowny was making "serious charges."

The senator asked the general how he alone, among the negotiators, knew the United States could have got a better deal. Rowny's answer was that "the people who negotiated this thing at Geneva at times had their hands tied"—an unsupported insinuation that his colleagues had compromised their convictions.

The Rowny indictment reflected not only on the Joint Chiefs but on all the officials (Republican and Democrat alike) who have been supporting SALT pacts, including the last three presidents of the United States, the various arms-control directors and the several chief SALT negotiators.

Whatever the shortcomings of SALT II, it is generally conceded to be an improvement over SALT I, which was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2. Rowny says the new treaty is not verifiable, but even Paul Nitze, the super-SALT critic seems undisturbed by this issue "because the limits are so high that what could be gained by cheating against them would not appear to be strategically significant."

Gerard Smith notes the SALT agreements have been in force since 1972 without violations. He also asks: If SALT II gives the Russians all the best of it, as the critics contend, why did they sit on it? In respect to Rowny's charges that the treaty could be a blow to NATO, the best answer is that the NATO defense ministers have already endorsed the agreement.

Larry Smith, a strategic affairs specialist, believes that SALT can make the use of nuclear weapons less likely, but doubts that this can be demonstrated mathematically or through sophisticated war-game analysis.

"But somehow," he says, "we all know deep down in our gut that the simple premise of SALT is the recognition by both nations, indeed the entire human race, that we have a desperate stake in avoiding nuclear war." In short, a matter of common sense.

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NEW YORK JOURNAL OF COMMERCE

23 July 1979

# USSR Seen Needing More Western Trade

## CIA Report Forecasts Slowdown

By RICHARD LAWRENCE

Journal of Commerce Staff

WASHINGTON — A Soviet economic slowdown may force Kremlin leaders to try harder to cultivate trade relations with the West in the 1980s, according to a Central Intelligence Agency report released this weekend.

The report, given to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress a month ago but kept confidential until now, said that "Moscow will need imports from the West more than ever before," including grains, pipe and other steel products, machinery and equipment, and a "wide range of oil and gas technology."

The Soviets, the report suggests, probably will step up efforts to negotiate "compensation agreements" with Western firms, in which the firms provide equipment and technology in return for the produced goods. The Soviets also may have to "increase markedly" their medium- and long-term debt to the West, the report said.

More borrowings from the West and the compensation agreements is the most likely way the Soviets would try to offset their projected decline in oil export receipts, according to the CIA.

### 'Evenhanded' Approach

Meanwhile, a group of 23 prominent Americans, headed by Deere & Co. Chairman William Hewitt, urged the Carter administration to persist in an "evenhanded" approach to the Soviet Union and China in "such broad policies as the granting of most favored nation trade status and the ability to apply for Export-Import Bank financing."

The panel, representing the privately constituted United Nations Association, also suggested, however, that China and the U.S.S.R. not be treated equally in all trade mat-

ters. Noting that the Soviet Union is more developed than China, it said "a mechanically applied policy of evenhandedness in such fields as trade opportunities and transfer of technology would serve to widen the gap between the two, disproportionately benefiting the Soviet Union."

The panel's recommendations were submitted to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who reportedly favors a balanced approach to the two Communist powers, at least as regards tariffs and Eximbank financing.

At this point, however, the Carter administration is expected to ask Congress to approve a trade agreement only with China. Soviet emigration policy has complicated chances of a U.S.-Soviet trade pact.

In general, the CIA report provides a bleak economic outlook for the Soviets over the next decade. Soviet leaders will be forced to make hard policy choices in allocating their nation's resources, it said. Either the Soviets will have to slow down industrial investment, further curb consumption, or pare back defense spending, the report suggests.

The CIA said it expects Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) to grow at less than 3 percent a year over the next few years — down from an earlier estimated 4 percent growth rate — and then fall to one or 2 percent a year by the mid-1980's. "There is every reason to believe," it said, "that a continued decline in the rate of Soviet growth is inevitable through most of the 1980's."

The CIA cited impending energy and labor shortages, sluggish productivity, rising resource costs, and a generally inefficient planning system as behind the dismal economic outlook. The Soviet oil indus-

try, it said, "may have entered a no-growth stage this year, to be followed by steady production declines beginning as early as next year." The CIA also foresees "shortfalls" in the coal and nuclear power industries in the 1980's. And so far, it said, there has been no "major effort" to shift more to natural gas.

In the first five months this year, the CIA reported, Soviet output of steel, cement, non-ferrous metals, mineral fertilizers and pesticides were below year-earlier levels, and average daily oil production declined "for the first time in Soviet history."

The CIA predicted "large" Soviet grain demand this year, because of poor weather conditions. The Soviet crop will be "considerably below" the 1976-78 average of 219 million tons, it said.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
22 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page 26 Pt. 1

## CIA Lowers Projection of Soviet Economic Growth

From Times Wire Services

WASHINGTON- The Central Intelligence Agency has lowered its projection of Soviet economic growth, saying the nation suffers from rising costs of resources and faces energy and labor shortages.

In a congressional briefing, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said the agency expected the Soviet gross national product to grow at a rate of less than 3% annually over the next few years—down from an estimate made last year of 4%—and then to fall more gradually.

The CIA said that agriculture and energy problems would pose "a major economic headache for the Soviet leadership" and that worsening economic conditions could force changes in Russia's foreign trade policy in the next decade.

"Moscow will need imports from the West more than ever before and the leadership may be forced to abandon its current conservative stance toward trade with the West," Turner said.

"Overall, there is every reason to believe that a continued decline in the rate of Soviet economic growth is inevitable through most of the 1980s."

Turner predicted that Soviet economic growth could drop below 1% in the mid-1980s if oil production falls below 8 million barrels a day.

The CIA forecast last year that the Soviet economy was entering a period of substantially reduced growth and, at that time, made the prediction of 4%. His latest estimate was made before the joint economic subcommittee on priorities and economy in government on June 26, and was released Saturday by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), the panel's chairman.

Turner said Soviet growth had been brought almost to a standstill by severely cold weather last winter. The weather conditions increased energy demand, curtailed production and took a heavy toll on agriculture.

As a result, he said, 1979 grain production will be "considerably below" last year's record crop, and "we expect a large grain import demand for Western supplies."

He said the Soviet economy was plagued by slow growth of the labor force and capital stock, plus poor productivity.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

22 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page Pt.1A 6**BONE UP ON CHESS STRATEGY****CIA Offers Tips on Soviet Talks**

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The CIA has some advice for those who negotiate with the Soviets: Bone up on chess strategy. Be ready for the "whipsaw" and the "foot-drag." Keep your eye on the interpreter.

The intelligence agency has put out these tips in an exhaustive study of Soviet strategy and tactics in economic and commercial negotiations. But the same principles apply to other kinds of negotiations.

The study said the Russians prepare meticulously for their talks with Americans.

"The result of this advance work closely resembles a chess strategy in its step-by-step program for negotiating success," it said.

The usual Soviet group is a tightly disciplined team of veteran negotiators, backed up by young technicians.

It is trained to operate on the assumption that the U.S. team will regard compromise as desirable and in-

evitable and will be deeply frustrated when quick agreement does not emerge.

The Soviets, on the other hand, "pride themselves on being great 'sitters' and they believe that this induces major concessions" from the impatient Americans.

The CIA study lists some familiar Soviet ploys.

—"The shopping list." They will open with highly exaggerated demands. Eventually, they concede on the extraneous points and insist the U.S. side "even up the tally" with some concessions.

—"The padded list." The initial Soviet proposals make the same point in several redundant sections. Thus, they can ostensibly give away some points without really sacrificing anything.

—"The foot dragger." One Soviet

negotiator plays the role of the "heavy," refusing all compromise. Finally, the team chief intercedes as "benevolent mediator," offering compromise. The tactic appears to be a variation of the "good-cop, bad-cop" routine used in criminal interrogations.

—"The whipsaw." The Soviets will often try to play one U.S. firm against another by dealing with both simultaneously, meanwhile letting negotiations drag on for years. Moscow's men assume time works in their favor.

The CIA study said the Russians often use social occasions to size up personality weaknesses among the Americans.

The Soviet interpreters, it said, are an integral part of the negotiating team. They often have long experience with Americans, alerting the Soviet team leader to any changes in the U.S. positions and feeding back information gleaned during recesses and social occasions.

Generally, the study said, the Soviets prefer a loosely worded agreement so that it can be construed to their advantage.

It also said Americans can assume some of the "silent extras" in Moscow's delegation are KGB secret policemen, there to keep an eye on the Soviets—especially in negotiations conducted abroad.

One Soviet weak point, the CIA said, is rivalry among the various government agencies involved in the talks.

The Russians also get nervous when the Americans change negotiating personnel.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-2WASHINGTON STAR  
22 JULY 1979

# CIA Sees Soviet Growth Lag

Associated Press

The CIA has lowered its estimate of the Soviet Union's economic growth and predicts Kremlin leaders "will have to make the best of a bad situation" through the 1980s, according to congressional testimony released yesterday.

The latest assessment says agriculture and energy problems will pose "a major economic headache for the Soviet leadership" and that worsening economic conditions will force changes in Russia's foreign trade policy in the next decade.

"Moscow will need imports from the West more than ever before and the leadership may be forced to abandon its current conservative stance toward trade with the West," said CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

"Overall, there is every reason to believe that a continued decline in the rate of Soviet economic growth is inevitable through most of the 1980s," Turner said.

Turner predicted the Soviets' total economic output will grow less than 3 percent annually over the next few years "and then fall gradually."

## Severe Winter Cited

Russia's economic growth could drop below 1 percent in the mid-1980s, he said, if its oil production declines below 8 million barrels a day.

Last year, the CIA forecast the Soviet economy was entering a period of substantially reduced growth with an annual economic output of 4 percent.

Turner's latest estimate was made before the Joint Economic subcommittee on priorities and economy in government on June 26, and was released yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wisc., the panel's chairman.

Turner said Soviet economic growth was brought to a near standstill by the severe weather last winter.

Adverse weather conditions increased energy demand, curtailed production and took a heavy toll on agriculture, Turner said.

As a result, he said, 1979 grain production will be "considerably below" last year's record crop, and "we expect a large grain import demand for Western supplies."

## Energy Picture Clouded

He said the Soviet economy is plagued by slow growth of the labor force and capital stock, plus poor productivity.

"In addition, the energy shortage will mean that the Soviets cannot operate all their plant and equipment at full capacity which, in turn, will accelerate the downward trends which we previously projected for the 1980s," Turner testified.

He said the Soviet oil industry "may have entered a no-growth stage this year, followed by steady production declines beginning as early as next year."

In addition, he said, "the Soviet energy picture in the 1980s will be clouded by shortfalls in the coal and nuclear power industries—thereby limiting the possibilities for inter-fuel substitution for oil."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES  
23 July 1979

## LONG BLACKOUT

# China Bares Its Economic Facts of Life

BY LINDA MATHEWS

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—China, ending a blackout that lasted two decades, has finally given the world a revealing look at its economic vital statistics.

In a startling series of economic reports, the Beijing government has recent weeks disclosed everything from the size of its budget and trade deficit to its annual output of bicycles and soap powder, matters that had long been classified as state secrets.

The State Statistical Bureau, an agency dismantled during the Cultural Revolution and only recently revived, even reported the number of records set by Chinese athletes in 1978. There were 171 of them, the bureau said, five world marks and the rest national.

Thousands of figures poured out of China during the recent National People's Congress, as the leadership peeled the wraps off the national budget, the latest production quotas and economic targets for the current year. Not since 1959, when the Chinese extolled the achievements of the Communist regime's first decade in a report called "Ten Great Years," had China published its full financial accounts.

Foreign diplomats and economists who have long specialized in piecing together the fragments of information released by the New China News Agency were elated that Beijing "has finally emerged from its economic dark age," as a Central Intelligence Agency bulletin phrased it.

"China is no longer quite so mysterious, and I'm glad of it, though this new candor may put some of us out of business," an American analyst joked. "I've spent half my life trying to figure out what was happening in China and, bam, here it all is."

After subjecting the new statistics to intensive scrutiny, the State Department and the CIA have pronounced them genuine.

"We have quibbles with some of the figures, and there are others we'd like to understand better, but there is no reason to doubt their accuracy," a government analyst said.

What emerges from the economic revelations is a portrait of a country that leads the world not only in population (958 million) but in grain and pork production as well. Beijing's industrial output also commands respect, for it appears that, despite antiquated machinery and obsolete technology, China now ranks third in coal production, fifth in steel and among the top ten in crude oil.

The Chinese economy has substantially recovered from the political turmoil and ideological strife of the last decade. In the 2½ years since the death of Mao Zedong and the purge of his radical widow, Jiang Qing, foreign trade has boomed 53.7%, state revenues have gone up 44% and personal income has risen dramatically across the board. Despite the worst drought in more than a century, Chinese farmers last year harvested a record-setting grain crop of 304 million tons.

It is also clear from the numbers that China has far to go if it is ever to achieve its ultimate goal of transforming itself into an industrialized power by the end of the century.

"The Chinese have made tremendous strides, but theirs is still basically a very poor country," Robert Dernberger, a University of Michigan economist, said. "Foreign visitors have always been taken to model communes and factories, so many people may be surprised to find out, from these latest reports, just how poor China really is."

The State Statistical Bureau reported, for example, that the average city dweller earned only \$405 in 1978, despite a 7% pay raise. Yet factory and office workers fared far better than China's 800 million peasants, who averaged only \$46 in cash income last year.

The figures alone may exaggerate slightly the economic plight of the average Chinese, for urban rents are tiny, food prices are stabilized by the government and the peasants receive most of their income in the form of grain and vegetables. But after paying for rent and groceries, there is not much left in a Chinese family's budget for discretionary spending—about \$10 per person for all of 1978.

Even when a family of four pools that extra income, \$40 a year will not pay for a wristwatch (\$55) or an electric fan (\$80), let alone a bicycle (\$107). In Beijing, a new winter coat for each family member would wipe out the family budget; the cheapest jackets of heavy padded cotton cost nearly \$10 each.

The size of the national budget also underscores China's poverty. The government of Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping spent a total of \$71 billion last year—less than was spent by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Among U.S. government analysts here, there was little surprise that Chinese assembly lines turned out only 149,000 motor vehicles last year—compared to about 9 million in the United States—for China has not yet lost its heart to the automobile. But China managed to produce only 8.5 million bicycles, Beijing admitted, leaving long waiting lists for that prized commodity in every major city.



The economy's shortcomings, combined with alarming population growth, has meant little appreciable improvement in the standard of living. Hua acknowledged last month in a speech to the National People's Congress. Despite sizable harvests, he said, average food rations are no higher now than they were in the mid-1950s.

The leadership, while unfolding this panorama of statistics, has been unexpectedly blunt about the failures that have been revealed.

"We have achieved far less than we should have," Hua said. "Almost 30 years have passed since the founding of the People's Republic; yet to this day the superiority of socialism has not been consistently and effectively brought into play."

He blamed the recent setbacks on the "Gang of Four," the doctrinaire Maoists led by Jiang Qing, but added that with the radicals removed from power there was no further excuse for the failings of the Chinese economy.

In the hardest-hitting section of the report, Hua said, "We have finally created the internal and external conditions favorable for rapid, peaceful construction. If we do not make use of this precious, hard-won opportunity... our generation will be unworthy of our country and our people. We will have failed in our duty to the cause of socialism in China and the world."

China has gone public with so much information, analysts here believe, partly out of a desire to muster support for the modernization drive and the sacrifices ahead. The New China News Agency drove home that point when it quoted a deputy to the congress as saying, "The disclosure of our country's major economic and financial figures shows the real situation in our country's economy. I think most workers will respond to the government's frank review of the difficulties our country is facing today."

There has also been speculation that the Chinese have put their statistical house in order because they are ready to join the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Such international organizations, a potential source of loans for the credit-hungry Chinese, demand full financial accounting as a condition for membership.

Spokesmen for the monetary fund and the World Bank here said they know of no formal membership application from Beijing, though the Chinese have told visiting foreigners, including a congressional delegation, that they are eager to join the organizations.

A further reason for China's decision to reveal all—or nearly all—is that the new leadership has been embarrassed by the blackout Mao imposed after the failures of his over-ambitious Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s.

Because of the pressure to make the Great Leap's backyard steel furnaces and hastily organized communes look successful, trumped-up figures were reported by local authorities. When these were challenged by senior statisticians and by foreign economists, Mao silenced the statisticians.

"The Chinese admit that they got a terrible black eye because they didn't disclose the very basic data that other countries routinely release," Dernberger, the Michigan economist said. "There was always the implication that this big, important country couldn't do what a lot of tiny little countries could."

Most of the new figures are considered genuine, but China's defense budget, said to be \$10.5 billion in 1978, arouses some skepticism. Although Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu projected that military spending would increase this year to \$12.6 billion because of the cost of China's invasion of Vietnam—and account for one-sixth of the national budget—military experts believe that the figure is actually higher.

Some defense spending is probably disguised by appropriations for science and research, pegged at \$3.7 billion this year.

"Every country, including the United States, understates its defense budget," a Washington China-watcher said. "The Chinese are no different."

The precision of the population figure was a surprise, too, because the Chinese have not had a census in 25 years. Foreign demographers distrust the Chinese figure—975,320,000, in-

cluding the 17 million people on Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its 30th province. The U.S. Census Bureau's chief China-watcher, John Aird, believes China's population has already passed the billion mark. The dispute will not be settled until next year, when the Chinese are scheduled to conduct a full census.

Foreign analysts trust most of the other statistics, in part because they are consistent with the estimates of Japanese and American China-watchers, in part because the Chinese have disclosed their failures as well as their successes.

Zhang, the finance minister, acknowledged in his budget address to the People's Congress that China's growing appetite for foreign technology means that the country will run up a deficit of nearly \$25 billion this year.

This disclosure was a daring act, for in China balanced trade has often been a political as well as an economic necessity. The current regime, by admitting a deficit, opens itself up to the charge that it is becoming overly dependent on foreign powers, in violation of Maoist doctrine.

In several sectors, Chinese production fell far short of the target and even lagged behind the estimates of the CIA, whose studies of the Chinese economy are generally acknowledged to be the most accurate. Production of tractors, railroad cars, motor vehicles, paper, wristwatches and fertilizer were from 5% to 48% below the CIA's estimates, a sign, according to analysts here, of the reliability of Beijing's reports.

"The Chinese figures are now acknowledged to be the best we've got," Dernberger said, "and I never thought I would say that."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-9WASHINGTON STAR  
21 JULY 1979Cord Meyer

## Saudi production and the oil shortage

After enabling President Carter to arouse Americans to the need for stringent measures on energy, the gasoline crisis is likely now to fade like a bad dream, leaving puzzlement in place of the long lines at the filling stations.

This abatement of the oil shortage will be temporary but some of Carter's advisers urged him to forecast it in his speech Sunday night. It appears that the shortage will be transformed into a temporary glut by the slowdown of the American economy and by increased Saudi production. The prospect carries risks for the president's credibility but he decided to ignore it in his speech.

The energy experts warn that this deceptive glut will vanish like morning mist as soon as the American economy starts to recover. World demand will again start to bump against the supply ceiling to force up prices. There is unanimity among the experts that for the next decade the world will be living on the ragged edge of genuine shortage and that Carter is absolutely right to call for draconian measures to reduce our dependence on foreign oil.

World supply and demand are so closely balanced that

the U.S. is at the mercy of uncontrollable political events abroad. The mounting turmoil in Iran could easily lead at any time to the complete closure of the Iranian oil fields. The impact on the world markets of the loss of about three million barrels per day would be devastating and shoot prices through the roof.

Recent news reports that Iraq is capable of quickly increasing production by one million barrels per day are misleading. The Iraqi oil fields are suffering from declining pressures partly as the result of the wasteful use of Soviet water flooding methods.

Moreover, intelligence estimates of future Russian oil production have had to be revised downward because of gross Soviet mismanagement of the Western Siberian oil fields. By as early as 1981, the Soviet bloc may be forced to become a net importer of oil, igniting new fires under the pressure cooker of rising world demand.

Under these circumstances, it is childish folly to make OPEC the scapegoat for our own profligate waste of genuinely scarce oil, as White House staffer Stuart Eizenstat advised and

Carter hinted in his speech. The OPEC nations functioned in 1973 as a conspiratorial cartel to raise prices by restricting production, but OPEC's recent price increase was a response to real shortages reflected in the frantic bidding in the spot market. England has been charging for North Sea oil just as much as the most greedy Arab.

We are fortunate that the largest OPEC producer, Saudi Arabia, has been prepared to hold its price below the new OPEC ceiling and to increase production from 8.5 to 9.5 million barrels. Fulfilling a promise made to this reporter on June 9, Crown Prince Fahd explained to Carter's envoy, Ambassador Robert Strauss, that the increased production was a response to the commitment to conservation made by the industrial nations at Tokyo.

Contrary to general impression, the Saudis have a compelling self-interest in not producing above the 8.5 million rate. They view their oil reserves as a one-time gift from the gods and are determined to preserve this patrimony for succeeding generations.

At a rate of 8.5 million, their reserves will last for 50

years and allow them to make a transition to an industrial economy. At higher production rates, the oil will be gone before they have time to train their people. They will have traded the liquid gold in the ground for declining dollars and uncontrollable inflation.

It is an act of farsighted statesmanship for the Saudis to have temporarily upped production to give the West time to adjust to lower consumption levels. They are motivated by the stake they have in Western prosperity and by their well-founded fear of the Soviets. But they sometimes despair of a fair hearing in the American media.

When the New York Times erroneously reported this month that the Saudis had decided not to increase production, the Saudis were criticized for selfish irresponsibility. When they did increase, the Washington Post in an editorial and cartoon charged that they were trying to hook the U.S. on dependency on their oil to bring pressure to bear on Israel.

As one young Saudi official complained, "We are damned if we do and damned if we don't."

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THE BALTIMORE SUN  
25 July 1979

## House panel finds lies in Soviet-Oswald files

Washington (KMT)—The Soviet government lied to the United States when it sent the Warren Commission what it claimed was every scrap of information the KGB (secret police) collected on defector Lee Harvey Oswald, a House investigation of President Kennedy's assassination has concluded.

In the tension-riddled days following the assassination by Oswald, Soviet officials turned over hundreds of documents on Oswald, who had lived in the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1961.

Almost simultaneously, a high-level KGB operative, Yuri Nosenko, defected to the United States and told Central Intelligence Agency officials that he was in charge of the division that kept Oswald's files.

The combination of the files the KGB provided and Mr. Nosenko's testimony convinced the Warren Commission that there was no Soviet role in President Kennedy's death.

The assassination occurred 11 months after the Cuban missile crisis when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev withdrew the missiles after President Kennedy imposed a naval blockade and the Soviets were widely considered to have suffered political damage.

During a two-year investigation of the Kennedy assassination, the House Committee on Assassinations agreed that the Soviets were blameless in the murder, but nevertheless concluded that the KGB had deceived the Warren Commission.

The committee also concluded that Mr. Nosenko either lied to the Warren Commission about Oswald or lied to the committee when questioned about the defector.

The committee's investigation turned up numerous details about both the Russian and the American intelligence operations suggesting that, at least in Oswald's case, the CIA was outmaneuvered by the KGB.

It is "highly probable" that the KGB hid from the United States "extensive information that most likely was gathered by a KGB surveillance of Oswald and [his Russian wife] Marina while they were living in Russia," the panel concluded.

"It also is quite likely that the Soviet government withheld files on a KGB interview with Oswald."

After the committee concluded that there was a coverup, the State Department asked the Soviets for the missing files for the committee's investigation, but the KGB refused the request.

Perhaps more significant to the intelligence community, however, has been the committee's experience with Mr. Nosenko, a defector whose case literally split the American intelligence community into two factions. One faction insisted that he was a gold mine of information, and the other insisted that he was a plant, a "disinformation" agent sent here to deceive the United States.

Some major assumptions that the CIA has made about certain Soviet moves were based on a belief in Mr. Nosenko's credibility—not only about the Kennedy assassination but also about all the other information Mr. Nosenko supplied to his interrogators.

Mr. Nosenko contradicted many of his early statements while being interviewed by House committee investigators.

For example, he told the committee that when Oswald, a marine radar expert, defected, the KGB kept him under extremely close surveillance as he settled in the Soviet Union.

At the recent investigation, Mr. Nosenko said that all Oswald's mail had been intercepted, his phone tapped, his apartment bugged and his movements watched.

But in 1964, he told the Warren Commission that there was no special KGB surveillance of Oswald.

Mr. Nosenko also told the commission that the KGB never subjected Oswald to any psychiatric examinations, even after he tried to commit suicide while living in Russia.

"In 1973," said the committee, "he detailed for the committee the reports he had read about psychiatric examinations of Oswald."

Mr. Nosenko never testified directly before the Warren Commission. Instead, he was questioned by CIA interrogators in solitary confinement. Richard Helms, then deputy director of the CIA for plans, passed his information on to Chief Justice Earl Warren, who headed the commission.

It since has been disclosed that Mr. Nosenko's interrogation was a brutal ordeal in which he was kept awake in an uncomfortably cold room for months.

That "virtually ruined him as a valid source of information about the assassination," the committee concluded. Nevertheless, the committee was certain Mr. Nosenko lied about Oswald—whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964 or the committee in 1973, or perhaps both.

"The reasons he would lie about Oswald range from the possibility that he merely wanted to exaggerate his own importance to the disinformation hypothesis with its sinister implications."

The committee also was told that the CIA bureaucracy and its complicated and coded filing system—arranged to keep outsiders from understanding the files—caused the agency to fail to spot the dangerous Oswald.

For example, after a thorough search of files, the CIA said that it had conducted a major operation collecting data about a radio factory in Minsk where Oswald was working and that the operation failed to note Oswald was an American defector.

After Oswald returned to the United States and shot the President, the CIA said it found numerous references to Oswald in its files—but none filed under Oswald's name.

Although the committee's final report produced numerous disclosures surrounding the Kennedy assassination, the findings in the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., produced no surprises.

Monday, the two ranking black members of the committee, Representative Louis Stokes (D., Ohio), chairman, and Delegate Walter Fauntroy (D., D.C.) criticized the news media for ignoring the King murder investigation in favor of the Kennedy probe's findings.

Mr. Fauntroy said the reason the King probe failed to generate media attention is that the investigators did not have time to follow all the leads they produced.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES  
22 July 1979

## Assassination Unit Finds Probabilities

Two and one-half years and \$5.4 million dollars ago, the House Select Committee on Assassinations began exploring the conspiracy theories surrounding the murders of President John F. Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Last week its final report was turned over to the Justice Department for consideration, and as expected, it included just enough evidence to keep the plot theorists busy for years.

Organized crime figures angered at Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy as well as his brother, possibly along with anti-Castroites, the panel concluded, "probably" conspired in President Kennedy's death. In any case, two people, not Lee Harvey Oswald acting alone, fired at his car in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, it concluded. James Earl Ray, it said, did fire the lone gun that killed Dr. King in Memphis on April 4, 1968, but his action "probably" evolved from a conspiracy of right-wing St. Louis businessmen offering \$50,000 for the job.

While the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency are cleared of involvement, the panel said, the F.B.I.'s counter-intelligence program helped create a climate in which Dr. King's assassination for his civil rights activities was possible. As for the Warren Commission, it too is cleared, but only of allegations of cover-up. The commission is strongly criticized for its efforts to prove that there was a lone assassin.

# TALES OF CONSPIRACY

With little fanfare and less suspense, the House assassinations committee assembled in an ornate Capitol caucus chamber one morning last week to disgorge its 686-page report on the murders of John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. As previewed months ago, the haunting conclusions of the panel's nearly two-year, \$5.4 million investigation were that "lone gunmen" Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray probably did not act alone—and that Oswald may have been the dupe of organized crime. The findings were pronounced a "can of worms" by a flummoxed FBI official, but conspiracy junkies traded I-told-you-so's. In New York, Bantam Books published 75,000 copies of the committee's report, hopefully titled "The Final Assassinations Report"—but given the committee's disturbingly open-ended investigation, the title seemed wildly optimistic.

**SECOND GUNMAN?** The full report rambled through 28 volumes of evidence, and only dedicated buffs could follow it all. The Warren Commission's verdict that Oswald killed Kennedy was copiously upheld, as was its theory that a single bullet wounded both the President and former Texas Gov. John Connally. The CIA, the Secret Service and the FBI were absolved of cover-up or involvement in the Kennedy assassination—although the committee harshly criticized the FBI's long COINTELPRO campaign to discredit Dr. King. Elaborately hedged and laden with might-have-beens, the committee's assertion of conspiracy seemed largely a matter of conjecture—except for the ominous claim, by a group of acoustics experts, that a second gunman had apparently fired on the Kennedy motorcade and missed.

First advanced last summer and substantially buttressed in December, the acoustics report prompted the committee to make a 180-degree turn in its initial conclusions, that Oswald acted alone. The authors maintained that a long-lost recording of Dallas police-radio transmissions contains the echoes of four shots in Dealey Plaza—three by Oswald, firing from the Texas School Book Depository, and a fourth by someone firing from the famous "grassy knoll" along Kennedy's motorcade route. Their analysis was not universally accepted: New York Times columnist Tom Wicker, in a foreword to the paperback edition of the report, argued against it—as did several committee members. But North Carolina Democrat Richardson Preyer, who headed the Kennedy investigation, was persuaded. "I think it takes a greater leap of faith not to believe the acoustics evidence than it does to believe it," Preyer said.

But the committee was unable to provide the merest hint of the phantom gunman's identity, and its efforts to suggest a motive for a plot were mired in speculation. Even its definition of "conspiracy" was a stringent legalism: "If two or more individuals agreed to take action to kill President Kennedy and at least one of them took action" leading to Kennedy's death, the report says, that constitutes a conspiracy. Confounded by such subtleties, some committee members rebelled. If the report were offered as prosecution evidence, snapped Michigan Republican Harold Sawyer, "I'd file it in the circular file."

**'TENUOUS' LINKS:** Half hidden in the report's factual chiaroscuro was the theory favored by staff director G. Robert Blakey—that Oswald was manipulated by mobsters bent on halting the Kennedy Administration's war on organized crime. Investigators traced Oswald's travels in Louisiana during the summer of 1963 and discovered "tenuous" links to the underworld. One was through the late David Ferrie, a cashiered airline pilot and sometime private eye who was a suspect in former New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's much-maligned assassination probe. Ferrie worked for a lawyer who represented underworld boss Carlos Marcello in a bitter deportation dispute with the Kennedy Administration and knew Marcello personally. The committee found six "credible" witnesses who saw Ferrie and Oswald together.

But Ferrie denied knowing Oswald. So did Marcello, who testified before the assassinations committee in executive session. And the committee conceded that the unstable and passionately ideological Oswald would have made an unlikely candidate for mob hit man. But that might also

be just the reason for choosing him. And staff director Blakey, an expert on organized crime, decided that the theory of Oswald as an underworld tool had the great strength of explaining his subsequent murder by the late Jack Ruby, a sleazy Dallas nightclub owner. Ruby, who had mob connections of his own, would simply have been silencing a dangerous witness. "You don't need any expertise to see that," Blakey said last week. "You need expertise to explain away the fact." Ruby himself claimed that he only wanted to prevent an Oswald trial, which would have meant more pain for Jacqueline Kennedy, the President's widow. Nevertheless, insisted Blakey: "I am now firmly of the opinion that the mob did it. It is a historical truth."

**PUTATIVE PLOT:** The outlines of possible conspiracy in the King assassination were simpler—but just as speculative. The committee concluded that Ray killed King in hope of claiming a \$50,000 bounty that he might have heard was being offered by St. Louis businessmen John H. Sutherland and John R. Kauffman. Sutherland and Kauffman died before the investigation began, and the committee could find no proof that Ray ever met them. Another aspect of the putative plot was that Ray got money and advice from his brothers, Jerry and John, while he "stalked" King across the South in 1968. But the committee was unable to show that Jerry and John played a part in the assassination. At most, the report said, "the possibility of their involvement was necessarily increased by the absence" of other possible co-conspirators.

Preyer called on the Justice Department to pick up the long-cold conspiracy trail with an investigation of Oswald's associations in New Orleans. But the response by department officials was icy—although the acoustical evidence of a second gunman in Dallas was the most persuasive part of the committee's conspiracy evidence, one official said, it offered nary a clue as to who Oswald's accomplice might have been. And Justice, another department honcho said, has better things to do than "chase ghosts."

TOM MORGANTHAU with  
ELAINE SHANNON in Washington

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DETROIT NEWS  
28 June 1979

## Carter's Korean Folly

**W**hen President Carter left Washington to attend the economic summit conference in the Far East, he took along an alarming new study about North Korea's military might. North Korea, it turns out, is far stronger militarily than had been supposed and that fact calls into question even more urgently than before Mr. Carter's policy to withdraw American troops from the region.

Army intelligence reassessed North Korean strength recently, and its findings are supported by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The findings show that North Korea has from 550,000 to 600,000 men under arms, not 450,000 as previously believed. The Communist North now has the fifth largest armed force in the world.

North Korea exceeds South Korea in tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers by a wider margin than previously reported. Unfortunately, America's deteriorating intelligence services failed to give warning of this buildup before it became an accomplished fact.

The American people have become painfully accustomed to such dangerous failures in the post-Watergate era, and one such failure moved Mr. Carter to considerable anger.

When it turned out that the United States had been blind to the implications of the uprising against the shah of Iran, the President demanded an improvement in intelligence gathering.

Obviously, that improvement hasn't materialized. Americans can only wonder: How many more Irans and North Koreas must occur before the U.S. regains an effective intelligence network?

The President announced in 1977 he intended to withdraw, in stages over several years, America's 30,000 ground troops from South Korea. As has been the Carter way, he made the decision unilaterally, with no concessions from North Korea.

This show of weakness (for it was interpreted as precisely that by Communist states) produced the inevitable result. North Korea seized the opportunity and secretly built up its military power. For what purpose? Defense against a weakened adversary?

In view of North Korea's response, which came as no surprise to realistic observers — however much it undoubtedly hurt Mr. Carter's feelings — the plan for American troop withdrawals from South Korea should be scrapped. Peace is simply not a game that one side can safely play alone.



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THE LOS ANGELES TIMES  
21 July 1979

# Carter Halts Pullout of U.S. Combat Troops in S. Korea

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—U.S. ground combat troops will remain in South Korea indefinitely under conditions that would draw them into battle at once if the 26-year-old truce should be violated, President Carter disclosed Friday.

In abandoning his campaign pledge to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea, Carter said that recent intelligence reevaluations indicate that Communist North Korea's military forces "are larger than previously estimated."

National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski read the statement on Carter's behalf at a White House briefing. He said U.S. combat troops would remain until there until there is "evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula."

Carter's decision affects about 30,000 U.S. ground troops in Korea, most of them members of the 2nd Infantry Division, which is stationed just south of the demilitarized zone to guard against a possible invasion by North Korean forces.

Carter ordered the withdrawal in 1977 after having pledged to do so during his 1976 election campaign. However, the program was suspended in February when the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency began to report the presence of larger North Korean forces than had been previously estimated.

In his order Friday, Carter said that withdrawals of combat elements of the 2nd Division "will remain in abeyance." He said that some support troops, probably numbering a little more than 800, would be sent home but that the rest of the force would remain at least until 1981 when conditions would be reexamined.

"In that review, the United States will pay special attention to the restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula," the President said in the statement.

Most U.S. military commanders had counseled Carter against the withdrawal before it was announced in 1977. After the policy was set, most military leaders went along with it, although reluctantly.

One exception was Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, then chief of staff of U.S. forces in Korea. Singlaub said Carter's decision would inevitably lead to war and was opposed by all U.S. military and civilian officials stationed in Korea. Carter called the general's public criticism of Administration policy "a very serious breach of propriety." Singlaub was transferred and shortly thereafter he retired from the military.

The President's latest decision is certain to be welcomed by most members of the military and by conservatives in Congress. On the other hand, it may add to the President's political problems with liberal Democrats who were already angry about some of his Cabinet changes.

Administration officials say the U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea has more than 600,000 men under arms, about the same number as South Korea. The officials said that in 1977, intelligence estimates showed about 500,000 North Korean troops. However, the officials said, it is now known that the Pyongyang regime began its military build-up in the early 1970s but that U.S. analysts did not detect the change until late last year.

THE WASHINGTON POST  
21 July 1979

Article appeared  
on page A-3

# U.S. Troop Pullout In Korea Dropped

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter yesterday abandoned for the rest of his term of office one of his most controversial international initiatives—withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea.

A White House announcement read by presidential assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski said additional large-scale withdrawals were being postponed at least until 1981, when the situation will be reassessed.

The principal reason given for the change was the recent increase in the U.S. intelligence estimate of North Korean ground forces. The White House statement said that new reductions in American combat elements "should await credible indications that a satisfactory military balance has been restored and a reduction in tension is under way."

Carter formulated his plan to withdraw U.S. forces as long ago as January 1975, when he was a long-shot candidate for the presidency, and he stuck to his idea with determination after taking office. With little support from anyone else and against strong misgivings of South Korea, Japan, the U.S. military and powerful elements in Congress, Carter ordered the phased withdrawal in the spring of 1977 and strongly defended it against attack.

Carter fired Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub as chief of staff of U.S. forces in Korea for saying that the planned pullout would lead to war. But as opposition continued, Carter shifted the timing so that the scheduled withdrawals started slowly, then postponed the departure of most of the first group scheduled to leave in February of this year he placed further

withdrawals "in abeyance" to study the new intelligence.

The authorized U.S. troop strength in Korea for been reduced during Carter's presidency from about 41,000 to about 38,000. But most of this was due to the departure of missile and support units whose withdrawal had been planned previously.

The only combat force withdrawn as a result of Carter's decision was an infantry battalion of 674 men. This was more than offset by the arrival of 12 more U.S. Air Force F4 fighter-bombers with 900 men, justified as a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to South Korea.

In other measures justified partly as compensation for the pullout the United States increased the number and visibility of joint exercises with South Korea, increased support for Korean defense industries and created a combined forces command. All these will continue, officials said yesterday.

A compensation package of \$800 million, voted by Congress after extensive debate, will be withheld for the most part until withdrawals actually take place.

Some 1,000 to 1,500 troops of a Hawk missile air defense unit are still scheduled to be withdrawn next year, in an arrangement set in motion during the Ford administration.

The new U.S. intelligence estimate, which represents a higher assessment of long-term activities rather than any sudden jump in actual North Korean forces, increased the communist army about 25 percent, to more than 600,000 men. Once the new estimate was leaked in January, official defense of the withdrawal plan became increasingly difficult. Based on the new data the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially recommended that the pullout be stopped until 1981.



Carter aide Brzezinski: Reductions "should await credible indications that a military balance has been restored."

During Carter's journey to Seoul last month, the South Korean government agreed to a joint proposal for diplomatic talks with North Korea. Carter's hints at the time that he was ready to put aside the troop withdrawal apparently contributed to Seoul's willingness to agree.

North Korea has rejected the plan for three-way talks, at least for now. The White House statement yesterday suggested a tie between diplomatic progress and future U.S. withdrawals. Critics had argued from the beginning that Carter should not have given up this leverage, such as it is, in announcing his pullout plan.

NEW YORK TIMES  
21 JULY 1979

## U.S. Halts Pullout of Combat G.I.'s From South Korea Till at Least '81

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 20 — The withdrawal of American combat soldiers from South Korea, temporarily suspended last February, was halted today by President Carter until at least 1981.

The White House said the action would foster "a favorable U.S. strategic posture in East Asia."

Reading a Presidential statement to reporters at the White House, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's assistant for national security, announced that while some reductions in American support units in South Korea would continue, any further withdrawals of the 32,000 combat soldiers in the country would "remain in abeyance."

The statement said the "timing and pace" of any additional troop cuts would be re-examined in two years.

Mr. Carter, in the statement, said that he believed his decision would "serve wider U.S. strategic security interests by reassuring our principal allies of our steadiness and our resolve."

### Action Not Unexpected

The announcement, which came less than three weeks after Mr. Carter met with President Park Chung Hee in Seoul, was not unexpected. His original decision, in early 1977, to withdraw all ground forces from South Korea provoked consternation among allied governments in East Asia and was heavily criticized on Capitol Hill.

More recently, the withdrawal decision came under scrutiny within the Administration when revised intelligence estimates were said to show that North Korea's armed forces were larger and better equipped than previously believed.

Nevertheless, Mr. Carter's announcement today was said to represent a significant turnabout in Administration policy. In his statement, Mr. Carter said he was suspending the withdrawals in order to give South Korea time to build up its own forces and to create conditions favorable to the resumption of diplomatic talks between South and North Korea.

Mr. Carter first called for the withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea as a Presidential candidate in 1975. During his first few weeks as President, he unveiled a plan in which almost all ground forces, including the Second Division, were to be pulled out of the country

by 1982. The remaining American presence was to consist mainly of Air Force units.

The plan, which was privately opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by several civilian defense and foreign policy aides, was attacked by several members of Congress, particularly Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, and Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of New York.

Despite this criticism, Mr. Carter said at the time that he intended to proceed with the withdrawal, and last year about 3,600 combat and support soldiers were brought home. At the same time, he approved an Air Force request to deploy 12 more F-4 fighters in South Korea.

Early this year, several developments led Mr. Carter and his top advisers to reassess the withdrawal decision. An Army intelligence study estimated that there were as many as 600,000 North Korean ground troops, about 100,000 more than had been previously calculated. The study also asserted that North Korea had a major advantage over the South's armored forces and artillery.

The Army's study led Mr. Carter last February to announce a suspension of any further withdrawals, pending an interagency review of the new estimate of North Korean military potential. Meanwhile, top Administration foreign policy aides are said to have concluded that the normalization of relations with China, the growth of Soviet naval power in the Far East and conflict in Indochina had made any further reductions of American troops politically risky at this time.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
25 July 1979

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## Betty Beale

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. . . . .  
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall was at the Egyptian Embassy saying he did not clear his assistants with the White House staff before picking them. He picked them, then sent their names over.

Counsel to the President Bob Lipshutz was telling how reassuring it was to listen to the news. First, he heard he was going to resign. Then he heard he was going to be a federal judge. "Last night I heard on the news that I was going to stay." His chuckling mood confirmed either (1) Nervousness over uncertainty, (2) Pleasure over a judgeship, or (3) Relief over remaining at the Casa Blanca.

CIA Director Stan Turner, getting a harmless tonic and ice at the bar, was as surprised as Marshall, Lipshutz, Budget Director Jim McIntyre and Undersecretary of State David Newsom that Ambassador Ghorbal was in Cairo. The invitations had been issued in the Ghorbals' names but he had to go to Cairo so they remained there for a holiday.

None of the big wheels needed to come in Ghorbal's absence. Under such circumstances an assistant secretary and the chief of protocol — Kit Dobelle was there — would have sufficed. But then, with Carter's Egyptian interests, it was better to be on the safe side.

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SAN DIEGO UNION  
14 JULY 1979

## OBJECT LANDED IN ARIZONA DESERT

# Baja's UFO May Have Been Drug Smuggler

By KIP COOPER

Military Affairs Writer, The San Diego Union

Would a drug smuggler try to fire a homemade rocket loaded with dope across the Mexican border into the United States?

That, said a spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, would be a wild thing to do.

"If you are going to try to smuggle something you try to do it in a way you wouldn't attract attention to what you are doing," he said.

"Drug smugglers have tried all imaginable ways to get things across the border including radio-controlled aircraft, but I can't think of a greater way to attract attention than firing a rocket or missile," he said.

But that might have happened six years ago and there are people who speak of coincidences at that time when the Air Force tracked a mysterious missile from Baja California to the Arizona desert and the Drug Enforcement Agency was alerted to the possibility that a rocket would be used to smuggle drugs from Mexico into the United States.

The rocket, or whatever it was, was picked up on radar at the missile detecting station atop Mount Laguna in March 1973.

"They (the airmen) were not really sure of what they had," said Major Jerry Hix of the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, Colo.

"It was not from an area we normally associate with a sea-launched ballistic missile so they thought they had a problem with their equipment.

"They checked and still did not find anything wrong so they did not know what they had. About a week later the drug people at San Ysidro visited them and asked if they had seen anything on radar.

"It correlated with their (radar) reading and reassured them that their radar had not given them a false reading," Hix said.

He said that the DEA people subsequently said that a rocket had been used to smuggle drugs into Arizona.

Diogenes Galanos, special agent in charge of the DEA office in San Diego (who was not here then) said the DEA had received an anonymous telephone call saying a homemade missile was going to be used to shoot drugs into the United States.

"The caller could not give us any information as to the place it would be launched from or where it would land and he did not have the names of any people involved," Galanos said.

But when the DEA contacted the tracking station at Mount Laguna, it was advised of the mysterious object tracked a couple of weeks before.

Galanos said he did not doubt that the Air Force tracked an object "but I doubt the plausibility of a rocket being used to transport drugs."

He said the cost of building such a rocket would be prohibitive in view of the possible return value of drugs it could carry and the chances of recovering such a cargo would be almost non-existent.

The CIA spokesman also said that

such a venture would be cost-prohibitive.

"There is also the risk of the thing blowing up or crashing," he said.

But the Air Force did track such an object, say spokesmen at Colorado Springs and at Mt. Laguna.

Hix said a parent missile tracking unit at McDill, Fla., also tracked the object on its warning system.

"They confirmed that there was a missile launch at that time," Hix said.

Capt. Roy Ash, present director of operations for the Mount Laguna facility, said he was not at the station in 1973 but people who were there confirmed the missile story.

"The missile launch came out of the Western coast of Mexico near the Gulf of Baja and it did paint a target on our (radar) scope."

Ash said the Mount Laguna facility is charged with detecting anything that comes through and reporting it to NORAD in Colorado Springs.

"It was reported and evaluated and determined not be to be a threat," he said.

Ash said the falling of Skylab apparently triggered interest in other sightings recorded by the station, especially missile firings.

"We have been briefing everyone who comes here for the past six years, including newsmen and visitors, on this missile recording," Ash said.

"One of the first questions visitors invariably ask is whether we have ever sighted any enemy missiles. We haven't. But we always tell them about the 1973 incident."

"Some of the people up here tracking the fall of Skylab thought this was interesting also," he said.

Both DEA and Air Force said the missile track and its possible involvement in drug transport has never occurred again.

Could it have been a UFO?

Not on Air Force radar, said Hix. "We terminated Project Bluebook (UFO tracking) in 1969. We don't do that anymore."

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ON PAGE **38**THE NATION  
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## SECOND THOUGHTS

CAREY MCWILLIAMS



An obituary notice in *The New York Times* of June 28 accurately described Carleton Beals as "a native American independent." But the characterization might have been sharpened had it said that he was a native Western or California-style radical, for there is, of course, a difference between the Western and the Eastern Seaboard variety. Carleton worked his way through the University of California—his parents had moved to California when he was 3 years old—and his brother, Dr. Ralph Beals, is a distinguished California historian. Although few American journalists of his time were more widely traveled or less provincial in outlook, Carleton never ceased to be the Western radical even though he was for many years a resident of Connecticut. It was, indeed, this difference in background that set him apart from his journalistic peers in the East.

There was a time, in the 1930s, when he was widely recognized as the dean of American correspondents writing about Latin America. But as the cold war intensified, Carleton did not jump aboard the bandwagon. As a result, he failed to win the kinds of assignments for which he was uniquely qualified by expert knowledge and first-hand experience. No American correspondent, for example, knew more about Cuba than Carleton. But his radical views kept him sidelined at a time when his insights could have been most valuable. As chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee he could hardly expect to be looked upon with favor by those who eagerly accepted C.I.A. briefings and the official Washington line. Moreover, he was always quite blunt and outspoken in voicing views which reflected his native American radicalism. But in no sense was he a committed Marxist or an ideological leftist.

Front-page headlines provided an appropriate if ironic backdrop to the notices of his death. Sandinists had gained the upper hand in Nicaragua. The dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle—"Tacho" as he is known to former classmates at LaSalle Military Academy on Long Island and at West Point—was huddled in an elegant bunker waiting for the final word from Washington, with his jet plane revved up for takeoff at an instant's notice. Although his family had been trained, financed, advised and militarily supported for decades by Washington, Tacho was obviously no longer in high favor at the White House; indeed, it was evident that he was clearly marked for history's dustbin.

In a sense, therefore, it was an appropriate time for Carleton to die. His first major scoop had been his famous 1928 interview with the rebel leader Augusto Sandino in the jungles of Nicaragua. Sandino had launched a gallant revolt against the Marine Corps occupation, and it was there, in the jungles, that U.S. troops had their first experience in combatting guerrilla resistance forces under tropical conditions. The Sandino revolt had been an unreported story until Carleton induced Oswald Garrison Villard, then editor of

*The Nation*, to give him \$100 a week, expenses included, so that he might find his way from Honduras, partly on horseback, partly on foot, through the jungle to a rendezvous with Sandino. Carleton's stories, a major scoop for *The Nation*, were picked up by a large section of the world press and, overnight, Sandino and the struggle for independence which he represented became world-famous.

In 1960, Carleton asked me for an advance of substantially the same amount he had received from Villard so that he might visit Cuba to find out what was really going on there. He was beside himself with curiosity and deep concern, but none of his former "big-time" news connections would send him to Cuba; so he appealed to us. His first article from Cuba (July 23, 1960) reported that tensions with the United States were mounting dangerously, and a report of November 12, captioned "Cuba's Invasion Jitters," clearly foreshadowed the Bay of Pigs invasion. It should be emphasized that these reports were written by a man who knew more about Cuba than most of the working press combined.

In view of Carleton's brilliant advance work, it is not surprising that *The Nation* broke the story of the impending Bay of Pigs invasion (in an editorial of November 19, 1960, based on information supplied by Ronald Hilton of Stanford, who had just returned from a visit to Guatemala where he had learned of the C.I.A. guerrilla base at Retalhuleu). So thanks to Carleton, *The Nation* scored two major scoops.

The span of more than thirty years between the first and the second of these scoops was marked by almost unrelieved American folly and stupidity in Central America and the Caribbean. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy moaned to Ted Sorensen: "How could I have been so stupid?" But his stupidity was willful; he had ample advance notice and warning. Later Kennedy told Turner Catledge that if *The New York Times* had printed more about the guerrilla base in Guatemala, this "colossal mistake" might have been avoided. But neither the President nor his friends at *The Times* had heeded the warnings that *The Nation* had carried, first in the stories by Carleton from Cuba and then the quite specific warning in our editorial of November 19, 1960. If *The Nation* had done nothing more than provide a home for Carleton's last great reports from Cuba and his earlier stories from Nicaragua, it would have deserved the Pulitzer Prizes which neither it nor its famous contributor received. □

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Jack Anderson

## Brzezinski-Vance Feud Bubbles

The long-simmering feud between President Carter's two top foreign policy advisers, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus R. Vance, has bubbled over again in the administration's mishandling of the Nicaraguan civil war.

Thanks to Brzezinski's ability to detect the Russian Bear behind every international development, Vance was pressured into proposing that the Organization of American States send a "peacekeeping force" into Nicaragua to prevent a Marxist takeover. This suggested return to the days of U.S. "big stick" diplomacy was rejected out of hand by the OAS, leaving Vance with egg on his face.

In fact, our associates Gary Cohn and Bob Sherman have learned, the secretary of state was bitterly opposed to the idea of intervention, correctly sensing the suspicions with which it would be received by gringo-wary Latin American nations. Behind the scenes, Vance argued that even a suggestion that the United States wanted a continuation of its dominance in Nicaragua was unwise, unethical and unworkable.

But because of Brzezinski's near-hysterical fear of communist influence among the Sandinista guerrillas who toppled President Anastasio Somoza, Vance was instructed by Carter to make the foredoomed suggestion that the OAS intervene, even though Vance personally opposed such a plan.

While the latest manifestation of the Brzezinski-Vance feud was apparently over a genuine disagreement on policy, there is a widespread suspicion in Foggy Bottom that the continual sniping is really a reflection of the Na-

tional Security Council chief's overweening ambition.

In short, Brzezinski wants to be the man who dictates foreign policy to a president woefully inexperienced in international politics.

The key to an understanding of Brzezinski's Machiavellian maneuverings, his critics say, is his intense desire to match or surpass what he sees as the achievements of his predecessor, Henry Kissinger, who ruled U.S. foreign policy under Presidents Nixon and Ford.

The Constitution explicitly bars a foreign-born citizen from becoming president, but there is nothing to prevent a naturalized American from gaining great influence as a presidential adviser. Like the German-born Kissinger, Brzezinski, who was born 51 years ago in Poland, is seen as taking the best route open to him in the quest for power.

Like Kissinger, Brzezinski has a background in Ivy League academia. And like Kissinger, he has ruffled more than a few feathers in Washington with his combative personality and a sometimes arrogant exercise of raw power. His Polish background is believed to explain his unwavering Cold War hostility to the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski's undoubted abilities have so far persuaded Carter that he is to be relied on, though he enjoys far from universal respect among the president's inner circle. Hamilton Jordan, the new White House chief of staff, refers to Brzezinski jokingly as "Woody Woodpecker;" Brzezinski returns the compliment by referring to Jordan as "Porky Pig."

As for Vance, the Nicaragua fiasco wasn't the first time the urbane secretary of state was humiliated by Brzezinski's street-tough tactics. In the midst of SALT negotiations with the Russians, for example, Vance was embarrassed when Brzezinski tried to telephone Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko — who diplomatically refused to take the call.

Vance has also suffered, State Department sources say, from deliberate leaks out of Brzezinski's office that put the blame for the Iranian situation on the CIA — when in fact Brzezinski had ignored State Department warnings that the shah was in serious trouble.

Although it is one of the worst-kept secrets in Washington, the White House steadfastly denies the Brzezinski-Vance feud. A spokesman for Brzezinski also claimed the reports of a dispute between him and Vance over Nicaragua are "malicious and untrue."

It seems doubtful, however, that Carter can succeed in this endeavor with a zigzag foreign policy — zigging with Ziggy one day and zagging with Cyrus the next.



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ON PAGE A-22NEW YORK TIMES  
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# Minimizing the Blackmail in Graymail

Sometimes the demands of national security clash with the demands of justice. Suppose the Government wants to prosecute a suspected spy but the defendant claims he can't get a fair trial unless the Government agrees to expose certain secrets. "Graymail," the C.I.A. calls it. It's not blackmail, exactly, but it certainly involves some painful pressure. Thus prosecutions that would strengthen security by deterring espionage sometimes have to be abandoned because keeping secrets is even more important than convicting spies.

The graymail problem extends beyond espionage — to bribing foreign officials, lying to Congress about intelligence activities abroad, and investigating and harassing innocent dissidents. The dilemmas posed for prosecuting such cases are just as serious.

But there are ways to avoid or minimize these dilemmas. The courts need to be allowed to determine whether a particular defendant is entitled to particular secrets without compromising other secrets in the process. Fortunately, security officials, prosecutors and civil libertarians — often adversaries — are working together, constructively, to just that end.

The various interests agree, in legislation just introduced on Capitol Hill, that Congress should enable courts to decide *before trial* whether specific classified information is relevant or admissible in court. Trial judges should be asked in advance to rule on the se-

crecy issue, and prompt appellate review should be available. If the Government loses in these pretrial skirmishes, it then has the choice of proceeding with the prosecution or not. If it wins, it can go forward with the trial, confident that there will be no leaks.

Secret proceedings would not eliminate graymail. But the procedure would let all parties know where they stand and reduce the number of cases that cannot be prosecuted. Moreover, such hearings would reduce the Government's temptation to drop a case in order to avoid having to reveal some crime or blunder of its own. Some versions of the legislation would also require the Department of Justice to explain, confidentially, to Congressional intelligence committees whenever it dropped a case involving graymail. The Justice Department, contending that Congress might meddle with its discretionary power, resists this requirement, but we hope the sponsors continue to insist on it.

We do not lightly endorse a new secret court proceeding. But what is proposed here would differ markedly from the closed hearings the Supreme Court has approved as a supposed safeguard against prejudicial publicity. Legislation to combat graymail would result in more public trials, not fewer. The choice is between a closed hearing that may permit a trial to take place, and no hearing or trial at all. Any bill that so serves the interests of both justice and security deserves wide support and speedy enactment.

POST-DISPATCH (ST. LOUIS, MO)  
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## Secrecy In The Courts

The federal government's addiction to secrecy in the supposed interest of "national security" has already undermined the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press in cases in which the courts have allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to censor books and other writing dealing with the agency's misdeeds. Now the same mania for secrecy is threatening to undermine the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial. A surrender to the supposed requirements of secrecy is being exhibited by the Carter administration, whose head once promised open government, and by Sen. Edward Kennedy, who has strongly backed freedom of information legislation.

In its latest manifestation, the issue of secrecy has arisen in connection with the prosecution of former CIA and FBI officials and others with access to classified information. The Justice Department has already dropped criminal prosecutions of two International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. officials who were alleged to be implicated in the CIA's illegal machinations in Chile. Earlier the department arranged for former CIA Director Richard Helms to make a plea bargain providing for a light penalty for his lying testimony to the Senate. Now there are reports that the prosecution of former FBI Director L. Patrick Gray will be dropped. In all of these cases the excuse for not pursuing justice has been that a public trial would expose national security secrets.

To avoid what is said to be the dilemma of having to drop prosecutions or expose secrets, several bills have been introduced in the Senate and House, with the Carter administration backing one measure and Sen. Kennedy another.

Although they differ in detail, the bills are similar in requiring judges to hold closed-door, pretrial hearings to evaluate classified material said to be relevant to the defense. If the judge found that the material was relevant and could not be "sanitized" without hurting the defense, the Justice Department could elect to drop certain counts or to dismiss its case without ever disclosing the secrets.

The trouble with this legislative approach is that it would widen still further the already excessive area of government secrecy. Despite the Freedom of Information Act, key agencies of the executive branch already operate behind a curtain of secrecy allowing certain officials to decide what clandestine activities may be carried out in the name of the American people. Now the courts would be authorized to operate behind closed doors in cases involving crime and possible corruption — a trend that unfortunately has been encouraged by a recent Supreme Court decision allowing judges to close their courtrooms ostensibly to protect fair trial.

Behind the trend toward secrecy is an attitude that runs counter to a basic tenet of American government — which is that public institutions are accountable to the people and that they are kept honest and responsive by being forced to operate in the open. Recent history is replete with examples of how the nation benefited from the exposure and halting of illegal activities despite initial solemn claims that a breach of secrecy would seriously jeopardize the national security. The risks of coverup and injustice are far too great to allow the national security rationale to be used as a pretext for closing the courts.

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THE NATION  
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## COUNTERING COUNTERFORCE

# SALT II— A Call to Disarm

MARCUS G. RASKIN

**S**ALT II is an attempt at a joint arms-planning arrangement between the military and national-security bureaucracies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the agreement, the Soviets will dismantle 250 strategic but vulnerable missiles. Although the missiles are outmoded, the Soviet commitment should nevertheless be counted as an impressive achievement of American negotiators. On the other hand, SALT II does not touch or transform the institutional structure of the U.S. national-security state, its assumptions or purposes. Nor, for that matter, does it alter the assumptions of the Russian security and military apparatus, or the bureaucratic mind set of its military and national-security planners.

The Soviet interest in signing the SALT II agreement is primarily political. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders see it as a way of relieving the sense of national encirclement that the U.S.S.R. has harbored for hundreds of years. A grand alliance with the United States has been the goal of Communist leaders since 1945. Brezhnev and Gromyko want to leave the Russian political scene having accomplished what Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev failed to bring about.

The support for the treaty by American leaders derives from their perception of it as a means of controlling adventurous elements among politicians and the bureaucracy. SALT II is not intended to change a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy—this country's "leadership of the Free World." Rather, it is based upon the political and tactical grounds of co-opting the more "rational" factions within the national-security bureaucracy into ratification machinery. SALT II is seen as a planning process involving military and national-security groups from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, as well as the National Security Council. These groups are by and large made up of sober people, conservative in outlook and, within the framework of their world, not "crazy." If the treaty is passed, those who are made a part of the process will be strengthened. They will be assigned "joint planning" responsibilities related to arms control. This involvement

might make some of them more open to arms limitations. On the other hand, if there is a defeat of the treaty in the Senate this group's elevation will cease, and the bureaucrats may well conclude that only bellicosity is rewarded.

If the present Democratic leadership wins the 1980 election and there is no treaty, the arms race will proceed at a much faster pace. If the Republicans win with a right-wing nationalist candidate and there is a treaty, it is possible that the SALT II group within the Government will be able to stalemata the war hawks. But if the Republicans win in the absence of a treaty, there will be no such group inside the national-security bureaucracy to brake the inertial momentum toward a more warlike stance or war itself. Further, one cannot expect the Senate to be a moderating voice during this period, because it is likely to have more conservative members after the 1980 elections than it presently has. Almost three times as many Democratic Senators stand for re-election in 1980 as do Republicans.

A move to the political right tinged with nationalist aggressiveness will strengthen American planners and politicians who argue that our willingness to spill blood will prove to the Russians and other political adversaries, as well as to our allies, that this country is determined to retain its world leadership. Under John Connally or Ronald Reagan the pace would be further quickened, and the national-security planners, to please their masters, will seek to resurrect belligerent war plans previously discarded as impractical.

With improved independent technical-intelligence verification of the missile and arms development of the Soviet Union, increased military expenditures for building the MX, the addition of the Trident submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to the fleet, and an increase in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and missile-delivery planes in Europe, the chance for a successful first strike in a "controlled" nuclear war against Russia will be seen as much greater than it has been in the past.

One may confidently predict that Russian national-security planners will seek to increase their technical intelligence, including adding a number of bases and listening posts. They will claim that this is the only way to guard against a first strike. They will press ahead in their MIRVing activities and seek bases outside the Soviet Union. The C.I.A. and N.S.A. will likewise demand a quantum leap in their budgets for covert and technical intelligence activities as the price for their initial support of the treaty. This price will get even higher after the treaty is signed. The C.I.A.'s supporters are claiming that it has been almost mortally wounded over the last several years by "irresponsible" attacks. Further, other voices within the military will call for new intelligence listening posts to replace those lost in Iran. Thus, ironically, an increase in the number of U.S. military and intelligence bases will now be justified as necessary for arms control.

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*Marcus G. Raskin, co-founder of the Institute for Policy Studies, served as a member of the special staff of the National Security Council during the Kennedy Administration.*

Even with the treaty apparatus operating under conditions of the utmost trust between the parties, the inertial direction of the arms race will continue upward. More important will be the fears and hopes of the national-security and political elites in both nations. To justify an increase in weaponry the conservatives are claiming that it is Russia that can mount a first strike because of its new, heavier MIRV-carrying missiles. It is true that the nature of nuclear war-fighting capability has changed over the last twenty years. American nuclear strategists have convinced their Soviet counterparts to change their defense views from deterrence to a strategy of fighting a nuclear war, and from disarmament to arms control. We taught them the value of MIRVing, pinpoint targeting and smaller nuclear bursts. The Soviet Union has sought, like the United States, to develop nuclear-war options beyond deterrence. This change in doctrine has created the "need" for a larger and more varied system of nuclear missiles. Each side has thousands of its thermonuclear weapons aimed at the other's. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have integrated nuclear missiles into their political and diplomatic strategies as well as their military strategy—even though planners long ago ran out of military targets. The horror is that while it was once thought that nuclear Armageddon would end within several hours, we are now finding serious men talking about controlled wars—long, drawn-out engagements using nuclear weapons. Such wars are neither conceivable nor in either nation's interest. The possibilities of maintaining command and control in the context of nuclear exchange are very low indeed. The likelihood is that communications systems on both sides will be jammed almost immediately, which would result in submarines, bombers and missile crews operating independently of central authority.

The nuclear pirates and marauders with missiles, who will almost certainly appear during a nuclear exchange, would threaten the very existence of the nation-state system. So it is little wonder that even the most cynical of statesmen favor "putting a cap on the arms race," as Henry Kissinger put it when he negotiated the first SALT agreement. "Both sides," Kissinger added, "have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side."

The defenders of SALT II usually argue that not supporting the treaty encourages groups like the Committee on the Present Danger and the American Security Council to plump for an even faster-paced arms race, including the testing of each other's will and military might in battle. This is by no means an insignificant argument. The hard-line policy planners who proclaim themselves protectors of Western civilization against the Tartar hordes see the Russians as "teddy bears" who could be defeated in war

because they are encircled by the world's most powerful nations and have undependable allies. But the Russians are also portrayed as militarily stronger than ever, expansionist in purpose and paranoid in behavior. Both views sustain the ideologically conservative military planner in his belief that the Russians must be given their comeuppance relatively soon. But the consequences of the defeat of SALT II are not likely to be what former national-security planners like Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow envisage. Actually, the Senate's rejection of the agreement would cause the U.S.S.R. to feel even more isolated and surrounded. Members of the Polit-

buro who favored détente would surely lose their political power, while the military hard-liners would be in the ascendancy. Soviet leaders would step up their wooing of West Germany, seek to settle differences with China and act as if a war were inevitable. The Soviet war hawks are quite prepared to foment international turbulence, and there will be no disarmament advocates within their bureaucracy to counterbalance them.

American hawks argue that the United States would win any test of military strength with the U.S.S.R. because we have fought in several wars since 1945, while the Russian military remained untested in battle and has grown rusty. This is usually offered as proof that Soviet leaders will soon test their armed forces.

The war hawks who would rather not be bothered with the niceties of a U.S.-Soviet joint arms-planning arrangement are, however, fearful that a repudiation of SALT II by the Senate will encourage the defense and foreign affairs ministries of other nations to speed up their own military preparations, including nuclear-weapons development. Otherwise they will not be able to defend their territories and interests against incursion and likely war among the great powers. Other nations will take the Senate's rejection as a devil's blessing to build up their own nuclear arsenals.

It is not surprising that even the war hawks among U.S. military planners fear this situation. The nuclear game of chess (or is it poker?) between the Russians and themselves looks stable in comparison to the anarchy of nuclear proliferation and catalytic war situations in which individual nations arm to the teeth and pursue their own ambitions and hatreds. Thus, the SALT II agreement has an important symbolic influence on the direction of the world

arms race. If the Senate rejects the treaty, war and defense planners in other nations will have all the more reason to conclude that arms control is an empty game.

We thus find ourselves in a tragic dilemma—one in which any action is dangerous and will predictably add to our overall problems. The question becomes whether support for the SALT II agreement will lead to smaller, less disastrous problems than not supporting it. In my view, the answer to this question is yes.

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There is, however, a qualifier. This affirmative answer is linked to the manner in which the agreement is supported and the political stratagems employed to pass the treaty. Senators Mark Hatfield, George McGovern and William Proxmire are politically correct in questioning whether the treaty would be an advance over the present situation. Their apparent intention is to signal the President that the liberal segment of the Senate will not have its support of this treaty taken as a silent assent to a counterforce or limited-counterforce strategy and a faster arms race.

**R**ecently, Senator Hatfield told President Carter that he was deeply concerned about the Administration's adoption of a counterforce strategy. Hatfield and other Senators have made it clear that the creation of a counterforce arms system would outweigh the benefits of a SALT II agreement. Unfortunately, counterforce was sanctified into official doctrine by then Defense Secretary James Schlesinger in January 1974, and has been the preferred strategy ever since. Already we have purchased weapons to sustain this strategy, and it would be extraordinarily difficult to interrupt it. Even George M. Seignious 2d, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the President's chief arms-control adviser, urges that the United States adopt the MX system to assure itself of counterforce capability.

From a progressive perspective the only courses of action are changing the institutionalized military and national-security nature of states—the primary cause of the arms race—and devising policies that offer an alternative to the military's disastrous doctrines. The political questions to be considered thus become:

(1) Can conversion planning away from the arms race and toward peaceful economic enterprises take place between the Soviet Union and the United States through diplomatic negotiations, as well as within their respective borders? Is such planning and implementation activity inspectable?

(2) Is it possible to make clear statements and undertake actions that show the SALT II agreement is not contradictory to disarmament?

(3) Finally, is there a means (such as mass actions) to get across to the hawks that war and war planning are not the highest purposes of civilization, but rather perversions of them, which must be judged as criminal activities? (I realize that the question of liberation struggles against racist and fascist regimes will remain, but from an international standpoint, and from the standpoint of the United States, these struggles are local, and must be judged in the light of the common strivings of humankind for human rights. Besides, there is little prospect of, say, blacks in South Africa using nuclear weapons in their struggle. It is the white South Africans who have the nuclear capability, after all, and who are likely to use it.)

The national debate over SALT II provides an opportunity for organizations to put forward proposals in communities, cities and Congress that point more clearly in the direction of arms limitation than does the agreement that Carter and Brezhnev signed in Vienna. One such proposal would be a resolution or an amendment (the form it would take would depend on the nature of the Senate debate, but preferably an amendment by the Senate) which would make clear that the United States wanted to begin discussions on international conversion and plans to end the arms race. This question would necessarily include pressing proposals for conversion of the present national-security structures that in an automatic, almost unconscious manner produce the arms race. Thus, an amendment to SALT II should be drawn up that outlines immediate steps for joint discussions on conversion, budget limitations and ways to reinstitute the framework of disarmament laid out in the McCloy-Valerian talks of 1962. Those discussions were committed to seeking comprehensive world disarmament in stages.

Second, this amendment should take into account the various resolutions of the United Nations on disarmament and conversion, including the statements of the U.S. representative. This would be the prime signal of a shift in war planning. By highlighting the way that the arms race is institutionalized in the SALT II agreement, we will be exposing its economic and political causes. The policy consequences of armaments that other nations should bear in mind are dramatized in the dollar increases for tactical nuclear weapons, conscription, MX development and so on.

An additional resolution or amendment to the SALT II treaty would place the signatories on record as favoring a moratorium on the design, development, production or acquisition of all major weapons systems. Such an amendment would lead to formal negotiations within the McCloy-Valerian framework, and that of the United Nations disarmament discussion. Another amendment should be drawn up stating that the SALT II agreement is not meant to stimulate military expenditures, weapons development and testing, etc., in areas not covered by immediate agreement. It is likely that this kind of amendment or resolution would have the broadest support within the Senate, and should be the minimal position taken by those in favor of ending the arms race. Resolutions of this nature should also be introduced in the House of Representatives as a way of emphasizing that Congress as a whole wants a disarmament process.

Finally, resolutions should be drawn up making clear that the arms race itself is a moral and political disaster for American and world civilization, that we are all in mortal danger of genocidal crimes against humanity and that we must redouble our efforts to forge a new system of international security. It could be stated in this resolution that the United Nations Charter calls for the formation of an international security committee to fashion a world security arrangement. This article of the charter should be referred to in an amendment or resolution. Upon its being made a reality rests the hope that new security arrangements can be devised that will enable world civilization to avoid untold misery without abandoning the human need for liberation.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
2 August 1979

*Daniel Patrick Moynihan*

## Arms Limitation Lost

In 1969 when discussion of an arms limitations treaty began, the Soviets had 1,050 ICBM warheads. In 1985 at the conclusion of SALT they will have upwards of 12,000. This is four warheads for every county in the United States. In terms of missile throw-weight, the Soviets will continue their rapid increase from their current level of 11.3 million pounds to 15 million pounds by 1985, the treaty's expiration date. This will be *half* again the American throw-weight. The number of Soviet MIRVed missile launchers alone will almost double under the treaty period from the present level of about 700 to 1,200 in 1985.

The problem I suggest with the process is that—so far—it has required American negotiators to reach agreement with the Soviet Union in an area where there is no agreement. Their strategic buildup has been under way, as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown attests, for 15 years. It was well under way when formal SALT negotiations began. It has never ceased because the Soviets would not agree to do so.

As a result, more often than not, the actual negotiations in SALT have taken place within the American government. The process goes something as follows. The advocates of strategic arms limitations obtain agreement to have "talks"—that is the term—with the Soviets. In these talks they find the Soviet government has already agreed with its military to continue their nuclear buildup. (At the time of SALT I the Soviets had already decided to build the SS19, which they proceeded to do. This is one reason why our Minuteman force is now threatened.)

Accordingly a treaty is drafted that permits the increase in Soviet strategic forces the Soviets have already planned. Our negotiators return with this treaty, which the American military in all honor cannot support unless a corresponding increase in

American nuclear forces is also to take place. This is then agreed to on our side through a complex negotiation involving the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department and Congress.

The MX has become the price of SALT II. It is hard to describe the weapons system, for it changes every

day. At minimum it is complex. More seriously, it will require the Soviets to deploy some 8,000 warheads to neutralize it. (Two warheads per 20 possible sites for 200 missiles.)

Thus the United States joins the arms race the Soviets insist on. This is the ultimate irony. Without thinking, without so far as I can tell even noticing, *United States behavior in nuclear weapons has become basically imitative of Soviet behavior, because we have accepted the Soviet definition of "arms control."*

By the end of SALT II the United States will have four nuclear warheads for every *rayon*—the Soviet equivalent of our county—in the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, our conventional military forces grow relatively weaker with respect to the Soviets. In the kind of conflict one can imagine and could accept we are ever more likely to be overmastered. All because we wanted arms limitation and went about it badly.

The gods must weep.

I would hope we do not have to settle for this. I believe we can still negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement that will limit arms.

Such hope as there exists for this is found in the "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms," an appendage to the treaty, though not a part of it that sets the agenda for the next round of SALT. This joint statement calls for a third SALT agreement that will bring about a "reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation."

These are not instructions; even if they were, they are not binding. They reflect nothing more than the ideals with which SALT I and SALT II were entered upon—on our side. For it is an open secret that when the United States in Moscow, in March 1977, proposed a specific reduction in strategic arms of one-third, the Soviets rejected any such specific. Less known, but now more important, at Vienna in June the United States proposed to the Soviets that the joint statement on SALT III specifically call for a one-third reduction in strategic arms, and again the Soviets refused.

Worse. The United States entered into the negotiations for SALT I with a pronounced advantage in strategic weapons and those for SALT II with a sufficient advantage. The prospect is that the SALT III negotiations will begin with the Soviets anticipating strategic supremacy by the end of the process. In such circumstances, to hold out hopes for any real reduction is self-deception or worse.

Our only hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now while the United States still retains the option to head off that shift in the strategic balance. If there are to be reductions in SALT III, their attainment must be written into SALT II.

I therefore propose an amendment to the treaty that will add a new provision to Article XIX of the text:

**CONTINUED**

*The writer is a Democratic senator from New York. This article is excerpted from a statement to the Senate on Wednesday.*

4. The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall, as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are unable to conclude such an agreement by December 31, 1981, the present Treaty shall terminate on that date.

Unlike other proposals that have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, this provision does not require undoing the present SALT II treaty. With respect to timing, it meshes with the expiration of the protocol to the treaty, which will itself automatically lapse on Dec. 31, 1981.

This much is certain: Our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We must rescue the "process" from itself; otherwise, it will present us with ever more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major contribution the Senate can make to the preservation of the SALT process that the president and others seek. We must at least make the effort.



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ON PAGE A-10

THE WASHINGTON POST  
2 August 1979

# Ex-Negotiator on SALT Details

## Split With Joint Chiefs

By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

Retired Lt. Gen. Edward J. Rowny, who recently resigned in protest as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative in the SALT II negotiations, said yesterday he parted company with his military superiors in March when they dropped their previously strong objections to "concessions" by the Carter administration.

"We made rather large concessions" while the Soviets "made small ones" in the last months of negotiation, Rowny said at a primarily sympathetic hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Asked why the nation's top military leaders would back down from their earlier positions, the forceful former Army officer said, "I attribute it to the [Administration's] interest and zeal to have an arms control agreement—and the appeal to the military that risks can be taken and should be taken."

Rowny resigned from the Army in June after six years as the Joint Chiefs' representative just as the SALT treaty was being signed in Vienna.

Until March 1979, Rowny said, he and the joint chiefs wanted:

- Cuts to be made in the 308 Soviet heavy landbased ICBMs, the SS18s, or some other compensation to the United States since it was not allowed to have any heavy missiles.

- No limitations on cruise missiles whether long or short range.

- The Soviet Backfire bomber to be counted as a strategic system because it could reach the United States from Soviet bases.

Those positions were not reflected in the SALT II agreement that was announced in May and signed in June.

Nonetheless the joint chiefs have given their support to the treaty, terming it "modest but useful." In their testimony before the Senate, however, the chiefs repeatedly have expressed concern on just those provisions Rowny termed previously unacceptable.

As he had in testimony July 12 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rowny yesterday said SALT II should be sent back for renegotiation.

He insisted that although "the Soviets would show a lot of hurt, it would not be the end of the world. In time they'll come around . . . the strain sooner or later will have to show [on their economy]."

He said his one criticism of the position taken Tuesday by former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger was that "he wants equality [in heavy missiles] to take place in SALT III. I want that now."

Several times, in answer to questions yesterday, Rowny gave illustrations of what he termed U.S. lack of patience in negotiating with the Soviets. "We say we'll stick to a position," he recalled for Sen. John Tower (R-

Tex), "but we don't. They sit us out."

Rowny said the United States "should have persisted in its objective of insisting upon a reduction" in the Soviet heavy missiles.

In March 1977, the United States proposed that the present Soviet limit of 308 heavy missiles be cut to 150 and that both sides be limited to 550 land-based ICBMs that carry more than one bomb or warhead—the so-called multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs.

The Soviets turned that proposal—which was part of a broader arms control package—down.

In later sessions, according to informed sources, the United States tried to get the Soviets to limit the heavy ICBMs to 190, then 220, then 250 before the Americans finally just gave up on that issue.

Asked by Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo) what concessions he would be willing to make in return for the Soviets' limiting their heavy missiles, Rowny replied, "None."

He went on to say the treaty is supposed to give both sides equality in strategic weapons, but Soviet possession of the big missiles is "a unilateral right."

When the U.S. advantage in sub-launched warheads was brought up, Rowny declared they were far less effective than the warheads on the SS-18.

Rowny said the military chiefs had pressed to prevent any limitation on cruise missiles since they were primarily a U.S. weapon. But, he added, when it was clear there were to be some limits, the chiefs initially disagreed with the positions eventually taken.

For example, the chiefs opposed a Soviet proposal to count all conventional cruise missiles as if they were nuclear.

They earlier had opposed limited ranges for ground and sub-launched missiles. When some limits were imminent, the chiefs wanted them at 200 kilometers—a range that would affect

hundreds of Soviet weapons, Rowny said.

"This view did not prevail," Rowny told the committee. Instead the limit in the treaty protocol was set at 600 kilometers, a distance that would keep any U.S. system from reaching the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe.

The protocol will expire in December 1981, before the U.S. land-based cruise missile will be ready for deployment. Nevertheless, the chiefs had opposed the protocol as setting a precedent.

Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine) confirmed through Rowny his concern that there was no firm understanding on what constitutes "national technical means"—the phrase describing intelligence monitoring of the SALT II provisions.

The United States believes use of third countries for intelligence collection is protected by the agreement; the Soviets do not, according to Rowny.

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ON PAGE A3

THE WASHINGTON POST  
30 July 1979

# SALT II Critics Hone Their Objections

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Supporters of SALT II express satisfaction with the three weeks of hearings held on the treaty so far, noting approvingly that few new arguments against it have emerged, and no senator has yet been able to embarrass seriously the administration's witnesses.

But the critics have hardly raised the white flag; they continue to argue their case with force and vigor.

There is no single line of argumentation shared by all the critics of the new treaty. Instead there are several themes, some embraced by one critic, some by another. These appear to be the principal ones:

*SALT II is another in a long and deplorable series of events that betray the essential fuzzy-mindedness and faintheartedness of a series of American administrations, particularly this one.*

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) holds this view. He articulated it a week before the Vienna summit in a much publicized speech accusing the Carter administration of pursuing policies that amount to appeasement of the Soviet Union.

The idea that the United States just hasn't been tough enough with the Russians clearly appeals to a substantial number of senators on the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Many recalled during the SALT hearings that there were better times not long ago when no one doubted America's military superiority, and especially its strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, once President Nixon's chief of staff and most recently the supreme commander of NATO, testified last week that in his opinion, an extra expenditure of \$2 billion to \$3 billion on strategic weapons every year since 1962 would have protected the nuclear superiority the United States enjoyed during the Cuban missile crisis of that year. Haig touched a sympathetic nerve in many senators who express frustration that the United States has needlessly squandered its preeminent position in the world.

One member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), has used virtually every opportunity in the hearings to pursue questions about the United States' determination to stand up to the Russians.

Most of Stone's questions on this theme have involved Cuba, the homeland of many of his constituents. He has repeatedly suggested that the United States has failed to hold the Soviets to their promises, given at the conclusion of the 1962 missile crisis, not to use Cuba as a military base. Then last week he lambasted retiring Ambassador Malcolm Toon for America's alleged failure to protest sufficiently against the Soviets' microwave bombardment of the American Embassy in Moscow.

*We were suckred.*

This view was best summarized by Adm. Thomas Moorer, retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee that the United States has "the world's worst negotiators."

The fear that the Soviet Union is the only party to the SALT talks that really knows how to pursue its own interests runs through much of the skeptical Senate questioning of witnesses. At one point, Jackson seemed to express his exasperation on this point by implying to Gen. David G. Jones, the chairman of the joint chiefs, that they knew the United States had gotten a bad deal, but were under orders not to say so.

Jones angrily rejected the accusation. Jackson and Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine) are trying to get copies of the joint chiefs' memos on SALT over the years as well as the cable traffic to and from the SALT delegation in Geneva during the negotiations, apparently to try to show that the administration ignored the chiefs' advice and mishandled the bargaining.

The strongest support for this general skepticism about the American negotiating strategy came from Lt. Gen. Edward J. Rowny, who retired last month as the joint chiefs' representative on the SALT delegation. Rowny has told the Foreign Relations

Committee—and will testify later to Armed Services—that officials in Washington "tied the hands" of negotiators in Geneva and missed opportunities to get a better deal for the United States.

*We'd be better off with nothing than with the treaty.*

For years, hard-line critics of American strategic policy have argued that the United States has stubbornly underestimated the speed and effectiveness of the ongoing Soviet buildup. One of the leading hard-line theoreticians, Prof. Albert Wohlstetter, demonstrated this point in a well-known article in Foreign Policy magazine several years ago.

Now many of the hardliners who once subscribed to that view are arguing that the Soviets have done so well that they no longer need to continue their breakneck buildup. They have all they need, Jackson argued in effect last week, so a world without SALT II wouldn't be much different than a world with it. Sens. John Tower (R-Tex.) and Jake Garn (R-Utah) have argued the same point.

If this is so, they continue, it would be better to jolt the American public into a realization of the serious plight America faces by rejecting SALT, rather than "tranquelize" the country by approving the treaty.

The risks and uncertainties of a world without SALT clearly worry a lot of senators, including some who aren't thrilled at the prospect of approving SALT II. But even some senators who seem inclined to vote for the treaty are sympathetic to the "tranquilizer" argument, first raised in those terms by the joint chiefs.

Thus far in the debate—which is likely to continue at least through October, and probably longer—the skeptics' principal accomplishment has been to convince a lot of senators that the United States is not competing with the Soviets effectively. Senators of many different persuasions—from hawk to dove—have been won over by this argument, and it is already clear that the SALT process will add billions to future American defense budgets, whether or not this treaty wins two-thirds approval in the Senate.

## International Notes

### Good for Everyone

When Iran's revolutionary government closed down the U.S. missile monitoring stations in that country last February, American opponents of SALT II were fearful that verification of Soviet compliance with the pact had become difficult, if not downright impossible. The Norwegian military establishment has now offered to bridge the monitoring gap. Though nobody had asked Oslo, a Norwegian Defense Ministry spokesman declared that as a NATO ally, his country would be prepared to provide the U.S. with new listening posts and even with U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. The Norwegian military's proposal had been prompted by speculative news stories in the U.S. that suggested that Oslo's help



One of America's U-2 spy planes

would be welcome. Indeed, Norway already has a dozen or so listening posts that are equipped with the latest in U.S. intelligence-gathering technology.

The Norwegian military's offer predictably angered the Soviets and, less predictably, annoyed its own civilian leaders. Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli stressed that the U.S. had made no formal request for listening stations or spy plane flights; he also pointed out that SALT II seems to call for inspection only by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. If the two sig-



Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli

natories to the treaty should ask a third party to verify compliance with restrictions on missile modernization, then, said Nordli. "Norway ought to be willing." Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund was also critical of the position taken by the Defense Ministry, which has traditionally been more hawkish than the rest of the government. Said a ranking Oslo diplomat: "The military should be more sophisticated."

Still, the Norwegian military establishment maintained that its proposal was a good test of Moscow's willingness to permit effective verification of SALT II. "Sometimes the Soviets can't see what's plainly in their own best interest," insisted an Oslo Defense Ministry spokesman. "Inspection is good for everyone."

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THE BALTIMORE SUN  
31 July 1979

# SALT II and U.S. Strategic Safeguards

Washington.

ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES of SALT is to regulate, in a balanced fashion, aspects of two fundamentally dissimilar and asymmetrical force structures. Not only are the force structures different in their composition, but different features on each side's forces are viewed as more threatening by the other side.

These differing perspectives have produced a negotiating process marked by various compromises and tradeoffs as each side seeks to protect the essential character of

By Gen. David C. Jones

its own forces while attempting to minimize the most threatening aspects of the other side's.

The result is an agreement with some provisions clearly favoring one side and some clearly favoring the other. The question of equity, then, cannot adequately be evaluated by a narrow and selective critique of portions of the SALT II agreement. Only a balanced appraisal of the total will yield an adequate evaluation.

Two issues of particular concern to us with regard to equity have been the Soviets' unilateral right to deploy 308 Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBM), which was allowed in SALT I [in 1972] and carried forward to SALT II, and the exclusion of the Backfire bomber from the aggregate totals of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) allowed under the agreement.

Clearly, the desired result would have been a major reduction in Soviet MLBMs in order to have reduced their very significant throw-weight capability and attendant potential to carry large numbers of warheads. Having failed to achieve that objective, we should accentuate our determination to obtain substantial reductions in future negotiations. In the interim, limiting the SS-18 [heavy missile] to 10 warheads achieves an important restraint on their MLBM potential.

The second major concern is the failure to count the Backfire bomber in the SNDV aggregate totals. While we are well aware of its employment capabilities in peripheral and maritime roles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently recommended that the Backfire be included in the aggregate because it has an

intercontinental range capability.

Nevertheless, the United States did obtain some constraints on the Backfire, the most important of which is a production limit not to exceed 30 a year. Furthermore, the United States retains the right to build and deploy an aircraft with equivalent capabilities.

We believe that an issue of great importance is the question of whether the SALT II agreements can be verified adequately to protect our national security.

The many quantitative and qualitative limitations contained in the treaty will pose a stern challenge to our varied and highly capable intelligence systems. Our review of these matters indicated that U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the many provisions of the agreement varies substantially. The difficulty of this task and the loss of important capabilities associated with our collection systems in Iran, make it essential that we vigorously pursue improvements in the capabilities of our monitoring assets.

While recognizing the difficulties associated with verification, we must also acknowledge the important assistance the SALT II treaty will provide in this effort. With or without SALT, we will be required to keep track of Soviet military capabilities as the basis for our defense planning and ultimately our national security. Certain provisions within the treaty will make the task easier:

- *Counting rules*—Provisions on ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) such as "once tested MIRVed, all counted MIRVed" and "look alike, count alike" help resolve potential verification ambiguities; similarly, requirements for various types of externally observable differences assist in distinguishing among various aircraft and cruise missiles.

- *Non-interference / non concealment measures*—Most important of all is insuring access to photographic and electronic monitoring data; in the absence of such measures, there would be no restriction on any intelligence-denial measures the Soviets might choose to take, severely compounding our intelligence gathering difficulties (a much greater problem for us than for the Soviets, due to the open U.S. society).

In this connection, there has been much discussion regarding agreement or lack of

agreement on telemetry encryption. The agreed Second Common Understanding to Article XV of the treaty states that "... neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty." Any Soviet attempt to deny or impede our ability to monitor SALT-limited parameters would be regarded by us as a most grave violation of the treaty.

Thus far in this discussion of equity and mutual interest, I have concentrated on the key issues of most concern to us. There are also a number of important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage. Among the most important provisions having an impact on Soviet plans for strategic forces are:

- Aggregate limits that will require the Soviets to dismantle (or convert to non-offensive systems) 250-plus operational systems; these are older and less capable weapons but still a significant fraction of their total systems and megatonnage.

- The various limitations that will enhance the predictability of the range of Soviet force developments, thus assisting us in our force planning.

- The cap on RV (Re-entry Vehicle) fractionation that denies full exploitation of the major Soviet throw-weight advantage for the period of the treaty.

- Testing, production and deployment of the SS-16 [Soviet missile] banned.

On the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal and provide the following options in planning our strategic forces:

- We can build an ICBM which fully meets our security requirements.

- We can continue with the modernization of our Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) program at the pace we determine.

- We can continue to modernize our air-breathing systems, including the exploitation of our air, ground and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past and, if we are not careful, in the future.

CONTINUED

Our ability to take the necessary programmatic actions to ensure essential strategic equivalence is the ultimate test for SALT II. Our options and flexibility under the treaty are adequate, so long as we choose to exercise them.

The most serious concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer to the American people, in which case adverse strategic trends could well become irreversible.

In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded. Had it been followed, we would face

less perilous strategic prospects in the 1980s, and we are convinced we could have achieved deeper mutual reductions in SALT II.

We are seriously concerned lest the nation repeat earlier mistakes through complacency, an incomplete understanding of the magnitude of the Soviet buildup, or an insufficient appreciation of the broader consequences of Soviet momentum in terms of stability, global power relationships and long term U.S. interests.

Therefore, we consider it absolutely essential that, if the nation accepts the SALT II agreement, it does so with a full understanding that we will be required to undertake a series of important strategic modernization programs in order to maintain strategic parity within the limits agreed upon. In this connection, the decision to proceed with the development of the MX [mobile] missile, capable of carrying 10 re-entry vehicles and deployed in a survivable basing mode, is an important step toward this end.

None of us is totally at ease with all the provisions of the SALT agreement. I expressed our concerns on the Soviet MLBMs and Backfire earlier and we also have significant concerns with regard to our ability to monitor certain aspects of the agreement. We believe, though, that the risks in this area are acceptable, provided we pursue vigorously challenges to questionable Soviet practices, improvements in the capability of our monitoring assets and modernization of our strategic forces. In this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the agreement is adequately verifiable.

We believe it is essential that the nation and its leadership view SALT II as a modest but useful step in a long-range process which must include the resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence coupled with vigorous efforts to achieve further substantial reductions.

If this can be achieved, history will record SALT II as a step forward; without this commitment, we will find that SALT II made little difference and may have been a net loss. Fortunately, our nation has the opportunity to make that choice.

*General David C. Jones is chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This article was adapted from his testimony on the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

## Glossary

Following is a glossary of selected terms used in the strategic arms discussion:

**Fractionation**—The division of a missile's payload into separate re-entry vehicles.

**MIRV**—Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle; a package of two or more re-entry vehicles which can be carried by a single ballistic missile and delivered on separate targets. A missile so equipped is said to be MIRVed. MIRVing is a kind of fractionation.

**MLBM**—Modern Large Ballistic Missile; another term for Heavy Missile. A heavy missile is one with a large payload of nuclear warheads capable of destroying fixed, hardened targets, such as U.S. Minutemen ICBMs in silos hardened, or protected, by concrete.

**Telemetry**—The transmission of electronic signals by missiles to earth. Monitoring these signals aids in evaluating a weapon's performance and provides a way of verifying weapons tests undertaken by an adversary. Encryption of such signals means encoding them to conceal the data thus transmitted.

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ON PAGE 30

THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
31 July 1979

# Looking out for No. 1 in SALT-2

By GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS 2d

**I**N THE LAST YEAR, Soviet missile submarines have been dismantled because of limits under SALT-1. We watched as they built these submarines. When they were fitting out for sea trials, we knew it. We watched as they put to sea. And we watched as the submarines were dismantled.

The SALT-2 Treaty, signed in Vienna in June by President Carter, was painstakingly designed and negotiated so that we can adequately verify—by our own independent intelligence capabilities—that the Soviets are living up to its terms.

We use photographic satellites, other satellite-borne sensors, powerful radars and numerous other means, operating from air, land and sea, to survey the Soviet Union on a regular, thorough and accurate basis. We do not depend on any one source exclusively. If we have even the slightest suspicion of a violation we can raise it with the Soviets at a special commission that has been set up for this purpose. The ultimate sanction, if our concerns are not satisfied, is to repudiate the treaty and take whatever steps we believe necessary to protect our security. The treaty itself provides for this.

I find our intelligence capabilities truly astonishing,

especially since when I began my military career in World War II, we seldom knew what was happening 600 yards behind enemy lines, let alone 6,000 miles away.

Today, it's vastly different. We know where Soviet missile subs are built. We count their missile tubes as they are installed and can determine the type of missile they are designed for.

We know the location and type of all Soviet ICBM launchers. We carefully observe missile flight tests, and we know whether a missile is tested with one warhead or with more than one. We can count the Soviet missile reentry vehicles as they reenter the atmosphere. We monitor the conversion of older

ICBM launchers. Well before conversion is finished, we know what type of missile it will contain.

The treaty bans deliberate concealment which interferes with verification, and it bans interference with our verification techniques. It also contains precise definitions and special rules to aid our verification efforts. If SALT is rejected and we lose these provisions, it would be harder to collect information on Soviet weapons, although our need for the information would be no less. No military leader likes to plan with less, rather than more, information about a potential adversary—that's one reason why I'm for SALT.

As in any intelligence effort, we can monitor some systems with greater precision than others. But I know of no way the Soviets could cheat in SALT on a scale large enough to pose significant military risk, or adversely affect the strategic balance, and not get caught. The bottom line is that now and in the future we can safeguard the strategic balance and our security against Soviet violations of SALT.

*(Retired Gen. Seignious is director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)*

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY  
30 July 1979

## Salt Verification Fears Begin to Ease in Senate

By Alton K. Marsh

Washington—Testimony in the third week of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty hearings in the Senate indicates growing belief that adequate verification is possible. Emphasis now is shifting to demands that defense spending be increased as a condition for support of the treaty.

Opposition emerged during hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) said his support for the treaty depends upon as yet undetected vigorous support for defense spending by the Carter Administration. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. David C. Jones said inflation has reduced the Fiscal 1979 and proposed Fiscal 1980 Defense budget increases to well below the 3% promised by President Jimmy Carter to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The next day, former NATO commander Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., told the Armed Services Committee he agreed with Sen. Nunn. He urged that ratification of SALT 2 "be held in abeyance" until serious flaws are corrected.

"Like Sen. Nunn, I am not satisfied that the necessary commitments have been made, not only with respect to our strategic needs," Gen. Haig said. "But I am also concerned that the Administration's budgets for the past two years and the President's defense budget projections through Fiscal 1984 are inadequate to meet our conventional needs, to say nothing of our already proffered commitments to NATO."

Asked by Sen. Howard W. Cannon (D.-Nev.) for specific flaws, Gen. Haig cited the hard target kill imbalance established in the treaty, the U.S. dependence on air-breathing strategic capability which means a "12-hr. time sequence" before reaching Soviet targets, and the general lack of consensus on U.S. policy which not only hampered SALT negotiations but also has been a problem for 15 years. Haig said he sees within the Carter Administration "flirtations toward a mutual assured destruction policy and a minimum deterrent."

Sen. Nunn called for a 4-5% real increase in the defense budget as his price for support of SALT 2, but said he doubted the Carter Administration will take corrective action on inflation to make that possible.

"The President's budget through 1984 shows the Carter administration is not ready to compete with the Soviet Union in the military arena," Sen. Nunn said.

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) changed his opinion of last March when he announced last week that he finds the treaty verifiable, but he still intends to vote against it. Sen. Goldwater told AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY his determination that the treaty is adequately verifiable is based partly on his knowledge of electronics.

Sen. Goldwater has reviewed a 14-volume Senate Intelligence Committee study of verification, as has Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D.-Del.). Sen. Biden has determined in recent days the treaty is verifiable. Sen. J. James Exon (D.-Neb.) has also announced his belief that the treaty is verifiable.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report is described by one observer as presenting information on both sides of the issue that could be taken either way. Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio), who is considered the key senator on the verification issue, also has read the secret report and has not reached a conclusion. Sen. Glenn is considering the attachment of three "reservations" to the treaty that would:

- Require announcement by both the U.S. and Soviet Union of all missile tests prior to flight, including those inside national territory not now covered by the treaty.

- Seek voluntary agreement not to encrypt missile telemetry. Failing that, the U.S. might encrypt whatever information the Soviets encrypt.

- Require notification of appropriate

Senate committees of complaints by either side to the Standing Consultative Commission, the U.S.-Soviet group established under SALT 1 to deal with questions of compliance. It meets twice a year.

Other clarifications may come from Sen. John W. Warner (R.-Va.), who noted during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Soviets do not recognize U.S. listening posts in foreign nations as a national technical means of verification.

Outgoing U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon, like Sen. Goldwater, has overcome earlier doubts about verification to announce his support for the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Sen. Glenn now agrees with the Joint Chiefs' testimony (AW&ST July 16, p. 25) that SALT 2 is a "modest but useful" step forward in the SALT process. He has said he will support the treaty if questions of verification can be resolved.

Sen. William S. Cohen (R.-Me.) joined in a call by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D.-Wash.) for memos and cable traffic between the negotiators and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would reveal military advice given on the treaty.

Among other recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for lower ceilings on total weapons and multiple warhead launchers, and inclusion of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber in the totals.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown continued to press the argument that U.S. land-based missiles will become vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike during 1982-86 with or without SALT 2, but SALT 2 will make that unstable period more predictable since it establishes limits. Gen. Jones said the U.S. does not fear a period when the Soviets could launch an actual strike "out of the blue," but rather, a period when the Soviet confidence for political adventurism is increased.

Brown said failure to count mothballed Boeing B-52 bombers in the weapons total would have allowed the Soviets to stockpile uncounted bombers. The U.S. would have to destroy several of 37 B-52 hulks now in storage, while the Soviets would destroy 250 missiles and bombers built since 1965.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A15THE BALTIMORE SUN  
31 July 1979

# SALT II and U.S. Strategic Safeguards

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By Gen. David C. Jones

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The result is an agreement with some provisions clearly favoring one side and some clearly favoring the other. The question of equity, then, cannot adequately be evaluated by a narrow and selective critique of portions of the SALT II agreement. Only a balanced appraisal of the total will yield an adequate evaluation.

Two issues of particular concern to us with regard to equity have been the Soviets' unilateral right to deploy 308 Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBM), which was allowed in SALT I [in 1972] and carried forward to SALT II, and the exclusion of the Backfire bomber from the aggregate totals of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) allowed under the agreement.

Clearly, the desired result would have been a major reduction in Soviet MLBMs in order to have reduced their very significant throw-weight capability and attendant potential to carry large numbers of warheads. Having failed to achieve that objective, we should accentuate our determination to obtain substantial reductions in future negotiations. In the interim, limiting the SS-18 (*heavy missile*) to 10 warheads achieves an important restraint on their MLBM potential.

The second major concern is the failure to count the Backfire bomber in the SNDV aggregate totals. While we are well aware of its employment capabilities in peripheral and maritime roles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently recommended that the Backfire be included in the aggregate because it has an

intercontinental range capability.

Nevertheless, the United States did obtain some constraints on the Backfire, the most important of which is a production limit not to exceed 30 a year. Furthermore, the United States retains the right to build and deploy an aircraft with equivalent capabilities.

We believe that an issue of great importance is the question of whether the SALT II agreements can be verified adequately to protect our national security.

The many quantitative and qualitative limitations contained in the treaty will pose a stern challenge to our varied and highly capable intelligence systems. Our review of these matters indicated that U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the many provisions of the agreement varies substantially. The difficulty of this task and the loss of important capabilities associated with our collection systems in Iran, make it essential that we vigorously pursue improvements in the capabilities of our monitoring assets.

While recognizing the difficulties associated with verification, we must also acknowledge the important assistance the SALT II treaty will provide in this effort. With or without SALT, we will be required to keep track of Soviet military capabilities as the basis for our defense planning and ultimately our national security. Certain provisions within the treaty will make the task easier:

- *Counting rules*—Provisions on ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) such as "once tested MIRVed, all counted MIRVed" and "look alike, count alike" help resolve potential verification ambiguities; similarly, requirements for various types of externally observable differences assist in distinguishing among various aircraft and cruise missiles.

- *Non-interference / non concealment measures*—Most important of all is insuring access to photographic and electronic monitoring data; in the absence of such measures, there would be no restriction on any intelligence-denial measures the Soviets might choose to take, severely compounding our intelligence gathering difficulties (a much greater problem for us than for the Soviets, due to the open U.S. society).

In this connection, there has been much discussion regarding agreement or lack of

agreement on telemetry encryption. The agreed Second Common Understanding to Article XV of the treaty states that "... neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty." Any Soviet attempt to deny or impede our ability to monitor SALT-limited parameters would be regarded by us as a most grave violation of the treaty.

Thus far in this discussion of equity and mutual interest, I have concentrated on the key issues of most concern to us. There are also a number of important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage. Among the most important provisions having an impact on Soviet plans for strategic forces are:

- Aggregate limits that will require the Soviets to dismantle (or convert to non-offensive systems) 250-plus operational systems; these are older and less capable weapons but still a significant fraction of their total systems and megatonnage.

- The various limitations that will enhance the predictability of the range of Soviet force developments, thus assisting us in our force planning.

- The cap on RV (Re-entry Vehicle) fractionation that denies full exploitation of the major Soviet throw-weight advantage for the period of the treaty.

- Testing, production and deployment of the SS-16 (*Soviet missile*) banned.

On the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal and provide the following options in planning our strategic forces:

- We can build an ICBM which fully meets our security requirements.

- We can continue with the modernization of our Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) program at the pace we determine.

- We can continue to modernize our air-breathing systems, including the exploitation of our air, ground and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past and, if we are not careful, in the future.

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Our ability to take the necessary programmatic actions to ensure essential strategic equivalence is the ultimate test for SALT II. Our options and flexibility under the treaty are adequate, so long as we choose to exercise them.

The most serious concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer to the American people, in which case adverse strategic trends could well become irreversible.

In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded. Had it been followed, we would face

less perilous strategic prospects in the 1980s, and we are convinced we could have achieved deeper mutual reductions in SALT II.

We are seriously concerned lest the nation repeat earlier mistakes through complacency, an incomplete understanding of the magnitude of the Soviet buildup, or an insufficient appreciation of the broader consequences of Soviet momentum in terms of stability, global power relationships and long term U.S. interests.

Therefore, we consider it absolutely essential that, if the nation accepts the SALT II agreement, it does so with a full understanding that we will be required to undertake a series of important strategic modernization programs in order to maintain strategic parity within the limits agreed upon. In this connection, the decision to proceed with the development of the MX (mobile) missile, capable of carrying 10 re-entry vehicles and deployed in a survivable basing mode, is an important step toward this end.

None of us is totally at ease with all the provisions of the SALT agreement. I expressed our concerns on the Soviet MLBMs and Backfire earlier and we also have significant concerns with regard to our ability to monitor certain aspects of the agreement. We believe, though, that the risks in this area are acceptable, provided we pursue vigorously challenges to questionable Soviet practices, improvements in the capability of our monitoring assets and modernization of our strategic forces. In this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the agreement is adequately verifiable.

We believe it is essential that the nation and its leadership view SALT II as a modest but useful step in a long-range process which must include the resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence coupled with vigorous efforts to achieve further substantial reductions.

If this can be achieved, history will record SALT II as a step forward; without this commitment, we will find that SALT II made little difference and may have been a net loss. Fortunately, our nation has the opportunity to make that choice.

*General David C. Jones is chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This article was adapted from his testimony on the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

## Glossary

Following is a glossary of selected terms used in the strategic arms discussion:

**Fractionation**—The division of a missile's payload into separate re-entry vehicles.

**MIRV**—Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle; a package of two or more re-entry vehicles which can be carried by a single ballistic missile and delivered on separate targets. A missile so equipped is said to be MIRVed. MIRVing is a kind of fractionation.

**MLBM**—Modern Large Ballistic Missile; another term for Heavy Missile. A heavy missile is one with a large payload of nuclear warheads capable of destroying fixed, hardened targets, such as U.S. Minutemen ICBMs in silos hardened, or protected, by concrete.

**Telemetry**—The transmission of electronic signals by missiles to earth. Monitoring these signals aids in evaluating a weapon's performance and provides a way of verifying weapons tests undertaken by an adversary. Encryption of such signals means encoding them to conceal the data thus transmitted.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-12THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
1 August 1979

## Letters to the editor

### Needed: eyes and ears in Greece

We must at once build supplementary listening posts to monitor Soviet missile firings. It will be prudent to install immediately such facilities in northern Greece to insure against possible loss of our equivalent coverage of the USSR from listening posts in Turkey. Additional monitoring stations in northern Greece will probably accord us surveillance of Soviet test launchings from Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam in the Soviet Union just as effectively as do our present installations in Diyarbakir and our other electronic facilities in Turkey.

Greece is a secure ally. Turkey is practicing holdup tactics against us in its efforts to obtain massive support for its tottering economy (while we do not begrudge our help, we find the forceful approach unacceptable) by continuing prevarications over Cyprus and its repetitive advices to us that our present monitoring operations within Turkey will depend upon future Soviet concurrence.

Turkey aims to obtain some \$1.5 billion of immediate aid to enable it to cope temporarily with its acute economic problems. Most of this support will have to come from U.S. sources, both directly and indirectly — indirectly because a portion of the Turkish bail-out would have to be provided by international financial organizations which we sustain. And there is no assurance that such massive economic help for Turkey will not become a repetitive effort on our part over the coming years.

Turkey offers us nothing in return for our cooperation apart from incipient denial of the use of our monitoring facilities on her soil and her refusal to solve the Cyprus problem. If Turkey is to receive financial assistance, the minimum conditions must include the immediate withdrawal of her approximately 30,000 troops from Cyprus.



The trade-off, measured against the \$1.5 billion that is being so categorically demanded, means that each repatriated soldier would be worth \$50,000 more on Turkish home territory than on Cyprus. This would be an extraordinarily generous arrangement. We, of course, wish to uphold and aid the present Turkish democratic government, but why must we do so at the price of continuing Cypriot humiliation and tragedy?

Should Turkey elect to go down a one-way street and collaborate with the Soviet Union in preference to obtaining our help, this would make it additionally imperative for us to have readily available monitoring stations in northern Greece at least as efficient as those we now operate in Turkey. We certainly do not wish to be held to periodic ransom because of Turkey's inability to bring its house in order, coupled with its continuing intractability in terms of a just Cyprus solution.

Paul A. Chadwell  
Washington, D.C.

(NOTE — The writer is retired from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.)

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ON PAGE B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 August 1979

# SALT II: The Kissinger Sword Dance

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Citizen Henry A. Kissinger finally spoke his long-awaited word yesterday on the SALT II treaty upon which Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger left so strong an imprint of paternity.

He did not rush to embrace his political founding. Instead, he delivered a message to the Senate-Foreign Relations Committee, current forum of the

## News Analysis

SALT debate, sprinkled with words of Spenglerian gloom on the American-Soviet strategic balance and exhortations to higher U.S. military spending.

Beneath his carefully crafted reservations, however, Kissinger did supply the endorsement for the SALT II pact for which the Carter administration had been sorely hoping.

The performance led professional semanticist Sen. S.I. Hayakawa

(R-Calif.) to exclaim admiringly to Kissinger on "the texture of your thought, the stately procession of your sentences and paragraphs."

In his testimony Kissinger drew a picture of a United States menaced by the "geopolitical offensive" of a Soviet Union now emboldened by the prospect of strategic superiority in the early 1980s. It was a theme that often had echoed from the lips of treaty opponents in the Senate chamber the last few weeks.

It was a state of affairs for which he said he sought to cast no blame, but could be traced to the military doctrines of the 1960s (Kennedy-Johnson years), the political backlash of the Vietnam war and the Carter administration's "unilateral" cancellations or delays in strategic weapons systems started in the Nixon years.

Doggedly, Kissinger pressed his version of history through the challenges

of Democratic interrogators such as Foreign Relations Chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.).

Church reminded Kissinger of his admonition in 1976 against "those who paint dark vistas of looming U.S. inferiority" when he, as secretary of state, was still pressing for acceptance of the SALT II principles he and president Ford had negotiated at Vladivostok.

"What has changed" Church asked after Kissinger had painted dark vistas of Soviet strategic superiority. Kissinger answered that what had changed was the abandonment of the military program he and Ford were proposing as well as the acceleration of Soviet technology.

This provoked new challenges from Church and Biden.

One major irony of yesterday's performance is that Kissinger found himself jousting with the advocates, rather than the opponents, of the SALT process. In previous years when he, as secretary of state, was pressing the SALT cause, these were the senators who formed his core of supporters and admirers.

Also, the same Henry Kissinger who when in power deplored congressional encroachment in the foreign policy process yesterday proposed periodic two-year Senate reexaminations of the treaty as well as any future SALT negotiations from the standpoint of Soviet global political behavior. It was a proposal by Citizen Kissinger that Secretary Kissinger would undoubtedly have found abhorrent.

The most vexing moments for Kissinger came when Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.) tried to press him on the point of whether he would have recommended signing the treaty now before the Foreign Relations Committee.

"This is a difficult question... er, er, answer," replied the treaty's

chief architect. Sarbanes repeatedly pressed and Kissinger hedged.

Finally, under Sarbanes' battering attempt, Kissinger said, "Yes, I probably would have signed the treaty and presented it to the Senate." Then came the condition: "But I would have simultaneously asked for military changes."

Ambivalence was the political keynote of Kissinger's overall testimony.

Within the course of his appearance yesterday he said no, that he would not sign the treaty unless it were accompanied by higher military spending and other conditions. He also said yes, he would sign the treaty if his terms were met. The "no" was delivered to Sen. Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.), an opponent of the treaty. The "yes" was uttered to Sarbanes, a supporter.

In fact President Carter has already accepted a higher level of military spending—3 percent beyond inflation—to meet NATO needs. The commitment was reaffirmed Monday by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Kissinger carefully chiseled his reservations so that none would require renegotiation of the treaty, a principal objective of the "killer" amendments being proposed by opponents of SALT II.

Kissinger kept his testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee until shortly before his appearance yesterday, a departure from Senate convention. But when it was all over, the administration's SALT strategists were understandably satisfied. They had every reason to be.

Despite Kissinger's "reservations" and ambiguities, they knew that he had come down unmistakably for ratification—albeit as the Republican Party's chief foreign policy spokesman and a potentially influential adversary in the 1980 presidential campaign.

However complex and tortuous his arguments, Kissinger in the end had to acknowledge his paternity of the SALT II treaty. He also had to act accordingly.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 August 1979

# Kissinger Links Approval of SALT II to Arms Increase

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that he would have signed the SALT II treaty himself, thus endorsing its specific contents, but went on to warn the Senate that the United States has fallen into dire strategic straits.

Ratification of the arms limitation treaty, Kissinger said, should depend on three conditions—a new American military strategy and an expanded defense program to fulfill it, three understandings or reservations that the Senate could add to the treaty without requiring any renegotiation and a firm statement from the Senate linking future SALT negotiations to restrained Soviet behavior around the world.

The Soviet Union soon will have palpable strategic advantage over the United States, Kissinger said, and when other countries realize this, "we will face a crisis in our relations with the rest of the world."

Recent years have brought "revolutions" in the strategic balance — the end of clear-cut American superiority — and thus in "the postwar security and geopolitical structure," which he said was based on that American superiority.

"Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the military balance," Kissinger told the Foreign Relations Committee. Although he foresaw "very grave dangers" facing the United States in the 1980s, Kissinger said that by the late '80s the situation could become "really quite favorable" and that SALT II will permit the United States to take brisk steps to rectify its position.

In all, Kissinger spent nearly 5½ hours at the witness table in the grandiose Old Senate Caucus Room, first reading from the longest piece of prepared testimony yet presented in the SALT hearings, then answering questions. It was a vintage Kissinger per-

formance, filled with intellectual agility and studied ambiguity.

Toward the end of the long hearing, Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) complimented Kissinger: "You've got a marvelous diplomatic way of not being too precise sometimes," Pell observed with a smile.

Kissinger was precise on one point—the unilateral decisions of the Carter administration were largely to blame for the gravity of the situation he described. He said several times that he was not anxious "to assess blame," and he traced the underlying U.S. problem back a decade and a half. But when asked pointedly what had changed since the days when he was in power and giving rosier descriptions of the U.S. position, Kissinger listed mostly Carter administration decisions.

Specifically, he said, the Ford administration had been counting on deploying the B1 bomber (canceled by Carter) and on earlier availability of the MX missile (now not deployable before 1986) and the Trident submarine (coming into service next year, but at a slow pace).

Moreover, Kissinger said, the Soviet Union has been conducting a "geopolitical offensive" since 1973 that has transformed the nature of world politics to America's disadvantage. He scorned the notion that a "small Caribbean country"—Cuba—could send troops around the world almost at will while the United States could do nothing about it.

Perhaps reflecting the bizarre course of the SALT debate thus far, the Carter administration last night issued a statement welcoming Kissinger's "general approach to the SALT II agreement and his opposition to its renegotiation or rejection." The statement said the administration does "not agree with some of the points made in Dr. Kissinger's analysis," but that his comments "contribute to a constructive debate on these vital foreign policy and defense issues."

The statement also revealed a little administration sensitivity: "The SALT debate has underscored the strategic problems which the president has recognized and has sought to rectify since he took office."

Senior administration officials said last night they took the Kissinger testimony as a plus in the SALT debate, though they acknowledged that meeting his conditions—like those of Sen.

Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and others who demand more defense spending in tandem with SALT II—will require political agility.

Kissinger said explicitly he agreed with Nunn. He said the Senate should delay action on SALT II until it has received a new, supplemental defense appropriations bill and a revised five-year defense program outlining an invigorated U.S. strategic policy.

In his prepared testimony Kissinger said the United States should accelerate development of the MX missile and Trident II submarine missile to give the United States the ability to knock out Soviet land-based rockets in their silos; improve air defense abilities against the Soviet Backfire bomber; take "immediate steps" to restore the balance of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and add to U.S. capacity to police farflung corners of the world, especially by improving the Navy.

Kissinger said the Senate should demand an "obligatory commitment" from the administration for more arms spending.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) told Kissinger he didn't understand "what you want." Biden listed new U.S. strategic and military programs already under way, and said, "We're moving rapidly to render the Soviet arsenal in the late 1980s much more vulnerable to a first strike than our forces would be."

The three treaty changes Kissinger proposed would declare that the accompanying protocol, which controls

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the use of cruise missiles that may be deployed in Europe, not be extended beyond 1981, its expiration date; would declare that the Senate's view that nothing in the "noncircumvention" clause of the treaty would interfere with normal U.S. aid to its allies; and would establish as a condition for a SALT III agreement the principle that the United States be entitled to match any Soviet weapons system.

Kissinger said this last idea is the best way to deal with the 308 "heavy" super missiles that SALT II allows the Soviets to keep but forbids the United States from matching.

None of these changes would force a reopening of negotiations with the Soviet Union, Kissinger said, and administration officials later said he was probably right.

The one subject Kissinger raised yesterday that could upset the administration's SALT-selling program was linkage—the tying of arms control to general Soviet behavior around the world. This issue had all but died out of the SALT debate until yesterday, when Kissinger revived it energetically.

Kissinger said it was too late to tie ratification of SALT II to past Soviet behavior, but he urged the Senate to accompany ratification with a firm declaration that future negotiations would depend on the Soviets and their allies and proxies following restrained policies in the future by avoiding intervention in other nations. If the Soviets failed to live up to this declaration, Kissinger said, the Senate could vote to suspend whatever SALT negotiations were going on at the time.

Kissinger's remarks on linkage set him at odds with the Carter administration, which has concluded that SALT must stand on its own as a contribution to national security. Kissinger, however, argued that the United States has both the duty and the opportunity to impose "political restraint" on the Soviets as the price for cooperation in arms control.

Kissinger referred repeatedly to his fear that the shifting strategic balance will embolden the Soviets to take more risks in regional crises. At one point, he said he had failed to analyze fully the consequences of rough strategic equality on lower-level conflicts around the world. He acknowledged that the Nixon-Kissinger brand of détente had failed to restrain the Soviets.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Foreign Relations panel, challenged Kissinger, observing that overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority hadn't deterred the Soviets from building the Berlin Wall or turning Cuba into a military base. "I can't see how they'd be inhibited by our building the MX," Church said.

"But they might be less inhibited if we didn't," Kissinger replied.

Kissinger said the NATO allies are deeply ambivalent about SALT II—worried on one hand about the insta-

bility that would follow its rejection, but concerned also that the shifting strategic balance means "the basis of their security is eroding."

Two Republican senators, Jesse Helms (N.C.) and Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.) sought to extract from Kissinger some encouragement for their views that the treaty might best be substantively amended before it is ratified. Kissinger gently but firmly rebuffed them.

On the issue of the Soviets' 308 missiles, which Baker has called a fatal flaw in SALT II, Kissinger said there was no practical opportunity to do anything about them within the six-year lifespan of SALT II, so the issue would be better dealt with in SALT III.

Despite this rebuff, Baker praised Kissinger's testimony highly, raising hopes among some SALT supporters that the minority leader might find a way to use Kissinger's testimony to move back toward approval of the treaty.

Kissinger told Helms that trying to renegotiate the treaty now would probably require a temporary decision to recognize the SALT limits while talks went on, and this might prevent the United States from undertaking the buildup Kissinger said was necessary.

SALT, Kissinger said, can only provide confirmation of an existing power relationship. The Soviets will never make unilateral concessions, he

said. "If we want equality, we must build to equality," he told the committee.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 August 1979

## The SALT Argument

IN A WAY, the administration has already succeeded beyond its wildest dreams in the effort to win Senate approval of the SALT II treaty. Here it is barely midsummer, and a growing chorus of important voices (whose opposition had been most feared) is saying that the treaty itself is no villain, that its ratification is almost a matter of indifference, that the fundamental strategic problems that most concern them are in fact beyond the power of the treaty, as such, either to remedy or even make much worse. That is necessarily a foreshortened and somewhat distorted version of the positions taken by Henry Kissinger and Georgia's Sen. Sam Nunn, as well as some others on the skeptical middle-right. And each has sketched out certain special hesitations and recommendations and objections of his own. But it is still fair to say that in some unexpected and consequential sense both have pronounced the treaty neutral—meaning that its significance and therefore its merit can only be judged in terms of the use the administration plans to make of its relatively permissive terms.

In this they were accepting a line of argument the administration has been plying with ever greater fervor for months: that the SALT II accords are neutral and harmless so far as the changes in the strategic balance that worry a lot of senators and others are concerned. Yes, it is all too unfortunately true, this argument goes, that for a period in the early to middle (or late) 1980s the American land-based ICBM force will be vulnerable to destruction by Soviet attack. But, in the context of ratifying the accords, the principal reply has not been that this is an unrealistic fear or that the United States would still have enough nuclear explosive power available to counterattack mercilessly and thus to deter in the first place (the standard answers). Rather it has been that the treaty under consideration did not cause the pending, "sitting duck" status of the Minuteman force and, most important, *does nothing to prevent our taking steps to remedy this status*. The argument runs that the proposed development of the new MX mobile land-based missile and some other military initiatives, all countenanced by the accords, will provide the remedy.

To the evident discomfiture of some of the treaty's supporters in and out of the administration, prominent critics such as Mr. Kissinger and Sen. Nunn have now accepted this construction of the treaty's inherent meaning and merit—almost. The difference is that they are insisting, as a condition of support, on tougher military and political measures, and they want them in hand before the SALT accords are approved.

The administration asked for this. There was never any prospect—nor should there have been—of its

being able to have the SALT accords discussed in that detached, antiseptic, "no linkage" way some of its spokesmen originally seemed to be insisting on, as if the treaty and protocol were self-contained and self-sufficient and self-enforcing documents that enjoyed a clean and innocent life apart from the conduct of the armed-to-the-teeth and not-very-friendly parties that had signed them. So it was always in the cards that the SALT documents would be considered in the context of larger Soviet-American relations and of Soviet behavior. And once the administration (properly) enlarged the whole debate to include the changing strategic relationship and its own plans (that is, the MX) for dealing with it—they could hardly expect to keep others, like Mr. Kissinger and Sen. Nunn, from pursuing this line of thought—to somewhat different, or at least more stringent, conclusions.

You do not have to believe in all the improbable-to-preposterous scenario warfare the arms specialists set forth to believe that the conditions the worriers describe, starting in the early 1980s, are worth worrying about. That *should* be a central focus of the arms debate. And even though the treaty is "neutral" in the sense of not ruling out steps to change these conditions, there is nothing wrong with making the treaty's acceptance contingent on certain undertakings from the administration about how it will act to reduce the high risks inherent in a situation where the American land-based ICBMs are known to be theoretically vulnerable to attack by the other side and of potential military use only if they are preemptively fired at the war-edge of an international conflict.

We think the critics are right to make evidence of an authentic and active effort to reverse this situation a central issue of treaty ratification. Our confidence does not extend, however, to the particular weapon system that has been selected to do the main part of the job. In gaining the approval of SALT I, a commitment to the Trident submarine—premature and now conceded by many to have been wrong—was undertaken. The MX system, along with the implausible basing modes being discussed for it, has as many serious and impressive critics (on both sides of the debate) as the Trident had, and the MX case looks to be even stronger. At the very least, the momentum toward acceptance of this system should be slowed and various proposed alternatives weighed. It is correct to say that SALT II can only be reasonably considered in the context of the changing U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship and how the American land-based missile force can be made more stable and secure over the next decades. There are far too many question marks surrounding the MX to suggest that it should have the principal part in this urgent project.

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ON PAGE A-3NEW YORK TIMES  
2 AUGUST 1979

# Kissinger's Revival of the 'Linkage' Issue

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 — Henry A. Kissinger has dramatically revived "linkage" as a political and foreign policy issue by proposing that future strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union be halted if the Russians do not practice military restraint around the world.

**News Analysis** In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, to be repeated before the

Armed Services Committee tomorrow, the former Secretary of State gave grudging endorsement to the pending treaty on strategic arms, which he helped negotiate and could hardly disavow now.

But he provided an issue for the Republicans to campaign on next year — the promise that if a Republican was elected President, the next round of talks on limitation of strategic arms would be linked to what the Russians and their allies do in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Specifically, Mr. Kissinger urged the Senate to state that "the absence of political restraint" by the Soviet Union would "seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process." He advocated that the next administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on how the Russians were conducting themselves in the military field. The Senate should vote every two years, he said, on whether the Soviet Union was showing restraint, and if the vote was negative, it should take another vote on whether to continue the arms talks.

## Proposal Called Unrealistic

Administration officials, who welcomed Mr. Kissinger's endorsement of the proposed treaty, scorned the linkage proposal as unworkable and unrealistic. Several officials also suggested that Mr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, would have used all the powers at his disposal to oppose such a plan.

But the State Department, while asserting that the strategic arms negotiations should stand on their own, unrelated to Soviet activity elsewhere, decided not to argue vigorously with Mr. Kissinger, whose testimony received more news coverage than that of Secretary of State

Cyrus R. Vance. This was because Mr. Kissinger had carefully put the linkage issue in the future, freeing senators to vote for the pending treaty.

"I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this country an opportunity to address its dangers without abandoning an important negotiation that has already extended over seven years," he said.

By so doing, Mr. Kissinger provided an issue for the 1980 elections. Should SALT III, as the next set of negotiations will be called, proceed as the past talks did, without reference to other matters? Or should there be the kind of explicit linkage now advocated by Mr. Kissinger?

## Fund-Raiser for Republicans

In a conversation today, Mr. Kissinger said that his views were strictly his own and that he had not consulted with the Administration or any Republican figures. Although Mr. Kissinger has been an active fund-raiser around the country for various Republicans, he has endorsed no candidate. He also says he has not decided whether to seek the nomination for senator from New York if Senator Jacob K. Javits retires next year.

Mr. Kissinger also insisted that he has been consistent on the need for linkage in Soviet-American foreign relations. But the record is ambiguous. While it is true that the Nixon Administration came into office advocating the need for a connection between arms talks and other Soviet actions, by the time Mr. Kissinger left office in January 1977 this was no longer so true.

President Richard M. Nixon, for instance, in his first news conference as President on Jan. 17, 1969, said: "What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time — for example, on the problem of the Mideast and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting to-

gether, can serve the cause of peace."

In fact, the Nixon Administration did delay the start of the first round of strategic arms talks to await movement toward an agreement on Berlin. And in 1971, Mr. Kissinger threatened to cancel a planned summit meeting in Moscow because of Soviet support for India's invasion of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

## Opposed Linkage With Rights

But after the initial meeting between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Mr. Kissinger found himself defending détente against those who wanted to link trade and other concessions with Soviet policies on human rights.

The policy came full circle in 1975, when the Ford Administration tried to counter the Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola by clandestine means without jeopardizing détente. Congress refused to support the secret financing of the operation, and Mr. Kissinger found himself in Moscow in January 1976 trying to negotiate a strategic arms accord while at the same time castigating the Soviet Union for its role in Angola.

Today, Mr. Kissinger said he almost canceled his trip to Moscow in 1976 because of Angola and did not push for conclusion of the treaty that year, in part because President Gerald R. Ford was afraid to risk losing the nomination to Ronald Reagan, but also because of Angola. This was not apparent at the time.

On April 22, 1976, Mr. Kissinger carefully avoided linking Angola with the strategic arms talks. At a news conference that day he said the Soviet actions in Angola were "irresponsible, inconsistent with the principles that govern the conduct between our nations." But he added: "The basic necessities of preserving peace in the nuclear age and of regulating the relationship between the superpowers remain." This "dual policy" will not change, he said.

JOURNAL (LANSING, MI)  
2 July 1979

## **Your Opinion**

### **Mutual trust is key**

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the chorus of American supporters and opponents of the Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty has been joined by your newspaper, which published an editorial "SALT II: Trust is the Key." The thing that surprised me was the discrepancy between its title and the content. The writer, seemingly admitting that mutual trust between the USSR and the USA is essential for implementing a new treaty, does everything to undermine his readers' confidence in the Soviet Union's policy.

The first charge leveled against the Soviet Union is that it is supposedly violating the accords reached in Helsinki. In our country, the article leads us to believe people are put into jail for "publicly expressing unpopular opinions." Facts? There is only an unsubstantiated statement totally contradicting the actual state of affairs, which is that punishment in the USSR is meted out not for expressing "unpopular" opinions, but for criminal activities.

I stress, activities, those directed against the political and social system of the USSR. I do not doubt that the writer could cite a dozen names of those sentenced under Soviet laws. But in each case, to be objective, the newspaper would have to admit that they received punishment not for their convictions, but for their antigovernment activities.

For justice's sake, however, it should be said that the author of the article recalled several examples of what he modestly called the "duplicity" of U.S. foreign policy, mentioning the U.S. aggression against Cuba in 1961, CIA actions in plotting against Fidel Castro and U-2 intelligence flights over Soviet territory. This is the topic which, I think, he should pursue by extending the list of well-known violations by the United States of international legal standards and saying honestly that such facts did take place and that they can justifiably cause Soviet people to have doubts about the U.S. ability to observe international commitments.

The view in the USSR, however, is that international treaties are not concluded to be violated. It is believed that common sense, which dictates the need for signing and ratifying a SALT II treaty between our countries, will triumph. It is believed in the Soviet Union that mutual trust is indeed the key to implementing the new treaty. But is such trust promoted by attempts to discredit the partner in the treaty? The answer to this question has to be left on the conscience of all those who, at this crucial moment, are trying to put in a bad light the important understanding reached between the USSR and the United States of America.

ALEXANDER DRUZHININ  
Novosti Press Agency  
Moscow



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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A4THE WASHINGTON POST  
30 July 1979

# Soviets Will Be Importing Oil Within 3 Years, CIA Report Says

By Keith Richburg  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Oil production in the Soviet Union may be peaking now, and the Soviets and their communist bloc allies who now have an oil surplus, may need to import up to 700,000 barrels a day in three years, according to predictions by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA figures on Soviet oil production are contained in a recent classified report. Unclassified parts of that report were released yesterday in a statement by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight Committee.

In the report, the CIA predicts that at best, the Soviets will be producing only 10 million barrels a day in 1985, but more likely will be producing less than that. The current production rate in the Soviet Union is 11.5 million barrels daily.

The CIA reported decreases in petroleum production everywhere in the Soviet Union except in western Siberia. Production nationwide hit a record 11.73 million barrels daily in April, the report said, and has been declining steadily ever since.

Soviet oil production could "plummet by a third in the next six years," according to Aspin's version of the CIA report.

The Aspin statement warned observers not to "gloat over Moscow's predicament," because a decrease in communist bloc oil production also would mean "a cut in worldwide fuel supplies—which in turn means more upward pressure on prices."

Communist countries currently export about 1 million barrels daily to the West, according to Aspin.

In 1977, a similar CIA report be-

came the subject of a bitter controversy, and the CIA was chided in a 30-page report of the Senate Intelligence Committee for predicting that the Soviets would be importing 3.5 million to 4.3 million barrels of oil daily by 1985.

After those 1977 predictions, critics charged the agency with playing with the facts to build domestic support for President Carter's energy program. In a televised speech April 15, 1977, the president used CIA statistics to announce that there was less oil and gas in the world than previously was thought.

Criticisms of that initial CIA prediction of Soviet oil production essentially centered on the apparent failure to consider how much oil the Soviets could save through strict conservation measures.

Critics argued then that in a state with a planned economy, strict oil conservation measures could be imposed, and consumption of coal and gas increased.

In his statement yesterday, Aspin said that after two years of "assessing a growing body of data, the CIA has reached essentially the same conclusion as in 1977—that the Soviet Union in the very near future will need to import oil."

Aspin said the CIA report suggests critics "have exaggerated the opportunities available to the Soviets" for conservation.

For instance, Aspin said, "The Russians can't save fuel by switching to small cars since they have hardly any cars to begin with. They can't switch from trucks to railroads since almost all their long-distance freight moves by rail already."

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
30 JULY 1979

# See Soviets heading for lack of oil

Washington (UPI)—Soviet oil production is peaking and the Russians and their Eastern European allies will become oil importers within three years, the CIA predicted in a new analysis released yesterday.

A summary of unclassified portions of the report was made available by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight Committee.

"We may be seeing the peak of Soviet oil production right now," said Aspin. Soviet production was said to have hit a record high of 11.7 million barrels a day in April and fallen now to 11.5 million barrels a day.

West shouldn't gloat.

"The CIA says that at the very best the Russians will be producing 10 million barrels a day in 1985," Aspin said. "But if luck isn't with them, production of only 8 million is very likely."

The West shouldn't "gloat over Moscow's predicament," he said, because the drop in production also means a cut in worldwide fuel supplies and more upward pressure on prices.

Aspin said for several years the

Soviets and their allies have exported an average of a million barrels a day to the West.

"The CIA now forecasts that as early as 1982, the Communist nations could be importing 700,000 barrels a day," he said. "That means that instead of adding 3% to the oil in world trade, the Communist states would be subtracting 2%."

In 1977, the CIA issued a controversial report saying the Soviets would be importing 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels a day by 1985. That report was widely criticized but two years later the agency, assessing a growing amount of data, has moved up the timetable for the developing shortage.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
30 July 1979

Soviet oil production is peaking and the Russians will become oil importers within three years, a CIA study predicted. By 1982 Russia and its Eastern European allies could be importing 700,000 barrels a day, the report said.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
30 July 1979

# Inside the news—briefly

## CIA says Soviet bloc will import oil in 3 years

Washington

Soviet oil production is peaking and the Russians and their Eastern European allies will become oil importers within three years, the Central Intelligence Agency predicted in a new analysis released Sunday.

Soviet production was said to have hit a record high of 11.73 million barrels a day in April, since falling to 11.5 million barrels a day. "The CIA says that at the very best the Russians will be producing 10 million barrels a day in 1985," said Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin, who released a summary of the report.

He added, however, that the drop in production could mean a cut in worldwide fuel supplies and more upward pressure on prices.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE D-1NEW YORK TIMES  
30 JULY 1979

# C.I.A. Sees Soviet Importing Oil Soon

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 29 — The Central Intelligence Agency is again predicting that the Soviet Union will soon be forced to stop exporting oil and start importing it, thus opening up possibilities of serious international economic and strategic disruptions.

The agency, in its latest assessment of Soviet capacities to produce oil, asserted that output is currently stagnant or declining everywhere except in the western Siberian fields. That would appear to be a fulfillment of C.I.A. projections made two years ago.

Therefore, the agency said, the Soviet Union may soon reach out to the same sources of oil that are already being pursued by the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The C.I.A. estimated that Moscow would be importing 700,000 barrels of oil a day by 1982. It now exports about one million barrels daily.

## Report Still Classified

The C.I.A. report is still classified, but parts of it were disclosed over the weekend by Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin and chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee.

The probable consequences of Soviet competition for oil, should it develop, would appear to include the following:

① Pressure on supplies would increase, as would prices, as the Soviet Union switched to being a net importer. Available supplies would drop about 5 percent, according to the report.

② The issue of whether the United States should assist the Soviet Union in developing its oil reserves, particularly in permitting the export of American drilling equipment, would be reopened. Advocates argue that such exports would lead to increased Soviet production and less pressure on the market. Opponents contend that those exports would strengthen the Soviet Union militarily.

③ Rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East would increase, possibly resulting in an increased military presence for both and a shift in American policy away from Israel toward the Arab oil producers.

④ Questions of Soviet control over

Eastern Europe, the primary market for its current oil exports, would be revived.

In 1977, the C.I.A. got caught in a swirling controversy when it predicted that Soviet oil production would peak in 1979 or 1980 and that the Soviet Union

would be importing 3.5 million barrels of oil a day by 1985.

When that prediction was made, President Carter used the projections as part of his argument that the United States must declare the "moral equiva-

Continued on Page D4



An oil tanker at port in Batumi, a Soviet export center on the Black Sea

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lent of war" on the energy shortage, contending that the entrance of the Soviet Union into the world market as a buyer would tighten oil supplies even more.

The C.I.A.'s analysis, however, drew considerable fire from oil specialists in the United States, Western European intelligence agencies and the Soviet Union itself. Generally, they argued that the C.I.A. had underestimated the extent of oil reserves within the Soviet Union and the capacity of the Russians to produce oil.

But later that year, Moscow informed its customers in Eastern Europe that they should seek additional oil supplies elsewhere because the Soviet Union was beginning to husband its own supplies.

In its new report, the C.I.A. said that Soviet oil production hit a record high of 11.73 million barrels a day in April but had fallen to 11.35 million barrels a day in May. "We may be seeing the peak of Soviet oil production right now," Mr. Aspin said.

The agency also estimated that the huge Samotlor field in western Siberia was nearing its peak of production and would start to decline in 1980 or 1981 and go into a steep dive after 1982. It provides nearly half of Soviet oil output.

#### Overall Production Drop

Over all, the C.I.A. said, Soviet oil production is expected to fall to 10 million barrels a day at most by 1985, and possibly to dip as low as eight million barrels a day. That is the same projection the agency made in 1977.

The agency also contended that the Soviet Union would be importing 700,000 barrels a day by 1982 even if it increased its use of other fuels and imposes conservation. Some critics had argued that the C.I.A. failed to take that into account in its 1977 report.

The C.I.A. specialists said that conversions to coal or natural gas in the Soviet Union have been frustrated by what they called the "severe disappointment" over coal output since 1975 and the rising cost of natural gas.

Moreover, they said, the Russians do not have the leeway to conserve that Americans or Europeans might have. They have few cars; most long-distance freight already moves by train rather than truck, and heat for apartments in the cold winters comes from

other fuels, such as coal.

There is, of course, the possibility of a major new oil find. But even if that were to come tomorrow, Mr. Aspin noted, it would take at least into the late 1980's or early 1990's to develop it sufficiently to ease the pressure on Russian fuel supplies.

The agency declined to predict how the Soviet Union might adjust to the combination of a loss of the foreign-exchange earnings it currently realizes from oil exports and the increased outflow of foreign exchange that would be needed to pay for expensive imported oil.

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THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
31 July 1979

## *International News in Brief*

The CIA believes that the Soviet Union will be importing oil within three years.

Soviet oil production will begin to drop next year and the nation will no longer be able to export oil, said Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee. "We may be seeing the peak of Soviet oil production right now," he said, but he warned against gloating because "this also means more upward pressure on prices." Soviet oil production hit a record of 11.7 million barrels a day in April and slipped to 11.3 million barrels a day in May. Soviet production of all goods has been dropping, and Soviet leaders fear that the economy will get worse.



ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE  
16 JULY 1979

## *CIA Scores One*

Chalk one up for America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Two years ago it predicted that the Soviet Union would not be able to produce as much crude oil as it would need, even though it is the largest single producer of oil in the world.

At the recent three-day 30th anniversary meeting of COMECON, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, whose nine minor members dance to the tune of the 10th, the USSR, that tune had some sour notes. In the first five months of this year, Soviet oil production has fallen three million metric tons short of its goal, or 435,000 barrels a day. The plan had been to increase production to 593 million metric tons in 1979 and to between 620 million and 640 million metric tons in 1980, the equivalent of 12.4 million to 12.8 million barrels a day. Last year and so far this year, that hasn't happened. There is nothing to indicate that things will get better for the Soviets and the COMECON countries, all of which except Romania depend on the Soviets for most of

their petroleum.

The evidence from public sources like Tass, the Soviet news agency, and the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, is that the COMECON nations will have to buy more crude for the oil exporting nations' cartel. Even the USSR may have to start importing oil. That's what the CIA said. Skeptics called the predictions a self-serving attempt to ingratiate itself with President Carter by supporting his warning of a world energy crisis.

Actually back then it didn't take a crystal ball to realize that the world is running out of oil, just the ability to accept objective facts and reach rational conclusions from them, instead of living in a dreamland of wishful thinking. The CIA's prediction should restore some of its lost credibility. But we wouldn't bet on it. It is too convenient a target for self-proclaimed liberal defenders of privacy and freedom, who would rather win votes and be wrong than be honest with the public.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
1 AUGUST 1979

## *Carter Expects Rise in Joblessness; Believes G.O.P. Will Pick Reagan*

By LEONARD SILK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 31 — President Carter expects unemployment to rise during the rest of this year and into 1980, when he is determined to make a fight to hold onto the Presidency, he told a visitor to the White House last night.

He accepts the diagnosis of his own economists and the great majority of private economists with whom he has met that the economy is already in a recession. But he intends to keep his Administration's policies focused on arresting the rate of inflation, which he regards as the most serious problem facing the nation economically — and himself politically.

In last night's discussion, the President ranged from the economy and energy to Middle East peacemaking and Presidential politics. At one point he likened the Palestinian cause to the civil rights movement in the United States. He predicted that few Palestinians would actually choose to return to the West Bank, if given the chance, and doubted that other

Arab states genuinely wanted a new Palestinian state.

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### EXCERPT:

#### Concerned on Soviet Oil Report

He is concerned about the report of the Central Intelligence Agency that that Soviet Union will be forced to start importing oil soon, and may be turning to the Middle East to satisfy its needs.

He said the C.I.A. was correct two years ago in projecting that the Russians were exhausting their ability to export oil. The Soviet Union, added Mr. Carter, has problems of getting oil into southern Russia with so much of its own production concentrated in its northeast.

In this situation, he regards Israeli-Egyptian unity as more important than ever. He does not take that unity as already accomplished, but regards the present dispute over the United Nations Emergency Force as "very serious."

He does not think that stable peace can come to the area without a solution to the Palestinian problem, and hopes urgently that American Jewish leaders — here he named Sol M. Linowitz and Robert S. Strauss — will support and help to sell his efforts to work out arrangements that will give autonomy to the Palestinians on such issues as schools, police, housing and immigration on the West Bank. Mr. Linowitz is a Washington lawyer who helped negotiate the Panama Canal treaties and Mr. Strauss is Mr. Carter's special Ambassador for the Middle East.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
2 August 1979

# ***U.S. Debates Aid To Latin Rightists To Bar Takeovers***

By John M. Goshko  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Fears of further leftist guerrilla takeovers in Central America as a result of the Nicaraguan revolution have triggered a major debate within the Carter administration about whether the United States should resume military aid to the rightist regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Reliable sources said yesterday that at a recent high-level White House meeting, representatives of the Defense Department and the intelligence community argued strongly that both countries, but particularly El Salvador, are in imminent danger of increased, Cuban-assisted guerrilla warfare.

The spokesmen for the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies contended that the United States should help the armed forces in El Salvador and Guatemala to counter the threat by resuming the former U.S. role as their principal supplier of arms and training.

The sources said that, largely because of objections from the State Department, it was decided not to pursue the idea now. But, the sources stressed, although the military aid proposal is in abeyance, it still is under consideration as a policy option and is scheduled for another White House review.

The main thrust of current administration policy is to seek friendly relations with the Sandinista-dominated government in Nicaragua. But, the sources said, Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials remain concerned that Cuba will use the momentum generated by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua to try and breathe new vigor into the guer-

**CONTINUED**

rilla movements stirring in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

El Salvador and Guatemala are among a group of military-dominated Latin American countries that two years ago rejected U.S. military assistance on the grounds that Washington's pressures over human-rights questions were an interference in their internal affairs.

More recently, fears about the spill-over effects from the Nicaraguan civil war have caused both countries to inquire about reestablishing the old ties that saw them receive from the United States almost all of their military training and sizable credits for the purchase of military equipment. But efforts to move in that direction have been blocked by liberals in Congress.

The sources said U.S. military and intelligence officials are most immediately concerned about the situation in El Salvador, where a long period of civil war between President Carlos Humberto Romero's government and leftist terrorists recently erupted into widespread rioting and killing.

According to the sources, one result of the White House meeting was that Viron P. Vaky, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, was sent last week on an unpublicized visit to assess the situation in El Salvador. Although Vaky visited several countries in the area, the sources described his stopover in El Salvador as the most important part of his mission.

Vaky is understood to have concluded that the situation there is rapidly becoming a carbon copy of what happened in Nicaragua—that the polarization between the ultra-rightist

Romero government and its opponents is becoming so intense as to make unlikely a moderate solution involving middle-road forces acceptable to both sides.

Yet, the sources said, Vaky, who has great influence with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, is understood to be among those cautioning against a jump back into close U.S. ties with the Salvadorean and Guatemalan armed forces.

Although some State Department officials are known to advocate a more hard-line approach, the department's basic position is that such a move could undermine the effort to gain the confidence of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, create suspicion and hostility among Latin America's democratic governments and provoke fierce new opposition from congressional liberals.

In addition, the sources said, Vaky and other ranking State Department officials are understood to have argued that renewed military aid should be extended to El Salvador and the Guatemalan regime headed by Gen. Romeo Lucas only in exchange for efforts to disarm the tensions in their countries by easing up on repression and denial of political rights.

However, according to the sources, Vaky, on the basis of his trip last week, came away with the impression that the Romero government is suffering from a "siege mentality" and is unwilling to make any concessions toward liberalization.

On the other side, the sources said, the dominant view in the Pentagon and the CIA is that the risk of Nicaragua becoming a Cuban satellite and a springboard for exporting revolution throughout Central America is too great to be ignored.

As a result, the sources added, powerful forces in these agencies are arguing that the administration should hedge its hopes for good relations with the Sandinistas by moving to prevent the Nicaraguan experience from being repeated in the other countries—even if that means reverting to the discarded policy of close U.S. ties with rightist military regimes.

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THE BOSTON GLOBE  
28 July 1979

# Carter cautions Brezhnev on Cuba

By William Beecher  
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The puzzling emergence in Cuba of a Soviet army brigade headquarters has triggered both a warning to the Soviets from President Jimmy Carter and a charge of an Administration whitewash.

Carter, it was learned yesterday, recently sent a letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev cautioning against a buildup of Soviet military activities in Cuba.

His warning was revealed in a letter from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), which declared that no significant Soviet military buildup had been discerned over the past year. Stone labeled that letter a "whitewash."

The preliminary intelligence assessment of the recently discovered headquarters near Havana, sources say, is that the military contingent appears engaged in training Cuban and possibly Soviet personnel in advanced jungle warfare tactics, employing tanks, artillery, rockets, helicopters and jet fighters.

But no one is sure why.

Might the Soviets be preparing Cuban units for jungle combat in Africa or Latin America? Might they be taking advantage of the environment to prepare Soviet officers and noncoms for military advisory roles in such places?

The American intelligence community has been directed to determine the mission and likely purpose of the unit.

The jungle warfare training, combined with the supply by the Soviets to Cuba of modern MIG23 jets and a Foxtrot class diesel submarine, is raising some serious concerns here. Comments one senior official:

"Cuba is being turned into a military outpost. But for what purpose? What do they need a submarine for, to sink an aircraft carrier? We've got a lot of questions but few answers."

Administration officials are reluctant to talk about developments in Cuba, for fear that could have a negative impact on the Senate as it debates whether to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Stone has been trying to get the Administration to declassify what it knows about the Soviet brigade headquarters to determine whether its presence runs counter to an assurance Stone got in writing from Carter before the Panama Canal treaties were approved last year: That the United States would not countenance the establishment of Soviet bases in the Western hemisphere.

US officials say Soviet training units began to set up shop in Cuba in 1976 after Cubans were bloodied by South African military units in the Angola war.

More units came in as the Cubans extended their combat activity to Ethiopia, against well-equipped Somali forces.

There are thought to be upwards of 2000 military advisers in the country now.

"What appears to have happened recently," one source said, "is that the Russians have combined their various training units into a brigade headquarters, perhaps for ease of administration."

The heart of concern is that the Soviet Union and Cuba might be setting up a more sophisticated intervention force, trained and equipped to mix it up with well-armed foes in Africa or Latin America.

For example, as Britain and the United States edge toward improved relations with the new government in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, might Moscow want to push the Patriotic Front guerrillas into a major stepup in the war there? The Rhodesian armed forces are relatively well-equipped, and if they run into serious difficulty, South Africa's even better forces might enter the fray.

Also, the Cubans helped train and arm the Sandinista guerrillas who overthrew the Somoza government in Nicaragua.

Might Moscow and Havana be emboldened by this success to step up efforts to topple the regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador and some of the small nations in the Caribbean?

Do they want an intervention force trained and available to move if needed?

Washington officials do not know the answers to such questions, but are making a high-priority intelligence effort to find out.

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THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
31 July 1979

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**Soviet completes  
Cuba plane deal**

Washington (AP)—The Soviet Union has completed delivery of 20 new turboprop transport planes to Cuba, replacing older models and giving Cuba a somewhat improved troop-carrying capability, United States intelligence sources said yesterday.

Delivery of the AN-26 Curl transport planes began last fall and was completed last week. Intelligence officials said the replacement represents no significant threat to any nations in Central and South America.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 August 1979

## *Rowland Evans and Robert Novak* Latin Dominoes

A few hours before President Carter declared over prime-time television July 24 that "I do not attribute at all the change in Nicaragua to Cuba," teletype wires into the Pentagon clattered out another link in the chain of evidence to the contrary.

The pilot of a U.S. Air Force C130 in Managua that day transmitted to Washington this most interesting travel note: Members of the Sandinista junta governing Nicaragua were seen piling into a Cubana Airlines plane enroute to Havana.

A few days earlier, a U.S. intelligence report teletyped into Washington reported an even more fascinating detail. A ranking official of DGI—the Cuban secret police—played a key role in masterminding the Sandinista takeover. Julian Lopez, DGI's chief of covert operations for Costa Rica, was present in the Sandinista command bunker (located over the border in Costa Rica) during the height of Nicaraguan fighting.

This buttressed a detailed CIA report of May 2 on Cuban military aid to the Sandinistas. It also fits another piece of intelligence that the Carter administration has not publicized: Command elements of a Soviet brigade have been introduced into Cuba. In addition, some 2,000 Soviet military personnel—brigade-sized, though there is no information that they are formed into an organic military unit—are in Cuba.

While intensification of Soviet-Cuban interests in the Caribbean is either ignored or overlooked by Jimmy Carter, its meaning is well understood by his own professional analysts in national security and intelligence. Central America is going red. Only the time, not the eventual outcome, is in question, unless there is a reversal of U.S. policy.

Specifically, the president's most sophisticated advisers do not doubt that, sooner or later, the Sandinista regime will be overtly communist. Present cordiality from Managua is, like Fidel

Castro's smiles in 1959, an effort to shake down Uncle Sam before the true colors are shown.

Nor is there any doubt about what's next on the agenda: extension of the Soviet-Cuban thrust into El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras over an undefined but probably protracted period. However slowly, Central American dominoes are falling.

Havana's aims were described July 20 by Ramon Sanchez, Cuba's top envoy to Washington in an exposition of chilling candor that has received too little attention. He told a breakfast sponsored by Foreign Policy magazine that Cuba will send aid "of all sorts"—including weapons—to guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras just as it had in Nicaragua.

Sanchez issued no denials about Soviet military reinforcements in Cuba. Ties between Moscow and Havana, Castro's man in Washington proclaimed, "will continue to increase in all fields, including military collaboration."

Tomas Borges, interior minister and Marxist strongman of the Nicaraguan junta, has been similarly candid. In leaflets that appeared in Honduras immediately after the Sandinista victory, Borges promised to join forces "with the revolutionary organizations of Latin America" and hailed "development of the Central American revolution." On the leaflet's first page, a photo shows Borges in Havana with Castro.

Panicky leaders in the targeted Central American countries fix U.S. visitors with one question: Will you help us? One indirect reply came from Carter July 24 when he said, "We worked as closely as we could without intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaraguans" to let them decide "what form of government they should have."

In that, Carter administration policy was decidedly interventionist against Anastasio Somoza's regime and for the Sandinistas. U.S. pressure stopped military aid for Somoza's National Guard

from Israel and Guatemala. U.S. officials refused to supply weapons to the National Guard even in return for Somoza's resignation. The National Guard ultimately gave up, not for a lack of will but for a lack of arms.

The rationale for Carter's policy is the view, long cherished by revisionists, that Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung and maybe even Lenin would have been fond friends of the United States had not Washington rebuffed them. The theory is now being put to the test in Nicaragua.

To a worried segment of U.S. officials, including some in senior positions, this is madness. They believe the United States should have braved the propaganda barrage from the left at home and abroad, held its nose and supported the unsavory Somoza. Nicaragua is gone, but there will be further demands for tough-mindedness in Washington as the Central American dominoes slowly fall.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 2WASHINGTON WEEKLY  
9 AUGUST 1979

# Accuracy in Media

## How The Washington Post Suppressed News of Castro's Role In Nicaragua *By Reed Irvine*

WASHINGTON—The Washington Post, the most influential newspaper in the nation's capital, recently put out a booklet about itself. It included this quote from Eugene Meyer, the father of Katharine Graham, who is now the chairman of the board of the Washington Post Co.: "The first mission of a newspaper is to tell the truth as nearly as the truth may be ascertained. The newspaper shall tell ALL the truth so far as it can learn it, concerning the important affairs of America and the world."

It is ironic that this statement should be reprinted just when the Post's editors have blatantly flouted this noble principle in the reporting of the communist drive to overthrow President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua.

Nicaragua has been taken by a group of communists who have been trained, armed and supplied by Cuba, with help from Panama, Costa Rica, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Venezuela. There have been unconfirmed reports that Cuban troops were actual participants in the fighting in Nicaragua. What is perfectly clear, according to a secret CIA analysis that was leaked to the Chicago Tribune, is that Castro was up to his ears in not only training and arming the rebels, but also in giving them strategic and tactical advice.

This explains why Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told the Organization of American States on June 21 that there was "mounting evidence of the involvement by Cuba and others in the internal problems of Nicaragua." Vance did not specify the evidence, but Col. James C. Thomas, USAF (Ret.) has testified that the government had more numerous intelligence reports on the involvement of Cuba. Thomas was responsible for Latin American matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense until his retirement on May 1, 1979.

The Washington Post was perfectly well aware of all this, but it withheld the information from its readers. Incredible though it may seem, The Washington Post did not even report Secretary Vance's statement to the OAS about mounting evidence of

Cuban involvement in Nicaragua. It reported his speech, to be sure, but it omitted any mention of that passage.

Equally hard to believe is the fact that this great newspaper has to this day told its readers nothing about the revelations in that secret CIA memo of specific Cuban aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. This was front-page, banner-headline news in the Chicago Tribune on June 27. It was blacked out by The Washington Post. Post publisher Donald Graham was asked about this when he appeared on a WRC radio talk show in Washington on July 18. Mr. Graham conceded that it was the duty of the Post to tell the truth about what was happening in Nicaragua, but he claimed not to know the details of editing of specific stories.

Asked if there had been a deliberate coverup of this story by the Post, Graham said "no," but he added that they couldn't cover everything. "We are a newspaper, not an encyclopedia," he said. He said the important question was not whether they had reported on a particular memo, but "have we given the reader all that he ought to know about the details." Graham added: "I do think we've done our job of giving our readers all the sides of the story that we had access to."

What Don Graham knew but neglected to mention was that he had received a letter from me two weeks previously calling his attention to the important revelations in the Chicago Tribune about the secret memo and to other evidence that his editors were suppressing information about the role Castro was playing in the Nicaraguan fighting.

I had received a reply to this letter. It called my attention to two articles that had recently appeared in the Post. Amazingly, neither of these articles dealt with the aid that Cuba was giving to the Nicaraguan rebels! One of them was part of a story that had run in the Chicago Tribune. The Post had edited out everything in it that dealt with Castro's aid to the Nicaraguan rebels! So much for ALL the truth.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
30 July 1979

# Iran Asks U.S. to Help Probe Savak

## Agency Apparently Spent Millions Here

By Bruce van Voorst  
Time-Life News Service

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran has asked the United States to help it investigate the American activities of Savak, Iran's secret police, Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi says.

The Savak was disbanded by the new Iranian government following the fall of the shah. Iranian students attending American universities frequently claimed that, under the shah, the secret police harassed and spied on them.

Yazdi, in a wide-ranging interview, said the FBI is investigating the transfer of millions of dollars from Tehran to the Iranian Embassy in Washington.

"We are determined to track down huge amounts of money that went to Washington," the foreign minister said, "and we have asked the FBI to help us."

"Some \$19 million was spent by the ex-shah's secret police in 1976-77," he continued. "The FBI wants to know whether the Alien Registration Act was violated, and we want to know what Savak chief Mansur Rafizadeh did with \$8 million in 1976."

"There's no record of how it was spent or who got it."

Yazdi also noted that his government has asked the FBI to look into the transfer of \$11 million to the embassy during the shah's 1977 visit to Washington.

"We gave the FBI considerable evidence on both cases some six weeks ago and are waiting for results," the minister added.

(In Washington, the FBI confirmed that the request for assistance had been received and said it was still investigating.)

### Wants to Sell Back F-14s

In the interview, Yazdi also confirmed that his government has begun negotiations with the U.S. to sell back the F-14 fighter planes purchased by the shah.

"We have started talks with the intention of selling all of them, the whole system," he said. "We have no problems with the other (weapons) systems and will not be trying to sell off other military hardware."

Throughout the interview, Yazdi appeared distressed by what he feels is the failure of West and the Western press to grasp what is now occurring in his country.

"There has been a revolution. 58 years of dictatorship are over," he pointed out. "Our transition to democracy is no easier than was yours — after the American Revolution there were years of turmoil."

"We are in a period of transition," Yazdi continued. "There are no textbooks on running a country after a revolution. We have no experience."

Yazdi defended the recent expulsion of New York Times Tehran bureau chief Youssef Ibrahim. "Every country in the world has controls," he said of the expulsion. "and if a correspondent doesn't act responsibly, he must leave."

But Yazdi would not cite anything specific in Ibrahim's reporting to justify the expulsion, criticizing instead the "general tone."

Mildly irritated at a suggestion that correspondents will now be issued visas only if the "general tone" of their reporting is acceptable to the Ministry of National Guidance, Yazdi replied "We're having visa problems of our own with the States."

U.S.-based Iranian students who returned to Iran for the summer cannot get back into the United States. "We even have sick people who have appointments for surgical operations at the Texas Medical Center who can't get visas," he said.

There is, Yazdi conceded, a good deal of confusion in Iran. "There are overlapping responsibilities. But when we sit down, we resolve the problem. Take the row over Gen. Azizollah Rahimi, chief of the army military police, who challenged his military superiors and was fired."

"You had the same problem with Gen. George Brown, who said things about the Jews in America and Zionist pressure forced President Ford to apologize for the general's comments," the minister argued.

"I believe in the power of the people, and I am confident that the extremists will finally come to the middle of the road," Yazdi continued. "This is the most natural way to react to it. If we respond to such agitation measure for measure, then there will be a chain reaction and we will not get anywhere..."

"The people made the revolution," he added. "It is up to the people to correct our course. If the people were powerful enough to overthrow the shah, they have enough power to stop these wrongdoings."

Asked about his claims that the Israelis, and possibly the Americans, are responsible for the unrest in Khuzistan and Kurdistan, Yazdi said, "That depends on what you mean by 'Americans.' We know there are Zionists in the United States. We know ex-President Nixon visited the shah and stayed with him 15 hours."

"They were not playing chess or telling jokes. They were talking business. What could that be if not Iran, the fate of the shah, and the revolution?"

Yazdi took sharp issue with reference to a "parallel" clerical government alongside the provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan.

"There is no 'parallel' government," said Yazdi. He insisted that, after the election of a president and a parliament, the revolutionary councils and other semi-religious organizations will "disappear."

The foreign minister was particularly sensitive to suggestions that the draft constitution, which will probably be approved pretty much as it is, provides for an Islamic theocracy, a clerical state.

"Your vocabulary does not apply to our revolution," said the foreign minister. "Islam is not a religion in the Western sense, that is, a private faith between an individual and God. We do not have clergy, as distinct from lay citizens, and therefore under Islam there can be no clericalism."

"But I tell you there is no room either under Islam for secularism. You are seeking to define a conflict which doesn't exist."

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
31 July 1979

## U.S. Aides Liked Shah's Army Rule

By Bruce van Voorst  
Time-Life News Service

TEHRAN, Iran — Several prominent Americans enthusiastically praised the establishment of a military government by the shah last November, and even cautioned about returning too rapidly to civilian rule, according to a highly confidential document.

They included President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, CIA chief Stansfield Turner, Henry Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller, the document said. The paper's authenticity has been confirmed by Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.

In the document, a 24-page, meticulously prepared handwritten report to the shah by the then-Iranian ambassador to Washington, Arde-shir Zahedi, the envoy quotes Brzezinski's reaction to the establishment of the military regime.

"At 4:30 pm yesterday . . . Brzezinski called me and said, 'My congratulations, it was a very good decision, and it came at an opportune time. I understand from reading the (message) traffic that the British ambassador has warned the shah about some consequences. . . .'"

In his report Zahedi quoted Brzezinski as asking, "Do you want us to make a statement?" Zahedi reported that he had suggested that "perhaps after his majesty's scheduled message (to the nation) the U.S. could express the view that after this chaos it was a necessary and useful measure."

All of this was a reaction to the establishment of a military government under the former armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Gohar Reza Azhari, after a series of demonstrations and strikes and a night in which throngs burned theaters, banks, restaurants and government ministries.

Zahedi's report, which is undated but from internal evidence was written Nov. 5, has circulated in Tehran for some time but was not widely quoted because of doubts about its authenticity.

After expressing his satisfaction at the shah's decision, Zahedi wrote that Brzezinski continued, "I hope you won't fix a definitive date to replace the military government with a civilian one because in that case your hands will be tied."

"This is good news," Zahedi quotes Brzezinski as saying. "We shall inform the president immediately."

Though the British ambassador's comments are not discussed in detail, that meeting also was mentioned by Rockefeller who, according to Zahedi, "telephoned personally to congratulate me on the establishment of the military government." Rockefeller said the British ambassador emphasized to the shah the need for a coalition government and "lectured on history."

Independent reporting confirms that immediately before dissolving the civilian cabinet and establishing a military regime, the shah called in U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan and British Ambassador Sir Anthony D. Parsons to ask their views. Parsons was widely considered the most able analyst in the diplomatic corps.

According to unimpeachable sources here, Parsons told the shah, "I would not have commented, but . . . precedent shows that a military solution, after a revolution is as advanced as this, does not work."

The American ambassador, on the contrary, told the shah that "the opposition has failed to seize an excellent opportunity in your generous offer, and deserves a takeover by a military government." The shah had offered his critics several relatively minor concessions, which were treated with scorn.

Further in the Zahedi document, which was passed to the shah by his Special Bureau chief, Nosratollah Moinian, Zahedi reports that, "I talked with Admiral Turner (chief of the CIA). He believes the National Front (an umbrella political organization of several liberal democratic parties) has behaved stupidly. He said the front leaders were a bunch of snobs to turn down the shah's generous offer."

Zahedi then records that "I talked with Kissinger on the phone" and Kissinger was "happy at the news." Zahedi quotes Kissinger as describing the establishment of a military cabinet under Azhari as "the best decision his majesty has made, and if he had made it earlier perhaps there would have been fewer difficulties."


Asked recently about the Zahedi comments reported in this document, Kissinger did not question its validity, but challenged the accuracy of Zahedi's reporting.

Zahedi concludes his report by saying that he had been at a "private dinner" with a Senator "Wasserman" (the transliteration from Zahedi's writing in farsi is unclear). Carter administration official Robert S. Strauss and Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, Zahedi continued, "Ribicoff said Sen. (Howard) Baker . . . asked Ribicoff to inform his majesty that he would be a hundred percent at his majesty's service and would not spare any effort to help."

"Ribicoff talked a long time on the personality of (the shah), his leadership, the measures he has taken and the importance of Iran. He deliberately did so for the benefit of Strauss, special adviser to the president."

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WASHINGTON WEEKLY  
9 AUGUST 1979



EXCERPT:

Another Hopeful: Some people close to the CIA  
are predicting the Shah of Iran will get back on the  
Peacock Throne. . .

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
1 August 1979

## Radical Iraq Decides Its Old Marxist Allies Are Now the Villains

By Dean Breilis  
Time-Life News Service

BEIRUT, Lebanon — Iraq, supposedly the arch-radical nation of the Arab world, is waging a major assault against communism inside its borders — a process that could portend a major shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.

Last weekend, Radio Baghdad described an anti-government plot allegedly led by Communists within the government. It said five people had been arrested, including the deputy prime minister. Sources here say, however, that as many as 34 Communists have been arrested, tried and executed by firing squad. Another 250 Communist dissidents are reported to be in jail.

In 1972, the Baath Socialist Party, which rules Iraq, welcomed Communists into the National Progressive Front. But in May 1978, the marriage of convenience ended with the execution of 21 Communists for agitation within the army. In December, Communists charged with bombings were executed.

Then, in February, nearly 2,000 Iraqis accused of having Marxist leanings or sympathies were arrested, and in short order, Communist representation in the National Progressive Front was officially ended.

The crackdown and this past weekend's events are of far more than passing interest to the West. Iraq, which produces 3 million barrels of oil a day, has reserves that are the equal of, and may even exceed, Saudi Arabia's.

These oil fields are in the area along the borders with Iran, Turkey and Syria, which is traditionally also the Kurdish area of Iraq. For 17 years, Iraq fought Kurds seeking autonomy. They were aided by the CIA and the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad.

Supplies for the Kurds came through Iran, and in response, the revolutionary radicals of Iraq gave aid, comfort and sanctuary to those who were hellbent on destroying the shah.

But in March 1975, the shah cut off the Kurds' supply route. In return, Baghdad promised it would no longer support Marxist and Islamic insurgents inside and outside Iran.

Last year, Iraq expelled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who for 17 years had been allowed to use Iraq as a base from which he inspired Iran's anti-shah revolution. The shah, in turn, persuaded the CIA and the Mossad to withdraw support of Kurds inside Iraq.

With the revolution in Iran, however, Iraq's Kurds are back on the warpath, this time, Iraq says, with the encouragement of Iranian Marxists who are awaiting an opportunity to gain control of the Iranian revolution.

Marxist Islamics, once the darlings of the Baghdad regime, have thus become today's villains.

If the Kurds were to win, the prize would be the oil fields of Iraq.

Leaders in Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq consider the threat immediate and pressing. The result, according to some unconfirmed reports, has been an overnight, secret military alliance between the conservative Saudis and the formerly radical and pro-Marxist Iraqis.

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AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN  
21 July 1979

# *Ex-agent says CIA covertly recruits at UT*

By CAROL THURSTON  
American-Statesman Staff

Former CIA agent John Stockwell of Austin said Friday that the CIA is covertly recruiting professors and students on the University of Texas campus and other major schools in Texas.

Interviewed on "Texas Weekly," a local public television program, Stockwell said six case officers operate undercover from an attorney's office in Dallas to recruit professors and students on the campuses of Southwest Conference universities and Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. He said no single operative works each campus, because "they would be too likely to become known.

"They travel around with a bunch of business cards, each carrying a different identity," Stockwell said. "One will meet a professor, who will introduce him to students under one name. A few days later, he works with other targets, using a different name and cover story." Stockwell said he does not think the UT administration knows about the recruiting.

Stockwell said the students are recruited primarily to spy in other countries. Prime targets, he said, are foreign students who might be "massaged" for a year with favors, gifts and small retainers from people they are led to believe are American businessmen planning to invest in their countries. By the time the student is told of the CIA connection, Stockwell said, he's usually in so deep, he signs up as an agent.

Stockwell was a CIA agent in Angola before he resigned in 1977. His book, "In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story," condemns the agency for its role in the Angolan war, a conflict in which he says he was a major operative.



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THE DAILY TEXAN (U. of Texas)  
25 July 1979

# CIA recruitment criticized

By LYNNE NIEMIEC

Six CIA operatives are working out of a Dallas attorney's office to covertly recruit students to act as informants, a former CIA agent said last Friday.

John Stockwell, a 12-year member of the CIA and former chief of the Angolan Task Force, said the operatives cover all Southwest Conference schools and Louisiana State

University.

Professors working for the CIA set up interviews with students, Stockwell said. While students are unaware the interviews are with the CIA, Stockwell added that nearly all the professors involved are aware of the purpose of the interviews.

"Third World elite students and students about to study in foreign countries" are prime candidates for CIA recruitment, Stockwell said.

Students are told by the operatives that they will be acting as consultants for a large company planning to invest large amounts of money in the student's home country.

Students who agree to act as consultants are not told they have been acting as informants until they are too involved to get out of the arrangement, Stockwell added.

Stockwell quit the CIA in 1977 and was offered a job as a covert student recruiter before quitting.

Stockwell said the operatives rotate campuses to keep from becoming known. Various cover stories and business credentials are used in each visit.

**STOCKWELL SAID** Money is no problem in CIA operations and some professors who deliver top candidates are paid as much as \$1,000 per month.

Stockwell said, however, that the "Walter Mitty factor" is the main reason professors become involved in the recruitment program. "What can be more satisfying than to have a real secret life," Stockwell said. "People like to feel a little more important than they are."

Dale Patterson, chief of media relations for CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., said Tuesday, "I have no comment whatsoever about the program."

KARL SCHMITT, chairman of the government department, said he had never heard of the program, as did other University professors and department spokesmen.

Stockwell said he believes the CIA should be shut down because "secrecy doesn't breed quality. Secrecy breeds mistakes."

"It is common for the CIA to be off in its intelligence information," Stockwell said.

Stockwell said he believes in what he calls the "Allen Dulles school of intelligence." That school holds that "the operative should be known by the people so the people know who to tell secrets to," he added.

Stockwell said he does not believe the oath of secrecy that CIA agents take is valid and said it is "used to intimidate and suppress by the CIA."

"It is preposterous. It's impossible. You can't sign someone at 25 and then expose them to crimes and then wave a piece of paper at them. It wouldn't stand up in court."

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 August 1979

# Proposed First Charter for FBI Makes Bipartisan Debut

By Charles R. Babcock  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration mustered an impressive array of bipartisan support yesterday for the official unveiling of the first legislative charter for the FBI.

A parade of speakers including Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and White House aide Stuart Eizenstat lauded the proposed legislation as a careful balance designed to protect American citizens from a recurrence of past FBI abuses while at the same time strengthening the nation's top investigative agency.

Despite the litany of praise at yesterday's ceremony at FBI headquarters, it seems clear that several provisions of the proposed charter will be sharply debated.

Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed some reservations in a statement delivered when he introduced the bill. An aide

said later that Kennedy agreed to sponsor the troublesome provisions for now to "focus debate on the issues."

Rep. Don Edwards (D-Calif.), chairman of a House Judiciary subcommittee that also will hold hearings on the bill, said he plans some changes, too.

The American Civil Liberties Union and several other groups monitoring criminal justice activities also announced opposition to parts of the bill.

Among likely areas of controversy:

- Whether the "criminal standard" required for triggering investigations is adequately defined, especially in cases involving suspected terrorist groups.

The charter would give the FBI authority to conduct investigations "on the basis of facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that a person has engaged, is engaged or will engage in an activity in violation of a criminal law of the United States."

- The need for expanded FBI powers to make "investigative demands"—similar to administrative subpoenas—for phone, insurance and credit records, and to investigate terrorist activities that violate state but not federal laws.

- Creation of broad exemptions from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act if the FBI director decides public disclosure might compromise investigative techniques.

- Lack of specific enforcement provisions for violations of the charter, and a vague section outlining the extent of congressional oversight.

The bill introduced yesterday is the product of more than a year of deliberations by Justice Department, FBI, White House and congressional leaders.

FBI Director William H. Webster has emphasized that the charter is not being forced on the bureau, but is being welcomed as a document that

clearly outlines the powers and limits of an agent's authority.

The charter establishes a series of "principles" which say the FBI will focus its attention on criminal conduct, not lawful religious or political groups, and will use "minimal intrusion" in its investigations.

The language then spells out how the broad "principles" will be applied. In many instances, this will be by "guidelines" drawn up by the attorney general.

Attorneys involved in drafting the bill said a section-by-section analysis also will be important in establishing the intent of the framers.

The charter would replace the single paragraph of federal law that now provides the FBI with its operating authority.

President Carter said in a statement to the Congress that "the controversies of past years," such as spying on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and

other activists, "are in some degree attributable to this lack of statutory direction."

Carter added that enactment of the charter "will enable FBI agents to carry out their duties with greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness."

Bell and his successor, Benjamin R. Civiletti—who was unanimously approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and is expected to be confirmed as early as today, gave special credit to the groundwork laid by former attorney general Edward H. Levi.

Levi, who returned to the University of Chicago Law School after serving in the Ford administration, said with a smile that he assumed he was invited "as kind of a gracious token" that the problems of law enforcement continue in succeeding administrations. The internal guidelines the FBI now operates under were first set up by Levi in 1976.

Rep. Peter Rodino (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee also endorsed the charter bill yesterday.

John Shattuck, director of the ACLU's Washington office, issued a statement commending the administration for introducing the bill, but he said the FBI charter should "directly address" issues raised by past violations of civil rights. For instance, he said, the charter doesn't specifically prohibit spying on political groups.

Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), a cosponsor of the bill, also expressed reservations about a lack of enforcement provisions, and said the standard for investigating alleged terrorists was too loose. But, like several other critics of specific provisions, he said he welcomed the draft charter as a well-developed starting point for debate.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE **A-8**NEW YORK TIMES  
1 AUGUST 1979

## Proposed Charter Governing F.B.I. Unveiled by Carter Administration

By PHILIP TAUBMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 31 — The Carter Administration today formally unveiled its proposed governing charter for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The charter, which would be the first for the bureau, restricts but does not prohibit such: controversial investigative techniques as the use of informers, undercover agents and covert criminal activity.

President Carter, in a message sent to Congress with the legislation, said, "The public must be assured that the F.B.I. is acting properly under the law. This charter strikes the proper balance between assuring that the civil liberties guaranteed to Americans by our Constitution are protected and that the F.B.I. can fully pursue its appropriate functions."

The charter specifies the powers and duties of the bureau, establishing precise standards and procedures for the conduct of investigations. It creates safeguards against harassment of citizens, break-ins and other past abuses.

The safeguards take the form of governing principles for the bureau, guidelines for conduct to be laid down by the Attorney General, and specific restrictions on some investigative work. The charter also contains extensive list of internal procedures to be followed by agents and informers.

### Allows Continued Surveillance

At the same time, it allows the continued use of electronic surveillance with court approval, it authorizes illegal actions in certain circumstances, and it increases the bureau's access to such confidential information as bank records without a grand jury subpoena.

The charter sent to Congress today contains no major changes from an earlier draft that was obtained in May by several news organizations, including The New York Times.

The charter is an outgrowth of disclosures about abuses by the bureau under J. Edgar Hoover. These included burglaries, mail thefts and the use of informers and illegal surveillance against such groups as the Black Panther Party, the Weather Underground and the Socialist Workers Party.

The bureau has been operating for three years under guidelines established by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi to prevent the continuation of such abuses. The charter is an effort to go one step further and put the bureau under permanent, statutory control.

### Statement by Kennedy

Mr. Levi endorsed the charter today at a ceremony at F.B.I. headquarters, as did the chairmen and ranking Republican members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and his designated successor, Benjamin R. Civiletti, F.B.I. Director William H. Webster and Stuart E. Eizenstat, assistant to the President for domestic affairs.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chair-

man of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who played a major role in preparing the draft, said, "The charter symbolizes the fact that the bureau has learned from its mistakes and come forward with a charter which will insure that the chronicled abuses of the past will not be repeated."

Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the senior minority member of the committee, said he planned to support the charter, indicating that it will not face major conservative opposition.

But the charter faces serious obstacles to enactment in its present form, primarily from liberal critics. Dozens of civil liberties groups oppose specific provisions, including those that permit the continued use of electronic surveillance, give the bureau access to private financial records, and approve the use of lawyers and journalists as paid informers.

Civil liberties groups are also concerned that the charter would exempt the bureau from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and would allow the destruction of bureau records that critics say detail past abuses. They also contend that the charter fails to provide for sufficient Congressional oversight.

Jerry J. Berman, legislative counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union, said, "We support the concept of an F.B.I. charter and believe that this draft does recognize principles essential to controlling the bureau, but we think that a great deal of change is necessary to insure that the principles are fully embodied."

### Plans to Review Charter

Senator Kennedy, aware of these concerns, said the Judiciary Committee would carefully review, and probably revise, sections of the charter. Hearings are scheduled to begin on Thursday, though serious consideration of the charter is not expected to begin until September.

According to Congressional sources, the F.B.I. charter stands a better chance of passage than a proposed charter to govern agencies involved in foreign intelligence operations, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The foreign intelligence charter bogged down in the Senate last year. Its supporters have been negotiating with the Carter Administration to resolve their differences and expect the introduction of a new charter in the Senate in September.

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THE WASHINGTONIAN  
August 1979

# **The Million Dollar Out of the White House Give Them the Heat But Always Stay Cool Shapeless Sport Coat Known as Bill Safire**

By Vic Gold

(EXCERPT FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM SAFIRE)

Safire: "Nobody around here tells me what to write or not to write. I'm my own man, limited only by the laws of libel, which don't concern me because I know that I harbor no malice, and even more important, I have a high regard for the truth. Before I turn in a piece, I've checked it out thoroughly, and working for the *Times* I've had the benefit of watching the best in the business, pros like Sy Hersh. I have a lot of respect for Hersh, but I doubt if I'll learn to use the telephone as well as he does. He's one of the best badgerers in town, and to be successful in investigative reporting you have to know how to badger, to stay after people in positions of power who want to stonewall on stories. Take Stansfield Turner. Now Turner, there's the guy who was supposed to open the doors and let in fresh air at the CIA, and he won't even return calls. I interpret that as a sign of weakness, a sure indication that what I'm dealing with is a public official who can't stand the heat."

It is 2 PM and Bill Safire, having lunched on a chef's salad at Duke Zeibert's, is back in his office, waiting for the one call that will wrap up his day. On schedule, the phone rings. It is not Stansfield Turner, but the columnist's source on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, "the one guy," as he describes him, "who hasn't been talked to by anybody else." But now he'll talk to Safire, as, sooner or later, will Stansfield Turner, if he stays in the kitchen long enough. It's inevitable, given Safire's talent for being in the right place at the right time: Jimmy Carter's CIA director will either call him back or one day find himself trapped in the barber's chair at Milton Pitts's establishment, with Bill Safire there to pull up a stool. □

THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
23 July 1979

## Documents Reveal CIA Probed U.S. Students

WASHINGTON

Newly released documents reveal that Walt W. Rostow commissioned a Central Intelligence Agency investigation of domestic student dissidence in the 1960's while he was President Johnson's national security adviser.

The documents, known within the agency as the "Family Jewels" because of their sensitive nature, were prepared in response to a 1973 request by James Schlesinger, who was then director of the C.I.A., for reports on all activities that might be considered beyond the agency's legislative charter. The charter limits the C.I.A.'s activity to conducting foreign intelligence operations.

### 1968 Report

The 1973 documents were obtained last week under the Freedom of Information Act by the Center for National Security Studies, a privately financed research group whose purpose is to reform activities of the intelligence agencies.

According to the Family Jewels, a report on worldwide student unrest entitled "Restless Youth" was commissioned in 1968 because, "confronted by tumult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was disconnected."

One section of the "Restless Youth" report "drew heavily on overseas literature and F.B.I. reporting

on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups," the document said. "Because S.D.S. was a domestic organization, the full paper 'Restless Youth,' including the essay on worldwide dissent, went only to nine readers."

The Center for National Security Studies said, "The documents reveal for the first time that satellite photography was used by the C.I.A. to analyze domestic disturbances." It reached that conclusion because satellite spying was mentioned along with other reports of C.I.A. spying on U. S. dissident groups, including statements that:

► "D.C.S. [the Domestic Contact Service] collects information on foreign students studying in the U. S."

► "D.C.S. collects information on physicians practicing in the U. S. who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals)."

► "O.C.I. [the Office of Current Intelligence], in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the U. S. anti-war movement and worldwide student dissidence (including the S.D.S.) at the request of the White House."

In the same section, the report said, "N.P.I.C. [the C.I.A. National Photographic Interpretation Center] and COMIREX [the National Foreign Intelligence Board's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation] 'review satellite imagery from N.A.S.A. programs to identify photography too 'sensitive' for public release.'"

—CATHERINE MYERS

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH  
18 July 1979

## ***Further CIA Abuses***

Another apparently illegal activity by the Central Intelligence Agency has come to light with the disclosure that the agency used intelligence satellites in the late 1960s to spy on American students engaged in anti-war demonstrations. Although the 1947 law setting up the CIA explicitly forbade it to exercise law enforcement or internal security functions, the agency undertook its domestic spying on the pretext that it was looking for "possible foreign connections with the U.S. anti-war movement." None was found.

Whatever the excuse was for spying on citizens, the operation — ordered at the request of the Johnson White House — was clearly not a proper one for the CIA. It represented an interference with what was supposed to be a constitutionally protected activity. This undermining of citizen rights is only the latest example of many such CIA excesses. It was exposed through documents obtained through a suit under the Freedom of Information Act.

Yet the CIA is trying to get itself more broadly exempted from compliance with the FOI law. And it is resisting more stringent restraints in a projected new agency charter. Since the public still does not know how many law violations and other abuses (compiled in a 693-page internal document) have not been revealed, this is no time to weaken the FOI act. And a great deal of evidence already points to the need for a strict charter.

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 3BST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH  
23 JULY 1979

# editorials

## Assassination Committee Reports

The recently completed investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations has not resolved, once and for all, the questions surrounding the murders of President John F. Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. On the contrary, it has raised new ones, by suggesting that both crimes involved conspiracies. Heretofore, the nation had been assured that Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray were "lone assassins."

The committee suggested that the conspiracy to murder President Kennedy may have involved the Mafia or anti-Castro Cubans, and that the King murder may have stemmed from an offer by two St. Louis area men to pay \$50,000 to anyone who murdered the civil rights leader. Although the idea that James Earl Ray acted entirely alone has always been suspect, the evidence connecting him with the St. Louis offer is only circumstantial.

Ultimately, the committee left it up to the Justice Department to sort out which of many possible conspiracies may have actually figured in the Kennedy and King slayings. But insofar as there are leads to be pursued, they should be.

If the sometimes controversial investigation came up short of conclusive proof, it did develop new evidence in both cases. In the process it has also exposed the deficiencies of the Warren Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiries into the killings and revealed numerous instances of the abuse of official power, intergovernmental in-fighting and cover-ups. In particular, it shed new light on the sordid connections between the CIA and orga-

nized crime in a joint effort to murder Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, and focused public attention, if only briefly, on the CIA's torture of a defecting Soviet agent who was thought to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald.

The deadly seriousness of the committee's work was underscored by the deaths of three Mafia figures linked to the anti-Castro plot. In some instances, executioners struck just prior to their victim's giving testimony to the committee. There were other deaths associated with the investigation, as well, including the apparent suicide of George de Mohrenschildt, an exiled Russian aristocrat who had befriended the Oswalds in Dallas. He died shortly after allegedly telling a Dutch journalist that he played a role in the Kennedy murder and only hours after a member of the committee's staff tried to reach him about testifying.

The committee also showed that the FBI, charged with investigating the King murder, had been involved in a conspiracy to discredit him and other black civil rights leaders and "militants." It identified the FBI's smear campaign for what it was — "morally reprehensible, illegal, felonious and unconstitutional."

Perhaps the most important recommendation the committee made was that the House give "early consideration" to legislation outlining the "proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the intelligence and investigative agencies." It may never be possible to completely protect a president and other leaders from private conspiracies, but it should be possible — indeed, it is essential — to bring the CIA and FBI under the rule of law.

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PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY  
23 JULY 1979

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**THE BUREAU: My Thirty Years in  
Hoover's FBI**

*William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown.*  
Norton. \$12.95 ISBN 0-393-01236-0

Certain to be widely discussed, this devastating exposé of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover packs all the more punch because Sullivan, who died shortly after completing this book, was the number three man in the bureau when he was forced out in 1971. Joined by Brown, best known as a television writer, he lays bare many secrets to document his claim that the long-time director was a danger to his agency and to the country. Concerned almost exclusively with the images of the FBI and himself, Hoover, according to the author, was only secondarily interested in crime and subversion, which, the author adds, explains why he never went after the Mafia and why he never gathered data about terrorists until forced to. Hoover is presented here as anti-Semitic and antiblack, sympathetic only toward those with power and dictatorial toward those without. Sullivan convincingly debunks the Hoover myth, a regime he himself worked under for 30 years. [September 24]

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 43THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
30 July 1979

# Administration Orders FBI to Find Leak to N.Y. Times

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Carter administration has ordered the FBI to find the source of a national security leak to The New York Times that has been described as "much more serious" than generally believed.

The leak, according to informed sources, involved a Times report that the United States plans to use electronic surveillance equipment already in place in Norway to help verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the SALT II treaty.

"What we are trying to do now is throw the fear of the Lord into some people," a high-ranking government official said, but he admitted there seemed little chance of apprehending the sources for the Times articles.

In fact, a well-informed official said, the leaked story is incorrect, and this fact could only have been known to a handful of people in the U.S. government.

This official said in reality there are geographical factors that make it impossible for electronic listening posts in Norway to take the place of the American "ears" that once monitored Soviet rocket and missile activity in central Asia from the lost bases in Iran. At best, the Norwegian listening posts can only pick up telemetry and radio signals from missiles being tested in the USSR.

The United States for years has made use of facilities at Bodo and other bases in Norway for certain

types of electronic monitoring of the Soviet Union.

But officials said Washington never had any intention of trying to convert the facilities in Norway to more sophisticated use because of the loss of the Iranian sites and the possibility that Turkey might refuse to permit the American U-2 reconnaissance planes from Turkish bases.

"The geography is all wrong," an official said. "The real problem is the extreme sensitivity of Norway about any finger-pointing about their role in watching over what goes on inside the Soviet Union."

Only a limited number of Norwegians have any idea of what goes on up there, an official said, and the United States has never advertised

that there are various types of facilities in place in Norway.

Earlier this month, however, Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli himself said Norway would be willing to let the United States set up listening posts for monitoring Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty if both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed.

The Times reported on July 13 that the FBI had begun an investigation at the request of CIA Director Stansfield Turner. Turner was reported to be furious at the leak and demanded an investigation in a letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell. FBI officials declined to discuss the matter, but it has become evident that an investigation by FBI agents is under way.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-7PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
30 JULY 1979CIA informer

# Dooley: Was he a saint?

By Patrick J. Buchanan

WASHINGTON — The resident "ombudsman" of the Washington press was transparently shaken. "The press," he wrote, "is used to being the messenger bearing bad news. . . . But of late it has been obliged to be as well the messenger bearing news that defies belief."

"Item: A doctor, now dead, so admired for his good works that he is being proposed for Roman Catholic sainthood, turns out to have been a regular informant of the CIA."

The "doctor, now dead," is Tom Dooley, legendary figure from the '50s, being considered for canonization for having given the best and last years of an abbreviated life ministering to the victims of poverty, disease and communism in Southeast Asia.

Though he "soared swiftly to fame as a paragon of brave, compassionate works . . . the late jungle doctor left a record that has become clouded." So led the Associated Press report.

An "ambiguous legacy," concluded one contributor to the Religious News Service.

And what crime against decency did Dooley commit that "defies belief," that left his record "clouded," his legacy "ambiguous"?

Well, documents recently unearthed reveal that during his six years of service to the persecuted peoples of Indochina, Dooley regularly informed American intelligence on the movement of Communist ammunition and troops.

Presumably, siding with the United States in the twilight struggle against communism has become a disqualification for the communion of saints. Apparently, one can no longer be both an American patriot and a soldier of Christ.

Was there ever any doubt as to where Dooley stood in the struggle between freedom and communism?

There should not have been. Dooley's first book, "Deliver Us From Evil," contains a foreword by Adm. Arleigh Burke and is dedicated: "To the men of the U.S. Navy and the courageous escapees of North Vietnam who, together, have shown me the true nobility of life."

In that book, Dooley recounts numerous episodes which might help us understand why a man can be both a committed Christian and a hater of communism.

"Now, the two Viet Minh guards went to each child and one of them firmly grasped the head between his hands. The other then rammed a wooden chopstick into each ear. He jammed it with all his force. The stick split the ear canal wide and tore the ear drum. The shrieking of the children was heard all over the village.

"Both ears were stabbed in this fashion. The children screamed and wrestled and suffered horribly. Since their hands were tied behind them, they could not pull the wood out of their ears. They shook their heads and squirmed about, trying to make the sticks fall out. Finally, they were able to dislodge them by scraping their heads against the ground."

The crime these children had committed was secret attendance at religious classes, learning the catechism. Their teacher — whom Dooley treated as well as the children — had his tongue torn out by a pair of pliers in front of the children.

Surely, a merciful God will forgive Dooley telling the CIA the whereabouts of the troops who committed these atrocities — even if his moral superiors among our capital elite cannot absolve him for being an American patriot.

INTELLIGENCER (WHEELING, WEST VA.)  
10 July 1979

## Going Too Far

The American penchant for some drastic steps — too drastic over compensation is obvious in many contend — to see that the the shenanigans of something questionable practices were called the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*.

The publication, which says it is out to destroy the Central Intelligence Agency, has been periodically publishing the names of persons it alleges to be CIA agents working under diplomatic cover in foreign countries.

Its latest "hit list" — that could be an apt description since in some instances the publication is jeopardizing the very lives of some of the people they identify as U.S. spies — has 20 persons, including three women, named as alleged CIA agents.

The publication adds these names to scores of others it has identified throughout the world as CIA or National Security agents. It is also promoting a book by renegade CIA official Philip Agee which names hundreds of alleged agents.

This is, of course, a carryover from the Watergate days in Washington when most extensions of the executive branch of government were being looked at with a jaundiced eye.

Congress delved deeply into the abuses being worked on foreigners and Americans by the intelligence communities and took

Even the Congress, which tends to get carried away in the heat of passion and public opinion, did not contemplate doing away with with the CIA.

We simply cannot function in today's rapidly changing world without our leaders being privy to information on movements and actions in foreign lands which threaten to have a profound impact on our lives.

What has been described as our shocking lack of information about the true situation in Iran and the consequences the Muslim takeover there held for us is often cited as one of the factors involved in our current gasoline crisis.

Of course, if we wish to present ourselves to the world as a civilized nation, there must be limits beyond which our intelligence and counter-intelligence forces cannot go, but the Congress has, and is, monitoring this closely.

What we don't need is a group of citizens who have taken it upon themselves to be the conscience of this nation by trying to eliminate our intelligence gathering forces and in doing so, jeopardize the future of every American.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
1 August 1979

## Sharp Problems at Soviet Bank's Branch In Singapore Are Described in CIA Study

By JIM DRINKHALL  
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

"Considerable losses" by Soviet banks operating outside the U.S.S.R. led to a Soviet government directive in 1977 ordering the institutions to curtail "drastically" their commercial banking activities, a report by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency contended.

One of the major causes of that decision, the CIA said, was a severe financial problem at the Singapore branch of London-based Moscow Narodny Bank. And the problem at the Singapore branch was much worse and began much earlier than the Soviets previously stated.

Those assessments and other details are contained in a series of documents prepared by the CIA between 1972 and 1977. The documents provide a rare glimpse into the highly secretive world of Soviet banking.

Moscow Narodny Bank, owned by a group of Soviet banks and registered in Britain, was set up in 1919 to finance East-West trade, but has since ventured into all kinds of banking activities. It has two branches, one in Beirut and the one set up in Singapore in 1972.

### Loud Clothes and Manners

When the Singapore branch opened in March 1972, one CIA report said, Singapore bankers described the Soviets "as acting more boisterous than the wildest Americans, complete with loud clothes and manners. While providing some amusement, these actions weren't endearing them to the Oriental banking community."

Also, the CIA said, the branch's Soviet manager, V.I. Ryzhkov, was buying a 21-bedroom house for the current equivalent of \$220,000.

While the CIA expected the Moscow Narodny Singapore branch to operate in an as "thoroughly capitalistic" manner as its London parent, it also quoted a source as saying the bank would be "the funding mechanism for intelligence operations in Hong Kong and Indonesia."

Banking sources as well as the CIA said the branch's "primary asset" was its local operating manager, P.K. Teo, a banker with an "excellent reputation" and "excellent credentials."

### Serious Difficulties

But in a June 1973 intelligence report, the CIA was saying that the bank was in "serious financial difficulties because of an overextension of credits."

Another report said that because of its "extremely liberal" lending policy, Moscow Narodny was said to be making loans "as if its supply were unlimited, mainly to customers who had been turned away as poor risks by other banks." Continued another: "Moscow Narodny borrows money from local banks (in Singapore) at 11% and lends the same money at 9%."

Loans weren't the only problem at the bank in 1973, the documents said. A January 1974 CIA report specified how the Soviets discovered that two senior employees at the bank secretly honored \$1.5 million in bad checks issued by a friend. The Soviets fired the two, the report said, but apparently never recovered the money. "This swindle is the most recent and most serious of large financial losses" at the bank, the report said.

Also in 1973, another Moscow Narodny borrower, the Vashi department store chain in Singapore, went out of business, according to one document, and the bank "was caught flat-footed and lost its entire investment."

About the same time, another report said, "Soviet banking authorities are very concerned" about the bank "collecting on

outstanding loans of over \$800 million. Almost 80% of this was loaned to a group of less than 200 local (Singapore) businessmen."

In 1973, considerable publicity was given the bank when the businesses of one of its borrowers, Singapore businessman Arura Dawe, began foundering. Moscow Narodny said its loans to him totaled \$40 million, while Mr. Dawe said they were about \$82 million. A 1976 CIA report said then that the bank "lost \$100 million rather than the publicity stated \$40 million."

Mr. Dawe, who has asserted ties to the CIA, is barely mentioned in this series of CIA documents, though court records show the agency has numerous reports on him.

Published reports have described Mr. Dawe as Moscow Narodny's biggest borrower, but a March 1974 CIA report gives that title to another Singapore businessman, Ng Tee Fong, who reportedly borrowed \$240 million and was in financial trouble then.

Moscow Narodny's London office has never disclosed financial data for its Singapore branch, but a CIA report, quoting from the branch's financial records, said without giving any details that at year-end 1974, the bank had assets currently equivalent to \$1.35 billion with total loans outstanding of \$709.2 million.